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Abstract
With the rapid growth of the Internet and digital communications, the volume of sensitive elec-
tronic transactions being transferred and stored over and on insecure media has increased dramat-
ically in recent years. The growing demand for cryptographic systems to secure this data, across
a multitude of platforms, ranging from large servers to small mobile devices and smart cards,
has necessitated research into low cost, flexible and secure solutions. As constraints on architec-
tures such as area, speed and power become key factors in choosing a cryptosystem, methods for
speeding up the development and evaluation process are necessary.
This thesis investigates flexible hardware architectures for the main components of a cryptographic
system. Dedicated hardware accelerators can provide significant performance improvements when
compared to implementations on general purpose processors. Each of the designs proposed are
analysed in terms of speed, area, power, energy and efficiency. Field Programmable Gate Arrays
(FPGAs) are chosen as the development platform due to their fast development time and reconfig-
urable nature.
Firstly, a reconfigurable architecture for performing elliptic curve point scalar multiplication on
an FPGA is presented. Elliptic curve cryptography is one such method to secure data, offering
similar security levels to traditional systems, such as RSA, but with smaller key sizes, translating
into lower memory and bandwidth requirements. The architecture is implemented using differ-
ent underlying algorithms and coordinates for dedicated Double-and-Add algorithms, twisted Ed-
wards algorithms and SPA secure algorithms, and its power consumption and energy on an FPGA
XV
measured. Hardware implementation results for these new algorithms are compared against their
software counterparts and the best choices for minimum area-time and area-energy circuits are
then identified and examined for larger key and field sizes.
Secondly, implementationmethods for another component of a cryptographic system, namely hash
functions, developed in the recently concluded SHA-3 hash competition are presented. Various
designs from the three rounds of the NIST run competition are implemented on FPGA along
with an interface to allow fair comparison of the different hash functions when operating in a
standardised and constrained environment. Different methods of implementation for the designs
and their subsequent performance is examined in terms of throughput, area and energy costs using
various constraint metrics.
Comparing many different implementation methods and algorithms is nontrivial. Another aim
of this thesis is the development of generic interfaces used both to reduce implementation and
test time and also to enable fair baseline comparisons of different algorithms when operating in a
standardised and constrained environment.
Finally, a hardware-software co-design cryptographic architecture is presented. This architecture
is capable of supporting multiple types of cryptographic algorithms and is described through an
application for performing public key cryptography, namely the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature
Algorithm (ECDSA). This architecture makes use of the elliptic curve architecture and the hash
functions described previously. These components, along with a random number generator, pro-
vide hardware acceleration for a Microblaze based cryptographic system. The trade-off in terms
of performance for flexibility is discussed using dedicated software, and hardware-software co-
design implementations of the elliptic curve point scalar multiplication block. Results are then
presented in terms of the overall cryptographic system.
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1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
With the rapid growth of the Internet and digital communications, the need for protecting files and
other information stored on, and transmitted between computers has become of vital importance.
Part of the requirement for trusted computing are cryptographic algorithms, used as network secu-
rity measures to protect data during transmission. The successful deployment of these electronic
systems for cloud computing and virtual private networks (VPN), data communications, mobile
commerce, internet banking and public-key infrastructures (PKI) amongst others, is dependent on
the effectiveness of the underlying security.
1.1. MOTIVATION
Cryptography, the study and practice of secret or secure data communication in the presence of
adversarial third parties, and cryptanalysis, the study of breaking the same secret or secure mes-
sages, as subjects have been studied for many centuries. While initially being the preserve of
governments, advances in technology and communication in the latter half of the last century has
resulted in cryptography becoming a widespread tool in the public domain, through the use of
third party security management and corporate data access and storage. Systems such as personal
computers, smart cards, wireless mobile phone and smartphone technology, along with network
appliances including web servers, firewalls, routers and gateways all depend on cryptography in
their day to day general use.
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Figure 1.1: Cost-Performance-Security Tradeoff
This rapid growth in communication technology also makes information more easily accessed and
available to abuse. Perceived private information can be exposed by eavesdroppers. Data can be
fraudently altered for the benefit of adversaries. Systems can be hacked to perform operations
other than those intended by their owners. As such, it is vital that these communication systems
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be made secure through the use of cryptography.
In addition to these security concerns is the use of these security algorithms in resource constrained
environments such as smart cards. Low power, more functionality, high speed in real-time systems
and longer battery life all add additional requirements which need to be considered in current and
future secure communications applications. Figure 1.1 describes the Cost-Performance-Security
Tradeoff modified from [1]. Any design involves tradeoff and the metrics are all interrelated.
Therefore it is usually the case that enhancing one metric will comes at a cost of another metric.
It is very difficult to optimize all design goals at the same time. For example, using a pipelining
technique can be used to provide high throughput and inbuilt security against side-channel attacks
but at a cost of area and complexity.
1.2 Thesis Aims
The primary aim of this thesis is to analyse and develop flexible hardware which can be used as
components of a cryptographic system, thereby allowing a basic implementation of information
security applications such as such as digital signatures, message authentication codes (MACs), and
other forms of authentication, such as key exchange, the purpose of which include, confidentiality,
authentication, integrity and non-repudiation. Figure 1.2 shows a generic overview of a model
for an elliptic curve based cryptosystem. High performance in the top three layers is directly
dependent on the efficiency in computation of the bottom three layers. This thesis examines and
implements each of these layers, along with the primitives defined in layer four and attempts to
find the best algorithms and implementations for efficient use in the top two layers.
Cryptographic algorithms can be implemented in hardware or software. There have been recent
increases in data rate speeds, along with an ongoing increase both in the size and the mathemat-
ical complexity of security protocols, as cryptanalysis becomes more feasible due to the amount
and availability of better and cheaper hardware following Moore’s law [2]. While it is relatively
easy to implement cryptographic algorithms in software, difficulties arise. Some systems require
3
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a large number of transactions in a short space of time, i.e. network routers, firewalls and cloud
computing, while other devices require resource constrained systems, i.e. smartphones and smart-
cards.
Dedicated hardware to perform cryptographic operations can help to alleviate both of these needs
at the same time. It can achieve high system performance while still maintaining good security
at low power. A dedicated circuit will have a lower power consumption than a general purpose
processor. In this way, mathematically complex and time consuming calculations can be offloaded
to dedicated hardware blocks thus reducing processor usage and potential bottlenecks. Both of
these factors combine to offer potential savings that could offset the initial cost of the design of
dedicated hardware.
One particular disadvantage of dedicated hardware is in its inherent rigid structure. Custom hard-
ware tends to perform one particular function. In modern systems, cryptographic advances due to
faster [3] or more secure algorithms [4,5], or inherent weaknesses found in current systems [6–8],
can result in costly (both in development time and in deployment and roll-out) systems being
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superceded by the next technology advance after a shelf-life of only a few years. Therefore, flex-
ibility, while being less efficient than dedicated hardware, is also a major requirement for any
commercially viable system to allow both new algorithms and protocols to be easily implemented,
while also maintaining support for existing and even legacy systems.
One such method to allow this flexibility is through the use of Field Programmable Gate Arrays
(FPGA). FPGAs are an attractive choice for implementing cryptographic algorithms as they allow
rapid prototyping of designs, and can be re-programmed in-place when adopting security protocol
upgrades. Another aim of this thesis is to implement cryptographic designs, (i.e. layer 2 and
3 of Figure 1.2), which can be quickly and easily configured to support various area or speed
implementations dependent on the availability of resources and the particular metrics required.
This can be achieved through the reconfigurable logic of FPGAs.
Power analysis attack can provide detailed information by observing the power consumption of
a hardware device. These attacks are roughly categorized into simple power analysis (SPA) and
differential power analysis (DPA). Algorithmically secure countermeasures such as dummy arith-
metic operations, unified formulæ and regular structures can be used to reduce the information
available to an attacker. Some of these security methods used in elliptic curve cryptography are
examined in this thesis.
While security is the most important criterion for a new cryptographic function, performance is
arguably almost as important. Analysis of these cryptographic functions and algorithms in the
literature tend to be examined and reported on almost exclusively in software. The metrics and
computation cost used for software are often quite different to those used in hardware. A third
aim of this thesis is to examine various new algorithms used in elliptic curve cryptography and
hash functions for use in hardware, (i.e. layer 4 from Figure 1.2). An analysis of these designs
for throughput, area, and energy is performed for differing key sizes (the size of the key is directly
related to the security of the system; the larger the key size, the greater the security level) and
design variants; where different versions of the same base design present higher security or higher
speed options. Speed increases due to parallelisation is also examined.
5
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Comparing many different implementation methods and algorithms is nontrivial. Another aim
of this thesis is the development of generic interfaces used both to reduce implementation and
test time and also to enable fair baseline comparisons of different algorithms when operating in a
standardised and constrained environment.
Another benefit to using FPGAs is that it allows the use of microprocessors, embedded in the
FPGA architecture, also known as System on Chip (SOC). These SOCs include additional general
purpose registers, instruction sets, interfaces to the external world and shift units, along with more
advanced features and peripherals to allow a further tailoring of the design to the required speci-
fications in a hardware-software co-design environment. This method allows the computationally
intensive components, i.e. the cryptographic algorithms, to be implemented in hardware, while
the non computationally intensive components, i.e. control, data processing, padding etc., which
are better suited to software are performed by the systems host processor, thereby allowing a full
cryptographic system on a single chip. A fourth aim of this thesis is to present a cryptographic
processor which uses cryptographic IP cores, comprised of the previously defined cryptographic
algorithms, implemented on a Xilinx Virtex-5 FPGA. An example application, namely the Elliptic
Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA), is presented to demonstrate the functionality of the
system, based on layer 5 of Figure 1.2.
1.3 Thesis Outline
This section outlines the structure of the remainder of the thesis. Chapter 2 provides a short intro-
duction to cryptography, and presents a brief history of the subject. The mathematical background
necessary for the rest of the thesis is introduced here. More specifically, the mathematics be-
hind public key cryptography (PKC), part of the main focus of this work, is described here. This
includes groups, rings, fields, finite fields and elliptic curves. Following this, some example pro-
tocols are presented, used both to differentiate between public key cryptography and other types
of symmetric key cryptography, and also to show how these public key cryptography schemes are
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used. Finally, a brief description of cryptographic key sizes is presented and the different security
levels provided by them is discussed. The platform tools used to form the underlying technology
used in this work are also presented here. Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) integrated
circuits are described along with the technology which underpins them. TheMicroblaze soft-core
virtual microprocessor is also described here along with the Sasebo GII cryptographic evaluation
board and the Xilinx XUPV5-LX110T Evaluation Platform. Constraints associated with hardware
implementations are examined and the concept of side channel attacks is introduced along with
various countermeasures relevant to this work. An outline of trade-offs between area, speed, power
and energy is presented. Some performance metrics used in the thesis are also presented here.
Chapter 3 examines the performance of various elliptic curve algorithms on a reconfigurable ellip-
tic curve processor. It begins with a description of the classic Double-and-Add method for point
scalar multiplication, and examines different coordinate systems which can be used. Next a spe-
cial form of curve is described, the twisted Edwards and extended twisted Edwards. These curves
can perform point scalar multiplication faster than standard curves and can be made unified for
additional security. The processor used for the various algorithms and implementations is intro-
duced and the methods to design it are described. The underlying modular arithmetic is presented
and different configurations of the processor are investigated. A method for measuring the power
dissipation on this elliptic curve processor is described and timing, area and power results are pre-
sented. A brief look at simple power analysis (SPA) is next performed and it is shown how the
algorithms examined so far are susceptible to this type of simple side channel attack. Following
on from this, various SPA secure methods are then examined, namely dummy arithmetic instruc-
tions, unified doubling and addition and regular algorithms. The algorithmic cost and area, energy
and timing results of these SPA secure algorithms is examined and some further observations are
made. The best performing algorithms are then selected for further analysis with larger key and
field sizes based on NIST specifications. Additional power, energy area and timing results were
acquired and comparisons between the differing security levels were made.
Chapter 4 examines an implementation method for the SHA-3 hash functions. It begins with a
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brief overview of cryptographic hash functions and the timeline of the recently concluded SHA-3
competition. It then examines the different types of hash functions accepted for the competition
and examines some implementation methods and area-speed trade offs. Some example implemen-
tations are also presented. Next, an overview of the algorithm and a description of the implemen-
tation methodology for the finalist designs is explored. A standard wrapper, used to interface the
designs is also presented here. Results for implementations of the round two of the competitions
designs are presented and metrics used for selecting one particular hash function over another are
discussed. The updated round three variants of the competition are next presented along with an
examination of any changes to the metrics due to these updates. Finally, a comparison against the
current state of the art is presented and conclusions are made.
Chapter 5 presents a cryptographic architecture that is capable of supporting multiple types of
cryptographic algorithms and architectures. This architecture provides support for the underlying
field operations performed by Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) along with the curve param-
eters, algorithm used, number of arithmetic units and key size, thus enabling flexibility in the
selection of both the underlying algorithm, the security level and the area-throughput require-
ments. Additionally, the cryptographic architecture can also support all of the SHA-3 algorithms
and their variants. These cryptographic blocks can then be used along with ancillary components
as building blocks to build bigger cryptographic protocols. Further examination is performed
regarding coordinate conversion between domains and coordinate systems. Software only and
hardware-software co-design implementations are presented and compared against the dedicated
hardware implementation. An overview of a commonly used application for performing public
key cryptography, namely the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA), is presented.
Another component of ECDSA, the random key generator, is presented and an implementation
method using a pseudo random number generator, Fortuna, is described. Results for the ECDSA
are presented and compared against the current state of the art.
Chapter 6 concludes the thesis. The main contributions of the thesis are summarised and some
suggestions for future research directions are outlined.
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Background
2.1 Introduction
This chapter provides a background to the work presented in this thesis. It is subdivided into
four main sections. In Section 2.2, a short introduction to cryptography is presented. Subsequent
sections explore the mathematical background and the hardware used for the work. Finally, a
short analysis of security and constraints, along with a presentation of some measurement metrics
to allow comparison between designs is performed.
An elliptic curve system consists of four main layers, the finite field layer, the elliptic curve point
operation layer, the scalar multiplication layer and the protocol layer. The mathematical back-
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ground of the first layer, the finite field layer is presented in Section 2.3.
Section 2.4 presents an overview of elliptic curve cryptography, and provides a mathematical
background for the second layer, the elliptic curve point operation layer, including the group law
for defining points over an elliptic curve. Point representation and an introduction to coordinate
systems are also presented here.
Section 2.5 describes the final two layers of an elliptic curve system, the scalar multiplication
layer and the protocol layer. Symmetric-Key and Public-Key cryptography is described. The
Integer FactorisationProblem (IFP), theDiscrete Logarithmproblem (DLP) and theEllipticCurve
Discrete Logarithm problem (ECDLP) are defined. A short analysis of cryptographic key sizes is
also presented. Digital Signature protocols are discussed, making use of the topics presented in
previous sections of this chapter. Finally, the security levels of the different types of cryptographic
algorithms are compared both in terms of broad design, security level and cryptographic keysizes.
Subsequent sections present an overview of the hardware. Section 2.6 provides an overview of the
platform tools used, namely FPGAs. The platform on which the cryptosystems are evaluated and
the tools used to do so are introduced. Section 2.7 describes the Microblaze soft-core processor
and the Xilinx Embedded Design Kit (EDK) used to generate it. The Sasebo GII cryptographic
evaluation board and the XUPV5-LX110T Evaluation Platform are presented in Section 2.8, upon
which, most implementation testing was done. Section 2.9 examines the constraints associated
with the hardware implementations. Side channel analysis of cryptographic systems and its coun-
termeasures are examined. A brief description of the trade-off between area, speed, power and
energy is also presented. In Section 2.10, some metrics are developed as a method of comparing
the different designs presented in this thesis. Conclusions are presented in Section 2.11.
2.2 Introduction to Cryptography
Cryptography provides the means of securing the communication between two parties across an
insecure channel. While there is evidence of the ancient Egyptians and Babylonians scribes delib-
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erately transforming ancient writings as a form of showing off their knowledge, the Spartans [9]
were the first to make use of cryptography for military purposes through the use of the skytale,
a staff of wood of fixed dimensions (the key), around which a strip of leather (the ciphertext), is
wrapped, and the message is written. Only with an identical staff can the message be decoded. The
Greeks wrote the earliest text on secret communication (and indeed the word cryptography itself
is an amalgamation the Greek words, secret and writing), On the Defense of Fortified Places by
Aeneas the Tactician [10]. This text contained details on replacing vowels of plaintext by specific
dots and forms of stenography (hidden writing) through the use of punching holes in a document
above the letters which spelled out the secret code. As it is unclear whether these systems were
ever actually used, the first attested use of a substitution cipher comes from the Romans, namely
Julius Caesar and his Caesar cipher [11] in which each letter in the plaintext is replaced by a letter
some fixed number of positions down the alphabet. This is known as a monoalphabetic substitu-
tion where the same key is always bound to the same plaintext. Cryptology was also extensively
used in the Arabic world (the word cipher for example, is arabic), and the fourteen volume Subh
al-a ’sha [9] included the section considering the concealment of secret messages within letters.
Frequency analysis of letters is also attributed to them.
Following this period of time, from around the 15th century was a stagnation and even a steady
decline of the use of cryptography as past methods were forgotten, and it was not until well into the
16th century that it again began to achieve significance in matters of state. The Renaissance was
the next period of significant growth, with a number of people making contributions. One such
person was Alberti, inventor of the polyalphabetic cipher, where both the plaintext and ciphertext
equivalents are changed in relation to each other, through the use of the Alberti Cipher Disk [12].
Another, Trithemius, wrote Stenographia, and Polygraphia thus introducing polyalphabetic sub-
stitution or the shifting of letters every substitution line [13], i.e. (a, b, . . .y, z), (b, c, . . .y, z, a),
(c, d, . . .z, a, b) etc. A third person of note was Belaso, whose book La cifra del. Sig. Gio-
van Batista Belaso proposed the use of a literal, easily memorable and easily changeable key [12].
While these three polyalphabetic solutions form the basics of modern day cryptography, they were
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at the time rejected as being too time consuming and prone to errors by the cryptographers of the
day in favour of the standard (and even at that time insecure)monoalphabeticmethod, and so were
forgotten until their re-discovery in the 19th century.
In the 19th century, the advance in technology, such as the telegraph and the computing machine
reinvigorated the need for security and ciphers in messages. Previous complaints about errors
in messages encrypted using polyalphabetic ciphers no longer applied as these could be quickly
fixed and resent by telegraph, whereas before a message could take weeks or months to be hand
delivered. This continued to be the case up to, and including World War I, with various wheel,
cylinder and disk based ciphers used, similar to the Alberti disk. However, at this point in the 20th
century, the use of machinery allowed the more widespread use of printing cipher machines by
people with only a basic understanding of their mathematical operation.
The Second World War, arguably the most exciting time for cryptography and cryptanalysis in the
history of the world, saw the battle in the Atlantic between the Axis, comprising Germany with
the Enigma machine, an electro mechanical rotary based cipher machine which implemented a
polyalphabetic substitution cipher through repeated changes of the electrical path through a se-
ries of replaceable rotors, versus the cryptanalysts of British intelligence’sGovernment Code and
Cypher School (GC&CS) at Bletchley Park set up to break the enigma codes, codenameUltra [14].
In the Pacific, a similar intelligence battle was raging between the United States Army’s Signals
Intelligence Section (SIS) with their cryptanalysis project, codenameMagic, and the Japanese Pur-
ple encryption scheme [9]. In both cases the cryptanalysts succeeded and contributed greatly to
Allied success in defeating the U-boats in the Battle of the Atlantic in the case of Ultra, and learned
in advance of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour in the case of Magic. Winston Churchill told
Britain’s King George VI after World War II: ’It was thanks to Ultra that we won the war’.
After the Second World War, due to the success of cryptography, it was seen as a dangerous
weapon and fell within the remit of various governmental intelligence and military organisations.
It was not until the 1970s, with the advent of computers and the internet, that need for ordinary
people and companies to secure their data became increasingly important. It is here we begin a
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description of the work in this thesis, as this was the starting point of modern cryptography. Mod-
ern cryptography is heavily based on computer and mathematical theory. Advances in electronics
and computers allow for more complex ciphers and cryptanalysis. Modern cryptographic algo-
rithms are designed around computational hardness assumptions, making it theoretically possible
to break any cryptographic system, but practically infeasible to do so. These schemes are therefore
termed computationally secure. Mathematical advances and better computing technology require
these solutions to be continually adapted both in mathematical complexity and in increased secret
key sizes to maintain adequate levels of security.
2.3 Mathematical Background
In this section a variety of basic algebraic structures that play roles in the generation and analysis
of sequences used in communications and cryptography is presented. A mathematical background
of the underlying layers are briefly examined, namely, groups, rings, fields, finite fields and elliptic
curves.
2.3.1 Groups
Groups are among the most basic building blocks of modern algebra. They are commonly used to
model symmetry in structures or sets of transformations. They are also building blocks for more
complex algebraic constructions such as rings, fields, vector spaces, and lattices.
A group is a set (G, ∗) with a distinguished element e (called the identity) and a binary operation
on G. This group operation is typically called addition or multiplication, denoted ∗ and satisfies
the following laws:
• Associative law; The order of the group operation does not matter.
• a ∗ (b ∗ c) = (a ∗ b) ∗ c, ∀(x, y, z) ∈ G.
• Identity law; G has an identity (unity) element, 1.
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• a ∗ 1 = 1 ∗ a = a ∀a ∈ G.
• Inverse law; For each element e of G, there exists an element e−1.
• e ∗ e−1 = e−1 ∗ e = 1.
The group G is said to be commutative or abelian if the composition law is commutative:
a ∗ b = b ∗ a, ∀(a, b) ∈ G (2.1)
The order of a groupG, denoted |G|, is its cardinality as a set. An element e ∈ G is of finite order
if the group contains a finite number of elements. The element e in this case is called a generator
or primitive element if the order of e is equal to the number of elements in the group G,and G is
cyclic. The order of the element e is the least positive integer, a such that ea = e ∗ e ∗ · · · ∗ e = 1.
Otherwise e is of infinite order.
The order of the above element e also divides the number of elements in G. If G is a group, then
a subsetH ⊆ G is a subgroup if it is a group with the same operation as G and the same identity
as G. i.e., the number of elements of a subgroup divides the number of elements of the group.
2.3.2 Rings
Rings involve algebraic structures with two interrelated operations. For example, addition and
multiplication of integers, rational numbers, real numbers, and complex numbers, AND and XOR
of Boolean valued functions, and addition and multiplication of n× n matrices of integers, etc.
A ring (R,+, .) consists of a set, R, along with two binary operations called (+) and (.) (unlike a
group which has just one operation), namely addition and multiplication. The ring R is said to be
commutative or abelian if it satisfies the following properties for all (a, b, c) ∈ R:
• Commutativity; a.(b.c) = (a.b).c ∀(a, b, c) ∈ R.
• R has an Additive Identity element,O such that
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• a+O = O + a = a ∀a ∈ R.
• Associativity; The order of the group operation does not matter.
• a+ (b+ c) = (a+ b) + c ∀(a, b, c) ∈ R.
• R has aMultiplicitive Identity element, 1, with 1 6= 0 such that
• a.1 = 1.a = a ∀a ∈ R.
• Distributivity; . is distributive over +.
• a.(b+ c) = (a.b) + (a.c); (a+ b).c = (a.c) + (b.c) ∀(a, b, c) ∈ R.
• Inverse; For each element e of R, there exists an element e−1.
• e.e−1 = e−1.e = 1, where 1 is called the (invertible) unit element.
2.3.3 Fields
Fields are rings where every nonzero element is a multiplicative inverse unit. A field (F,+, .)
consists of a set, F, along with two binary operations, namely addition and multiplication, along
with an additive identity element, O, and a multiplicitive identity element, 1. As an algebraic
structure, every field is a ring, but not every ring is a field. The main difference being that fields
allow for division (though not division by zero), while a ring need not possess multiplicative
inverses.
The set must satisfy the following properties:
• Commutativity; (F,+, .) is a commutative ring such that every nonzero element is invert-
ible.
• Inverse; all nonzero elements are invertable.
A subset H of a field F is a subfield of F if H is itself a field with respect to the operations of F .
In such a case, F is said to be an extension field ofH . ifH 6= F we say thatH is a proper subfield
of F. A field containing no proper subfields is known as a prime field.
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Due to the fact that F is a field, all nonzero coefficients have an inverse and standard polynomial
division can be performed. Therefore, if g(x) and h(x) 6= 0 are polynomials in F[x], then there
exists two polynomials q(x) (the quotient) and r(x) (the remainder) in F[x] such that:
g(x) = q(x)h(x) + r(x),
where degree(r) < degree(h).
r(x) = g(x)mod h(x),
q(x) = g(x) div h(x).
(2.2)
2.3.4 Finite Fields
A finite field is a field F which contains a finite number of elements. Finite fields are also referred
to as Galois fields after the French mathematician E´variste Galois, who showed that the order of a
finite field must be equal to the power of a prime p, and are denoted either Fq or GF(q). It can be
shown that any finite field contains q = pm elements, for some prime p and some positive integer
m and is isomorphic, i.e. indistinguishable, for Fq. Since finite fields have cyclic groups, they
enable algebraic constructions with finite alphabets.
The prime p is known as the characteristic of the field. The characteristic of any field is either 0 or a
prime number. In cryptography, the two most studied fields are prime fields,G(Fq); q = p, where
p is a prime, and binary extension fields (finite fields of characteristic two),GF(2m); q = 2m. The
work in this thesis focuses on the prime field.
While binary fields algorithms are considered to have better performance over their prime field
counterparts for hardware based implementations, it can be shown that higher level protocol im-
plementations, e.g. digital signature generation and verification using the ECDSA, results in a
similar area and power performancei between the two fields [15]. For a review of GF(2m) and its
implementation in hardware, the interested reader is referred to [16].
iBinary fields are however still faster and therefore more energy efficient.
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2.4 Elliptic Curves
Elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) was established as a form of public key cryptosystem in 1985
independently byMiller [17] and Koblitz [18]. An elliptic curveE defined over a field F is defined
as the set of points (x, y), with coordinates in Fq in an equation (in this case Weierstraß) of the
form:
E : y2 + a1xy + a3y = x
3 + a2x
2 + a4x+ a6 (2.3)
with a1, . . . , a4, a6 ∈ F; δ 6= 0 , where δ is the discriminant (i.e. which shows the nature of the
roots) of E , and the coefficients a1, . . . , a4, a6 are the elements of F. The group of points on an
elliptic curve contains all of these points (x, y) along with a special point at infinity,O, the additive
identity of the group. i.e. if H is any extension field of F, then the set of H-rational points on E
is:
E(H) = {(x, y) ∈ H.H : y2 + a1xy + a3y − x3 − a2x2 − a4x− a6 = 0} ∪ {O} (2.4)
The number of points on the curve is called the order of the curve and is defined as #E(Fq) =
q+1− t, where t is the Trace of Frobenius and |t| ≤ 2√q (approximated as#E(Fq) ≈ q) [19]. If
t is a multiple of the characteristic q, the curve is supersingular. Otherwise, it is non supersingular
or ordinary. The basic operations of Elliptic Curve Cryptography are point scalar computations of
the form:
Q = [k] g = g + g + · · ·+ g︸ ︷︷ ︸
k times
(2.5)
The order of the group, g, is the smallest integer n such that [n]g = O, the identity element. In a
cyclic group, the order of the group is the same as the order of the generator g as defined in Sec-
tion 2.3.1. Repeated addition of points on an elliptic curve is known as point scalar multiplication.
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2.4.1 The Group Law
For point addition (PA), the chord-and-tangent rule [20] is used for adding two points on the curve
E , to give a third point. Together with this addition operation, the set of points over the curve form
an abelian group withO as the identity. This is illustrated here in Figure 2.1(a) over a field of real
numbers.
P
P
T
P = P +P
y
x
1
2
3 1 2
(a) Point Addition
P
= P2P
T
+P
x
y
(b) Point Doubling
Figure 2.1: Point Operations on an Elliptic Curve
A line is drawn through P1 = (x1, y1) and P2 = (x2, y2), two distinct points on the elliptic curve.
Where this line intersects the elliptic curve at a third point, T , a reflection about the x-axis is made
to give the third point P3 = (x3, y3).
For a large k this can be quite slow. Therefore a second group operation on the elliptic curve is
introduced. Point doubling (PD) is a special case of point addition in which the two input points
are the same. In this case a tangent is drawn to the point on the curve. This line intersects the
curve at exactly one other point, T . Again, a reflection along the x-axis is made to give the point
[2]P . This is shown in Figure 2.1(b).
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2.4.2 Elliptic Curves over Prime Fields
Elliptic Curves over prime fields, Fp, where p is a large prime, consists of the integers 0, 1, . . . , p−
1 with all arithmetic operations, addition, multiplication, inversion etc. performed modulo p. The
Weierstraß equation defined in 2.3 can be simplified down to the short Weierstraß equation. If the
characteristics ofH > 3 then:
(x, y)⇒ x− 3a
2
1 − 12a2
36
,
y − 3a1x
216
− a
3
1 + 4a1a2 − 12a3
24
transforms E to the curve
y2 + xy = x3 + ax2 + b (2.6)
Where a, b ∈ H ; δ = −16(4a3 + 27b2).
A point addition,P3(x3, y3) = P1(x1, y1)+P2(x2, y2), can be described algebraically as follows:
x3 = (
y2 − y1
x2 − x1 )
2 − x1 − x2 and y3 = ( y2 − y1
x2 − x1 ).(x1 − x3)− y1 (2.7)
A point doubling, P3(x3, y3) = [2]P1(x1, y1), can also be described algebraically as:
x3 = (
3x21 + a
2y1
)2 − 2x1 and y3 = (3x
2
1 + a
2y1
).(x1 − x3)− y1 (2.8)
where . is equivalent to modulo multiplication, a ∗ b mod p.
The equations given here for Weierstraß, 2.3 and 2.6 are represented by (x, y), given in affine
coordinates [19]. In Chapter 3, the different coordinate systems and their implementations are
explored in greater detail.
2.5 Cryptographic Primitives & Protocols
A cryptographic protocol details the steps and components required for a security-related function
using cryptographic methods. Schneier [21] defines a protocol as a series of steps, involving two
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or more parties designed to accomplish a task. Everyone involved in the protocol must know
the protocol and all of the steps to follow, and must agree to follow it. The protocol must be
unambiguous and must be complete. Most Importantly for cryptographic protocols, it should not
be possible to do more or learn more than what is specified in the protocol.
2.5.1 Symmetric-Key Cryptography
Symmetric-key cryptography, which would also be in layer 4 of Figure 1.2, involves the use
of secret cryptographic keys for the encryption and decryption of data. The study of modern
symmetric-key cryptography relates mainly to the study of block ciphers, stream ciphers, mes-
sage authentication codes (MAC) and their applications. The cryptographic keys for encryption
and decryption may be identical or there may be a simple transformation to select between the
keys. As such, the keys require a shared secret between two or more parties to ensure privacy.
This requirement that both parties have access to the secret key is one of the main drawbacks of
symmetric key encryption.
A block cipher is the modern form of a polyalphabetic cipher, in which individual parts of the
message would be encrypted differently, first proposed by Alberti in 1467 [12]. Modern block
ciphers are based on the concept of an iterated product cipher. Product ciphers, as suggested by
Shannon [22], involve combining multiple simple operations, usually through the use of a feistel
scheme [23], substitutions and permutations, as a means of improving the security. Block ciphers
take a block of plaintext data and a key, carry out encryption over multiple rounds, using different
subkeys derived from an original key and output a block of ciphertext data. The strength of a
block cipher is entirely dependant on the secrecy of the key value. Block ciphers are not secure
cryptosystems themselves (by modern standards, it is unacceptable for the encryption of a single
plaintext to always be the same), but may be used in a mode of operation such as Cipher-block
chaining (CBC) mode [24] to implement secure encryption through the use of data partitioning,
randomisation and padding of variable length messages. The better known block ciphers include
DES [25], Triple DES and AES [26].
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Stream ciphers, use a key but no plaintext input, and produce a pseudorandom output stream. To
encrypt with a stream cipher, the output is combined with the plaintext, as in the one-time pad.
RC4 [21] is an example of a well-known stream cipher. A MAC is used to authenticate messages.
It uses a key and an arbitrary-length message to be authenticated, and outputs a tag. This tag value
is used to verify both a message’s data integrity as well as its authenticity, by allowing trusted
verifiers to detect any changes to the message content. The verifiers are trusted by also having a
copy of the secret key. An example of a MAC is the HMAC [27]. They can also be constructed
from block ciphers, such as the CBC-MAC [21].
2.5.2 Public-Key Cryptography
In 1976,Whitfield Diffie andMartin Hellman [28] proposed the notion of public-key cryptography
in which two different but mathematically related keys are used, a public key and a private key
(although in 1997, it was publicly disclosed that asymmetric key algorithms were developed by
Ellis, Cocks, and Williamson at the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) in the
UK in 1973, but were kept classified [29]). Deriving the private key from the corresponding
public key is equivalent to solving a computational problem that is believed to be intractable. A
user, Alice, generates a key pair and releases their public key while maintaining the secrecy of
their private key. Any other person, Bob, with access to this public key can use it to encrypt their
own data, to allow secure transmission across an unsecure channel, monitored by an eavesdropper,
Eve. The message can only be decrypted by the user with the private key, i.e. Alice. Compared
to Symmetric-key cryptography, this method allows the ability to transfer keys across unsecure
channels while still maintaining the security of the encryption.
The Diffe-Hellman Key Exchange is used as an example to describe the operation of public key
cryptography:
• Alice and Bob agree on a groupG, with generator g such that for any number n in the group,
there is an integer k which satisfies n = gk, i.e. g is primitive mod n
• Alice chooses a random large integer a and sends to Bob: A = ga mod n
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• Bob chooses a random large integer b and sends to Alice: B = gb mod n
• Alice computes: ka = Ba mod n
• Bob computes: kb = Ab mod n
• Since both ka and kb are equal to gab mod n, both Alice and Bob arrive at the same value
As it can be seen from above, any Eve, listening in on the channel cannot compute the value (as
they only have access to the values n, g,A andB), unless they can compute the discrete logarithm,
discussed further in section 2.5.4. An eavesdropper can however spoof their identity, for example
in a man-in-the-middle attack [21]. In this situation, Eve, intercepts the public key belonging to
Alice, ka and replaces it with her own key, ke, which is sent on to Bob. Bob, assumes that ke is
Alices public key and replies; thereby establishing a shared key with Eve gbe. Eve then replies to
Alice to also acquire gae. It is now trivial for Eve to intercept messages between Alice and Bob,
access the contents of the message and then forward it on using either gae or gbe.
A method of protecting against this type of man-in-the-middle attack is through the use of digital
signatures, discussed further in Section 2.5.6.
2.5.3 The Integer Factorisation Problem (IFP)
In 1978, Ronald Rivest, Adi Shamir, and Len Adleman invented RSA [30], another public-key
system.
• Two distinct prime numbers of the same bit length, p and q are chosen at random.
• n is computed, where n = pq
• ϕ(n) = (p− 1)(q − 1) is computed where ϕ is Eulers totient
• An integer a is chosen such that a and ϕ(n) are coprime
• b is calculated, where b = a−1 mod ϕn
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• Set a as the public key and b as the private key
The RSA equation is given as:
kab = k mod n, ∀k (2.9)
Assuming that a and b are large enough, then the problem of determining the private key b from
the public key (n, a) is computationally equivalent to the problem of determining the factors p and
q of n. This is otherwise known as the Integer Factorisation Problem (IFP).
2.5.4 The Discrete Logarithm problem (DLP)
The discrete logarithm problem is defined as the problem of determining k such that [k]g = Q,
given g and Q using Equation 2.5. Described another way, given b mod p and bn mod p, find n.
Computing the exponentiation modulo the group order, (i.e. the encryption of) [k]g, can be per-
formed efficiently i.e. in polynomial time. The strength of the DLP comes from the inverse
operation; finding the logarithm is deemed intractable, i.e. computable in exponential time, and is
considered to be roughly equivalent to the difficulty of the IFP. The Diffe-Hellman key exchange
described in Section 2.5.2 is based on this problem.
2.5.5 The Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm problem (ECDLP)
The principles of the DLP can be applied to elliptic curves, resulting in the ECDLP.
Given an elliptic curve, E defined over a finite field Fq, a point P ∈ E(Fq) of order n, and a point
Q ∈ E(Fq) determine the integer n ∈ [0, . . .k, . . .n − 1] such thatQ = k[P ]
Q = [k]P = P + P + · · ·+ P︸ ︷︷ ︸
k times
(2.10)
The operation Q = k[P ], is referred to as a point scalar multiplication. Similar to the DLP,
computingQ = k[P ] can be performed in polynomial time, while the inverse operation is deemed
NP-hard (non-deterministic polynomial-timehard) (although nomathematical proof of this exists).
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Given a small enough k, a brute force attack can be used to calculate the sequence of points of
P until k is found, however this is considered intractable once sufficiently large primes are used.
There are other attack methods uses to reduce the time taken or the complexity of the ECDLP,
however again, these are infeasable when using a large prime. The Pollard Rho [31] and the
Pohlig-Hellman [32] are two such attacks.
Since the ECDLP appears to be significantly harder than the DLP, the strength per key bit is sub-
stantially greater in elliptic curve systems than in conventional discrete logarithm systems. Thus,
smaller parameters can be used in ECC than with DL systems but with equivalent levels of security.
The advantages that can be gained from smaller parameters include speed (faster computations)
and smaller keys and certificates. These advantages are especially important in environments
where processing power, storage space, bandwidth, or power consumption is constrained.
2.5.6 Digital Signatures
It was described in Section 2.5.2 how the Diffe-Hellman Key Exchange is susceptible to man-in-
the-middle attacks. To counter these types of attacks, Diffie and Hellman also proposed the use of
a signature scheme [28]. The Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) was proposed in August 1991,
by NIST and was specified in FIPS-186 [33] in May 1994. Its security is based on the intractability
of the discrete logarithm problem described in Section 2.5.4. By first signing the message with
their private key, prior to encrypting it with the recipients public key, the receiver can verify the
authenticity of the message using the senders public key. Essentially, the sender performs the
digital equivalent of a handwritten signature.
Johnson [34], defines a digital signature as a number dependent on some secret known only to the
signer (the signers private key), and, additionally, on the contents of the message being signed.
Signatures must be verifiable if a dispute arises as to whether an entity signed a document, an
unbiased third party should be able to resolve the matter equitably, without requiring access to
the signers private key. Digital signatures should be essentially unforgeable [35], and are used to
provide:
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• data Integrity; The assurance that data has not been altered by unauthorized or unknown
means.
• data origin authentication; The assurance that the source of data is as claimed.
• non-repudiation; The assurance that an entity cannot deny previous actions or commit-
ments.
The digital signature schemes can be classified according to the hard underlying mathematical
problem which forms the basis of their security:
• Integer Factorization (IF) schemes, which base their security on the intractability of the
integer factorization problem. e.g. RSA [30] and Rabin [36] signature schemes.
• Discrete Logarithm (DL) schemes, which base their security on the intractability of the
(ordinary) discrete logarithm problem in a finite field. e.g. ElGamal [37], and DSA [33]
signature schemes.
• Elliptic Curve (EC) schemes, which base their security on the intractability of the elliptic
curve discrete logarithm problem. e.g. ANSI X9.62 [38], FIPS 186-3 [33], IEEE 1363-
2000 [39] and ISO/IEC 15946-2 [40].
The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) along with its implementation are pre-
sented in Chapter 5.
2.5.7 Cryptographic Key Sizes
There are many different parameters which need to be chosen with care to ensure that an encryp-
tion scheme is resistant to all known attacks. This work only ensures that the size of the prime field
and the key size are sufficiently large as to be representative of this security metric. The interested
reader is referred to Chapter 4 of [19] for a full list of the other parameters and their generation.
As discussed earlier in this section, in symmetric key cryptography, the size of the key is directly
related to the security of the system, whereby, the larger the key size, the greater the security level.
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Table 2.1: ECRYPT II Security Level Recommendations (2010)
Discrete Logarithm Elliptic
Level Protection Symmetric Asymmetric Key Group Curve Hash
1 Attacks in real-time by individuals 32 - - - - -
Only acceptable for authentication tag size
2 Very short-term protection against small organizations 64 816 128 816 128 128
Should not be used for confidentiality in new systems
3 Short-term protection against medium organizations, 72 1008 144 1008 144 144
medium-term protection against small organizations
4 Very short-term protection against agencies, 80 1248 160 1248 160 160
long-term protection against small organizations
Smallest general-purpose level,
2-key 3DES restricted to 240 plaintext/ciphertexts,
protection from 2009 to 2012
5 Legacy standard level 96 1776 192 1776 192 192
2-key 3DES restricted to 106 plaintext/ciphertexts,
protection from 2009 to 2020
6 Medium-term protection 112 2432 224 2432 224 224
3-key 3DES, protection from 2009 to 2030
7 Long-term protection 128 3248 256 3248 256 256
Generic application-independent recommendation,
protection from 2009 to 2040
8 Foreseeable future 256 15424 512 15424 512 512
Good protection against quantum computers,
unless Shors algorithm applies
For asymmetric key cryptography, the standard benchmark is RSA, and in public-key cryptogra-
phy, two algorithms are considered to offer equivalent security (in a cryptographic sense), if the
work needed to break them is the same using a given resource [41]ii. As such, Table 2.1 presents
the recommendations for the minimum keysize required (in bits) data as defined by the Ecrypt
II [42] network of excellence in cryptology. The table gives eight levels of security, with level 5
being the current standard acceptable level of security. The second column presents the protection
being offered, while the rest present a symmetric key size from which equivalent asymmetric key
sizes are built. Column 3 presents the equivalent security in bits for a private key scheme. Col-
umn 4 indicates the bits required in RSA. Column 5 and 6 indicate the bits required in a system
based on the DLP in a finite field for both key and field size. Column 7 gives the bits required
for systems based on the ECDLP, while column 8 gives the recommended bit sizes for the SHA-2
hash algorithm. It can be immediately seen that the advantage ECC gives in size when compared
iiThe security strength represents the amount of work (i.e. the number of operations) that is required to break a
cryptographic algorithm or system. It is dependent on time complexity, computational resources, memory/data and the
possibility that certain specific attacks to that algorithm may provide computational advantages.
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to RSA, and how this advantage grows as the security level increases.
Table 2.2: NIST Security Recommendations (2011)
Minimum Discrete Logarithm Elliptic (SHA)
Date Strength Symmetric Asymmetric Key Group Curve Hash
2010 80 2TDEA 1024 160 1024 160 224,256,384,512
2011 - 2030 112 3TDEA 2048 224 2048 224 224,256,384,512
> 2030 128 AES-128 3072 256 3072 256 256,384,512
>> 2030 192 AES-192 7680 384 7680 384 384,512
>>> 2030 256 AES-256 15360 512 15360 512 512
For comparison, Table 2.2 gives the NIST recommended minimum key sizes [41]. The first col-
umn indicates the timeframe that the level of security is likely to cover. Columns 2 and 3 give
the symmetric security level along with the symmetric algorithm required to provide this cover.
The subsequent columns again present the equivalent RSA, DLP, ECDLP and SHA-2 security
provided. The analysis from both groups is fairly similar with level 5 and 6 from Table 2.1 being
comparable to rows 1, 2 and 3 from Table 2.2.
2.6 Hardware Overview
Next, the different hardware used in this thesis is described. A Field Programmable Gate Array
(FPGA) is an integrated circuit which is user programmable; as opposed to an Application Specific
Integrated Circuit (ASIC), which is customised by the manufacturer for a particular use. FPGAs
are an attractive choice for implementing cryptographic algorithms, because of their low cost in
prototyping relative to ASICs. FPGAs are flexible when adopting security protocol upgrades,
as they can be re-programmed in-place, and FPGAs also allow rapid prototyping of designs. The
downsides however are they are larger in area and higher in power usagewhen compared to ASICs.
An FPGA can be described as an array of configurable logic blocks and interconnects, all of
which can be programmed by the user to describe combinational and sequential logic circuitry.
The components and connections which make up these logic blocks however, vary to a greater or
lesser degree between different manufacturers, and even between different families of the same
manufacturer.
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Xilinx [43] and Altera [44] FPGAs are the two FPGA products used for the implementations of
the hash functions. The two basic measurement standards of an FPGA in the case of a Xilinx
device are Configurable Logic Blocks (CLB) or Slices, and for an Altera device they are, Logic
Array Blocks (LAB), Adaptive Logic Modules (ALMs) or Logic Elements (LEs).
For a more indepth description of the different types of FPGAs, ASICs and microprocessors, the
interested reader is invited to examine Chapter 3 of [16], or from the author [45].
2.6.1 Xilinx FPGA
Configurable logic blocks (CLB) are organized in an array and are used to build combinatorial and
synchronous logic designs. Each CLB element is tied to a switch matrix to access the general rout-
ing matrix. A CLB element comprises a number of similar slices, with fast local feedback within
the CLB. These slices are split into columns with independent carry logic chains and common
shift chain.
Each slice includes a number of multi-input Look-Up Tables (LUT), carry logic, arithmetic logic
gates, wide function multiplexers and storage elements, namely D-type flip-flops. CLBs can be
configured to operate as either a logic or a memory element. When operating as a logic element,
the LUTs are programmed to operate as combinational logic, with a 1-bit register, or as a variable-
tap shift register. As a memory element, each LUT is configured as an 2n× 1-bit Distributed RAM
block, where n is the number of inputs to the LUT. The slices also contains logic that combines
function generators to provide multiplexing, sum of products (SOP) chains, shift registers and
tri-state buffers used to drive on-chip buses.
In most cases, Xilinx CLBs share a similar make-up. There are distinctions though, as certain
families are designed for different specific purposes. For example, the Virtex-II Pro can use each
LUT as a 16× 1-bit RAM. Others come with a specific designation; ’L’ denoting a low power
version for example. The underlying technology is quite similar however. For the Spartan-3
onward, slices are seperated into those which include built-in RAM resources (SLICEM) and
those which do not (SLICEL), with two of the four slices in a CLB being SLICEM and two being
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SLICEL. This allows each CLB to operate both as logic or memory.
The exception to this is the newer Virtex-5 and Virtex-6 families. They incorporate larger LUTs in
their CLB, and as such, can achieve more varied functionality than the previous generation FPGAs
(at a greater monetary cost). SLICEM logic for the Virtex-5 and Virtex-6 can be configured as 64-
bit Distributed RAM. While the Virtex-5 [46] was the main FPGA technology used in this work,
some implementations were also performed and comparisons were made a using the Spartan-
3 [47] and as such it is included here. Table 2.3 summarizes the logic resources in one CLB for
each of the target FPGA types.
Table 2.3: Area logic resources in one CLB per FPGA Type
FPGA Slices LUTs LUTs Storage Distributed Shift
Type 4-input 6-input Elements RAM (bits) Registers (bits)
Spartan 3 4 8 - 8 4x16 4x16
Virtex 5 2 - 8 8 4x16 2x64
All of the CLBs in a given FPGA device are identical and each CLB (or slice equivalent) can
be implemented in one of the configurations listed above. For the Distributed RAM and Shift-
Registers columns, the values given refer to the number of bits that one slice (or SLICEM) LUT
can be configured to store. For example, each Spartan-3 SLICEM LUT can be configured as
a 1 × 16-bit shift register, with 4 SLICEM LUTs per CLB, thereby allowing 4 × 16-bit shift
registers per CLB. These can also be configured in a smaller number of larger shift registers.
2.6.2 Memory and DSP Blocks
Some Xilinx FPGA devices also incorporate large block memory resources (BRAM) and dedi-
cated multiplier or DSP blocks.
The BRAM complements the distributed memory resources that provide shallow RAM structures
implemented using the CLBs. Implementing using BRAM (for example, S-boxes), can improve
the clock frequency while also reducing the number of slices required. Note the BRAM usage
does not show up in the CLB area result and so must be taken into account separately.
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For the two devices, the Spartan-3 contains dedicated 18× 18-bit, twos complement signed mul-
tipliers. The Virtex-5 has an equivalent DSP block (DSP48E). In this case, each DSP48E slice
contains a 25 × 18 multiplier, an adder, and an accumulator. Table 2.4 summarizes the total area
per device type used in this work in slice and block memory available. The Spartan-3 device pre-
sented here is the XC3S5000 and two different Virtex-5 FPGAs are used; the XC5VLX50, used
on the SASEBO-GII cryptographic evaluation board [48], detailed further in Section 2.8, and the
XC5VLX110T, used on the Xilinx XUPV5-LX110T Evaluation Platform [49], detailed further in
Section 2.8.1.
Table 2.4: Total Area logic resources per FPGA Type
Slices BRAM BRAM Dedicated DSP Max User
(Blocks) (Kb) Multipliers Blocks i/o’s
xc3s5000 33,280 104 1,872 104 0 633
xc5vlx50 7,200 144 1,728 0 32 560
xc5vlx110t 17,280 444 5,328 0 64 680
2.6.3 FPGA Design
The Xilinx ISE Design Suite 12.3 [50] was used as the toolkit for the designs presented here
and VHDL (Very High Speed Integrated Circuit Hardware Description Language) was chosen to
implement the designs. The interested reader is directed to [51] for further information on VHDL.
The Synthesis tool takes the VHDL code and maps it to the physical components (i.e. the CLBs,
Slices and BlockMemory described in Section 2.6.1) of the target FPGA.
An initial synthesis determines that the circuit is error free and behaving correctly. Once this is
confirmed, post-place-and-route (P-P-R) is performed which maps the logic to the target FPGA
and returns a more accurate area and timing result. A bit-file is then generated which can be
downloaded to the FPGA, allowing it to perform the circuitry assigned to it by the VHDL. Further
information on architecture, implementation and optimization can be found in [51,52].
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2.7 Microblaze
A microprocessor incorporates the functions of a computer’s central processing unit (CPU) on a
single integrated circuit (IC). Microprocessors available for use in Xilinx FPGAs can be broken
down into two broad categories; soft-core and hard-core. Hard-core microprocessors, for exam-
ple the IBM PowerPC (Performance Optimization With Enhanced RISC Performance Comput-
ing) [53], are embedded into the fabric of certain FPGAs, namely some members of the Virtex-II
Pro, Virtex-4 and Virtex-5 FPGA families. These hard-core processor blocks cannot be removed
from the chip irrespective of whether they are used or not in any particular design. This method is
also known as System on a Chip (SOC).
The Microblaze [54], a soft-core virtual microprocessor, is a 32-bit Harvard RISC (Reduced In-
struction set Computer) architecture optimised for Xilinx FPGAs. It is designed using predefined
blocks, called cores, in the general-purpose memory and logic fabric an FPGA. Using this method
of adding cores as necessary, a specific microprocessor can be created containing only the blocks
required, thereby only using as much space as is necessary on the FPGA. It was selected for use in
the work presented in the thesis over other hard-core microprocessors due to its availability on the
Virtex-5 devices used (see Section 2.8). TheMicroBlaze is highly configurable, allowing a specific
set of features to be applied to a design in addition to the FPGA hardware blocks implemented in
VHDL.
2.7.1 Microblaze Architecture & Implementation
The basis of the microblaze architecture is a single issue 3-stage pipeline, thirty-two 32-bit general
purpose registers, 32-bit instruction word with three operands and two addressing modes, a 32-bit
address bus, an ALU a shift unit and two levels of interrupt. This base design can then be be added
to with more advanced features, such as a barrel shifter, divider, multiplier, floating point unit, Fast
Simplex Link (FSL) interface etc. to allow a tailoring of the design to the required specifications.
Figure 2.2 gives a visual representation of the microblaze system, with the white items comprising
the base design and the shaded items showing some optional features.
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Figure 2.2: Microblaze Processor
The processor has up to three interfaces for memory accesses; Local Memory Bus (LMB) to pro-
vides single cycle access to on-chip dual port BRAM, the IBM On-chip Peripheral Bus (OPB) to
provide a connection between on-chip and off-chip peripherals and memory, and Xilinx Cache-
Link (XCL) for use with specialised external memory controllers. Microblaze also supports up to
eight FSL ports, each with one master and one slave FSL interface.
Xilinx Embedded Design Kit (EDK) [55] is a suite of tools and Intellectual Property (IP) that
enables a user to design an embedded processor system for implementation. It mainly comprises
of two main sections:
• Xilinx Platform Studio (XPS): The development environment used for designing the hard-
ware portion of the embedded processor system.
• The Software Development Kit (SDK): An integrated development environment, comple-
mentary to XPS, that is used for C/C++ embedded software application creation and verifi-
cation. SDK is built on the Eclipse open-source framework
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2.7.2 FSL Bus
The Fast Simplex Link (FSL) [56] is a uni-directional point-to-point communication channel bus
used to perform fast communication between the Microblaze processor pipeline and user devel-
oped custom hardware accelerators (co-processors). This provides a mechanism for unshared and
non-arbitrated communication mechanism, thus allowing fast transfer of data words between mas-
ter and slave implementing the FSL interface. Table 2.5 gives the I/O signals used by the FSL.
Table 2.5: FSL Bus Signals
Signal IO Description
FSL Clk in Synchronous clock
FSL Rst in System reset, should always come from FSL bus
FSL S Clk in Slave asynchronous clock
FSL S Read in Read signal, requiring next available input to be read
FSL S Data out Input data. Multiple of 32-bit
FSL S Control out Control Bit, indicating the input data are control word
FSL S Exists out Data Exist Bit, indicating data exist on the input FSL bus
FSL M Clk in Master asynchronous clock
FSL M Write in Write signal, enabling writing to output FSL bus
FSL M Data in Output data. Multiple of 32-bit
FSL M Control in Control Bit, indicating the output data are control word
FSL M Full out Full Bit, indicating output FSL bus is full
The input and output are read in 32-bit blocks and requires two clock cycles, a read and an ac-
knowledge, per block. FIFO buffers read and release the data and are set prior to runtime.
2.8 Hardware Architecture
The hardware used to test the various algorithms, was implemented on the Xilinx Virtex-5 FPGA
and evaluated on the SASEBO-GII cryptographic evaluation board [48], as presented in Figure 2.3.
The SASEBO GII evaluation board comprises of:
• Two Xilinx FPGAs:
– A cryptographic FPGA : XC5VLX50 -FF324 (Virtex-5 series).
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Figure 2.3: Sasebo GII
– A control FPGA : XC3S400A-4FTG256 (Spartan-3A series).
• An onboard 24Mhz clock. An external clock input is also supported.
• External power source supplying the on-board power regulators and the FPGAs.
2.8.1 Additional Hardware
The Microblaze designed for this work mostly uses a stripped down version, necessitated by size
constraints and a lack of external RAM, on the main Virtex-5 XC5VLX50 device used on the
SASEBO. However, some testing was also completed for comparison purposes on the Xilinx
XUPV5-LX110T Evaluation Platform [49], which uses a Virtex-5 XC5VLX110T, and allows full
use of the Microblaze components. The maximum clock frequency of the Microblaze when im-
plemented on this board is 125MHz. The board contains 256MB DDR2 RAM that the Microblaze
can access through an external memory controller. The implemented design uses the DDR2 RAM
for storing some of the code sections, the heap and stack are placed in 64kB of BRAM internal to
the FPGA. The general setup of the system is shown in Figure 2.4. In comparison, the SASEBO
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design comprises the baseMicroblaze, an XPS timer, a clock generator, BRAM and some ancillary
components.
Microblaze
Virtex 5 FPGA
BRAM
external memory controller
DDR2 RAM
xps_timer
plb bus
plb bus
plb bus
Figure 2.4: Microblaze Design on XUPV5
The description given above is necessarily short and the interested reader is directed to [54,55,57]
for a complete description of the Microblaze and its components.
2.9 Hardware Constraints
As a final overview in this section, some constraints and trade offs are examined. Whether neces-
sitated by security, the throughput required for a system, or the size limitations associated with a
particular device, constraints are required to achieve the best performance for any particular met-
ric at the cost of others. Here, a brief description of side channel attacks along with some design
constraints are presented.
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2.9.1 Side Channel Attacks
One element to take into account when designing a public key cryptosystem is the security of
the system. Implementations can leak sensitive information during the execution of a compu-
tation [58], and this may lead to a release of secret information, no matter how mathematically
secure the system may be.
A side channel attack (SCA) is any attack based on information gained from the physical imple-
mentation of a cryptosystem, rather than brute force or theoretical weaknesses in the algorithms.
This method consists of monitoring some side channel information, such as the power consump-
tion emmisions [59], and using the data emitted to deduce, or partially deduce, the inner workings
of the system [60] through the leaked information, such as timing information, power consumption
or electromagnetic leaks, in some cases making recovery of the key a trivial matter.
Power analysis attacks can be grouped into two categories, simple power analysis (SPA) and dif-
ferential power analysis (DPA) [59]. Simple power analysis (SPA) involves visually interpreting
power traces from an oscilliscope while Differential power analysis (DPA) is a more advanced
form of power analysis which statistically analyses data collected from multiple runs of crypto-
graphic operations. As such, in order to carry out such an attack, the attacker needs physical access
to the device running the cryptographic algorithm. Smart cards are particularly vulnerable to this
type of attack as the attacker normally has unlimited access. There are several countermeasures
available to prevent such an attack. Since this work is concerned with elliptic curve implementa-
tions we only concern ourselves with the mathematical countermeasures applicable to them, such
as the various algorithms presented in Chapter 3. An example of an FPGA under SPA attack is
shown in Figure 2.5. The different instructions being processed can clearly be observed on the
oscilliscope measuring the power line.
2.9.2 Area, Speed, Power and Energy
Along with the surge in demand for smaller and smaller handheld computerised devices such as
smart phones and smart cards, is the demands for longer battery life, more functionality, higher
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Figure 2.5: SPA analysis using FPGA
speeds and lower power. All of which are critical design constraints, and in many occasions a
trade off is needed to select the best ratio of one to another.
The energy consumed by an electronic circuit when performing a computation is equal to the
product of the average power and the computation time. Therefore, to minimise the energy a
designer must attempt to reduce both the power consumption and the calculation time (speed).
Dedicated hardware to perform elliptic curve operations can help to alleviate both of these needs
at the same time. A small dedicated circuit will have a lower power consumption than a large,
general purpose processor. Also, by exploiting parallelisation in the design the circuit will also be
able to reduce the computation time. However care must be taken, as there comes a pointwhere the
addition of extra parallelisation leads to a decrease in the efficiency, and results in a small increase
in speed at the cost of large increase of area. Both of these factors combine to offer potential
energy savings that could offset the initial cost of the design of dedicated hardware. Through the
careful examination of the Area-Time and Area-Energy tradeoff, where Power P and Energy E
are defined by:
P = IV, (2.11)
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E = PAvgT, (2.12)
where V is the voltage, I is the current, PAvg is the average power and T is the time.
Although the Xilinx ISE Design Suite provides its own power estimation tool, XPower Analyzer,
to measure the power consumption of FPGA devices, the estimated values derived by the tool are
considered to be not particularly accurate and estimation errors have been shown to range from
17.5%-200% [61]. Therefore, for accuracy, all power and energy results are measured from the
hardware.
2.10 PerformanceMetrics
As a method of comparing the different designs presented in this thesis, some metrics were devel-
oped. The area-time product (ATP) was calculated to get a representation of any speed decrease
relative to the increase in design size. This gives a more accurate representation of the cost in
relation to the overall system. The area-energy product (AEP) was calculated using the power to
give a representation of the energy increase against the increase in size. The power generally in-
creases with an increase in area, however the energy costs are reduced due to the calculation being
performed faster. This shows the best increase in area for a decrease in energy. In both cases, the
lower the value, the better the performance.
Another standard metric used to allow a baseline comparison between designs, namely the area-
speed trade-off, is the throughput per unit area (TPA) metric. Analysing the throughput per slice
of the architectures, determines which designs make the most efficient use of FPGA area.
The throughput is calculated as follows:
Throughput =
# Bits in a message block×Maximum clock frequency
# Clock cycles per message block
(2.13)
Along with these metrics, the area, computation speed, number of clock cycles, power and en-
ergy measurements are all used to describe the relative costs and benefits of each of the designs
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presented in this thesis.
2.11 Conclusions
This chapter has provided the background information necessary for the rest of the thesis. The
concept of cryptography was introduced and a short background of its history was presented.
It was shown that an elliptic curve system consists of four main layers, the finite field layer, the
elliptic curve point operation layer, the scalar multiplication layer and the protocol layer. Each of
these layers of elliptic curve cryptography were presented and described, along with the mathe-
matical background necessary to understand them.
A description of cryptographic primitives and protocols was given. Symmetric-Key and Public-
Key cryptography were described. The Integer Factorisation Problem (IFP), the Discrete Loga-
rithm problem (DLP) and the Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm problem (ECDLP) were defined
and how they are used in protocols was described. A short analysis of cryptographic key sizes was
also presented.
The platform tools used to form the underlying technology were described with a short introduc-
tion to FPGAs and the Microblaze soft-core processor along with the Xilinx Embedded Design
Kit used to generate it. The Sasebo GII cryptographic evaluation board and the Xilinx XUPV5-
LX110T Evaluation Platform were presented, upon which, most implementation testing was done.
Constraints associated with hardware implementations were examined and the concept of side
channel attacks was introduced along with various countermeasures relevant to this work. Trade-
offs between area, speed, power and energy were also presented and some metrics were defined
which allow a baseine comparison between the different implementations presented in the thesis.
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Elliptic Curve Cryptography
3.1 Introduction
It was seen in Chapter 2 that finite field arithmetic underpins all elliptic curve based cryptosys-
tems. The efficiency of the system will depend in large part on the efficiency with which addition,
multiplication, squaring and division/inversion can be performed in the underlying field. An as-
sumption is often made that metrics and operations associated with software easily port over and
compare to their hardware equivalents [20, 62]. While for the general case this is true, there are
certain aspects specific to hardware, which provides a benefit for using it. Hardware is generally
much faster than software, requires no additional processing power on the part of the computer
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and generally has more integrity than software-based encryption since it usually operates as a
stand alone unit whereas software based solutions tend to share resources. Indeed the inverse is
also true and software provides benefits of its own; much simpler to deploy and is relatively easy
to extend access to various users.
However, there are some specific differences between implementing any particular algorithm in
hardware or in software. For example, on FPGAs, RAM blocks are used to hold the coordinates
and results from particular calculations. Remarked in various literatures [63, 64] is the use of as
minimal as possible temporary registers for resource constrained systems. This is not so relevant
on FPGAs, as through the use of these blocks of RAM (BRAM), the minimum number of BRAM
available for any pb = 192, where pb is the field size in bits, is identical for any number of
addresses between 2 and 1024.
Another difference between hardware and software, specifically for prime field (Fp) arithmetic
in this case, is the use of squarings. Squarings are relatively straightforward in software, and
indeed in binary extension fields, GF(2m), where a dedicated squarer can be significantly more
efficient in terms of both time and area, and essentially comprises of a two step process of inserting
interleaved zeros followed by a reduction [16, 65]. In Fp a squaring is essentially equivalent to a
multiplication, and as such, multiplication architecture tends to be used to perform field squaring
simply by setting the two inputs of the multiplier to the same value, rather than implementing a
specific squaring architecture, which would result in extra area for only a minor computation time
increase.
However, results presented for the current state of the art algorithms tend to be based on the cost
in software [20, 66] and distinctions are made between multiplications and squarings. Taking an
example from the previous chapter for point addition and point doubling as given in Equation 2.7
and Equation 2.8, it can be seen that the computations involve multiplications (M), squarings (S)
inversions (I), additions (add) and subtractions (sub). In the context where p is a large prime, it is
often assumed for software that:
• The inversion cost is I ≈ 10M.
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• The squaring cost is S ≈ 0.8M.
• The addition cost is equal to the subtraction cost and only takes a few clock cycles, add ≈
sub.
While these costs are architecture reliant in a hardware based system, they are in general equiv-
alent. For the work presented in this thesis, a multiplication takes pb clock cycles, where pb is
the field size in bits and squarings are seen as equivalent to multiplications. It is also stated nu-
merous times in the literature [63, 64, 67]) that field addition and subtraction costs are generally
ignored as being negligable in comparison to multiplications or inversions. This is in general true
in a one-to-one conversion, however, as shown in [68], these operations are not insignificant for
hardware devices, especially when taken alongside other relatively small but numerous operations.
The additions and subtractions presented here take between 2− 4 clock cycles.
While these differences between software and hardware would all appear to be minor, the numer-
ous calculations required to be performed over a large prime field can result in some significant
differences between results reported in the literature for software based implementations and ac-
tual implemented hardware performance.
This chapter examines the performance of various elliptic curve algorithms for prime field (Fp)
arithmetic on a reconfigurable elliptic curve processor (ECP). The underlying modular arithmetic
is presented and different parallel configurations of the processor are investigated in an attempt to
select the best performing algorithms for a hardware based system.
The rest of the chapter is presented as follows. Section 3.2 describes the various forms of dedicated
point doubling and point addition algorithms, namely the Double-and-Add algorithm, specifically
in a number of differing coordinate systems, continuing on from the introductionprovided in 2.4.2.
Section 3.2.4 describes a new form of special curve, namely the twisted Edwards. Recent updates
to this type of curve in the form of the extended twisted Edwards are also examined.
Section 3.3 then describes the reconfigurable elliptic curve processor in detail and presents meth-
ods for modular arithmetic along with methods for performing the scheduling and calculating the
efficiency. Finally, the algorithmic cost of these algorithms and their cost in area for the elliptic
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curve processor are examined for differing numbers of multipliers in parallel.
Section 3.4 describes a method and circuitry for examining the power dissipation and for calcu-
lating the energy and computation time for the various algorithms.
Section 3.5 then goes on to further describe power analysis attacks and how the algorithms ex-
amined so far are susceptible to this type of side channel attack. Various power analysis attack
secure methods are then examined, namely dummy arithmetic instructions in Section 3.6, unified
doubling and addition in Section 3.7 and regular algorithms in Section 3.8. The algorithmic cost
and area, energy and timing results of these SPA secure algorithms are examined in Section 3.9
and Section 3.10.
Section 3.11 then expands on the top performing algorithms and examines the performance for
larger key and field parameters, examining the additional cost associated with security for the
current and forseeable future based on NIST specifications. Finally conclusions are presented in
Section 3.12.
3.2 Dedicated Doubling and Addition
The Double-and-Add algorithm is the classic method for evaluating scalar multiplication, Q =
k[p]. It works on the relation that
k[p] = 2([
k
2
]p); k = even,
k[p] = (2([
k
2
]p) + p); k = odd.
(3.1)
Iterating the process yields a scalar multiplication algorithm, left to right scanning scalar k. This
algorithm is also known as the left-to-right binary method and is presented in Algorithm 1. This
Double-and-Add algorithm requires bk − 1 point doubling operations where bk is the bit length of
the key, and w(k) point additions, where w(k) is the Hamming weight of the key.
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Algorithm 1: Double-and-Add
input : p ∈ E(Fq); k =
∑nk−1
i=0 ki2
i
output: Q = [k]p ∈ E(Fq)
Initialise: Q = p;
for i← nk − 2 to 0 do
Q = 2Q –point double (PD);
ifKi = 1 then
Q = Q+ p –point addition (PA)
end
end
3.2.1 Affine Coordinate System
Elliptic point representation in two coordinates, (x, y), is called affine representation. Simplifying
equations 2.7 and 2.8 to equations 3.2 and 3.3 for (PA) and (PD) respectively, it is obvious that
the computational cost in affine coordinates for the point addition (PA) formula for this type of
representation comprises one inversion and three multiplications, 1I, 2M, 1S and 6add while the
point doubling (PD) formula comprises one inversion and four multiplications, 1I, 2M, 2S and
4addi.
λ = (
y2 − y1
x2 − x1 )
x3 = λ
2 − x1 − x2
y3 = λ(x1 − x3)− y1.
(3.2)
λ = (
3x21 + a
2y1
)
x3 = λ
2 − 2x1
y3 = λ(x1 − x3)− y1.
(3.3)
Clearly, for both PA and PD the field Inversion will be the dominant calculation and as such
the most costly operation. To avoid the need to compute these costly inversions, other coordinate
systems can be used.
3.2.2 Projective Coordinate System
One such coordinate system is projective coordinates, which uses the set of three points (X, Y, Z).
Using this method, inversion can be avoided, albeit at the cost of extra additions. Conversions from
iAs stated earlier in the introduction M = S in Fp and as such are interchangeable. Where necessary, they will be
referred to specifically asM
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and to affine coordinates are made and occur only once, at the beginning and the end of a point
scalar multiplication. To convert from affine to projective coordinates, it is sufficient to set the Z
coordinate equal to one.
(x, y) 7→ (X, Y, 1) (3.4)
The cost of conversion back to affine from projective is two multiplications and an inversion.
(
X
Z
,
Y
Z
) 7→ (x, y) (3.5)
As such, the projective form of the Weierstraß equation
E : y2 + a1xy + a3y = x
3 + a2x
2 + a4x+ a6 (3.6)
defined over a field k is
E : Y 2Z + a1XYZ + a3Y Z
2 = X3 + a2X
2Z + a4XZ
2 + a6Z
3 (3.7)
For standard projective coordinates, after re-labelling a4 = a, a6 = b, the short Weierstraß equa-
tion can be defined [20]:
y2 = x3 + ax + b (3.8)
The projective form of the short Weierstraß equation defined over k is
Y 2 = X3 + aXZ2 + bZ3 (3.9)
The point at infinityO corresponds to (0:1:0), and the negative of (X : Y : Z) is (X : −Y : Z).
The points of the line at infinity do not correspond to any of the affine points.
The equations governing PA and PD in projective coordinates using the Double-and-Add method
are given in Algorithms 2 and 3 respectively. Each PA requires 12M, 2S and 7add. Each PD
requires 8M, 5S and 13add.
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Algorithm 2: Point Addition in Projective Coordinates
input : P (X1, Y1, Z1);
Q(X2, Y2, Z2) ∈ Fq
output: P +Q(X3, Y3, Z3) ∈ E(Fq)
A = X2Z1 −X1Z2, B = Y2Z1 − Y1Z2,
C = B2Z1Z2 − A3 − 2A2X1Z2,
X3 = AC,
Y3 = B(A
2X1Z2 − C)− A3Y1Z2,
Z3 = Z1Z2A
3
Algorithm 3: Point Doubling in Projective Coordinates
input : P (X1, Y1, Z1) ∈ Fq
output: [2]P (X3, Y3, Z3) ∈ E(Fq)
A = 3X21 + a4Z
2
1 , B = Y1Z1,
C = X1Y1B,D = A
2 − 8C,
X3 = −2BD,
Y3 = A(4C −D)− 8Y1B2,
Z3 = 8B
3
The full breakdown for the Double-and-Add algorithms, directly used to generate the instruc-
tion set schedule for the elliptic curve processor described in Section 3.3 are described in Ap-
pendix A.1.
3.2.3 Jacobian Coordinate System
Another commonly used coordinate system is Jacobian coordinates. The point at infinityO corre-
sponds to (1 : 1 : 0), and the negative of (X : Y : Z) is (X : −Y : Z). Conversion from Jacobian
to affine coordinates is trivial and again it is sufficient to set the Z coordinate equal to one.
(x, y) 7→ (X, Y, 1) (3.10)
The cost of conversion back to affine from projective is four multiplications and two inversions.
(
X
Z2
,
Y
Z3
) 7→ (x, y) (3.11)
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The Jacobian form of the short Weierstraß equation, Equation 3.8, defined over k is
Y 2 = X3 + aXZ4 + bZ6 (3.12)
The equations governing PA and PD in Jacobian projective coordinates using theDouble-and-Add
method are given in Algorithms 4 and 5 respectively. Each PA requires 12M, 4S and 7add. Each
PD requires 6M, 4S and 13add.
Algorithm 4: Point Addition in Jacobian Coordinates
input : P (X1, Y1, Z1);
Q(X2, Y2, Z2) ∈ Fq
output: P +Q(X3, Y3, Z3) ∈ E(Fq)
A = X1Z
2
2 , B = X2Z
2
1 ,
C = Y1Z
2
2 , D = Y2Z
3
1 ,
E = B −A, F = D −C,
X3 = −E3 − 2AE2 + F 2,
Y3 = −CE3 + F (AE2 −X3),
Z3 = Z1Z2E
Algorithm 5: Point Doubling in Jacobian Coordinates
input : P (X1, Y1, Z1) ∈ Fq
output: [2]P (X3, Y3, Z3) ∈ E(Fq)
A = 4X1Y
2
1 , B = 3X
2
1 + a4Z
4
1 ,
X3 = −2A+ B2,
Y3 = −8Y 41 + B(A−X3),
Z3 = 2Y1Z1E
It can be seen from the standard projective algorithms, Algorithms 2 and 3, and the Jacobian
projective algorithms, Algorithms 4 and 5, thatPD in standard projective has more multiplications
than Jacobian, but less for PA. Therefore, a key with a low Hamming weight (and therefore less
point additions when compared to point doubles), would be better suited to Jacobian coordinates.
However, the extra multiplications in the Jacobian PD, would somewhat offset this saving.
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3.2.4 Twisted Edwards Curves
In 2007, Edwards [69] introduced an addition law on the curves
x2 + y2 = c2(1 + x2y2), ∀c ∈ k (3.13)
where k is a field of characteristic not equal to 2. He showed that if k is algebraically closed, then
every elliptic curve over k is isomorphic to a curve of this form. If k is finite this is not necessarily
true, and in fact holds only in a very limited number of cases.
In [3], Bernstein and Lange generalised this addition law to the curves
x2 + y2 = 1 + dx2y2, ∀d ∈ k \ {0, 1} (3.14)
More generally, they considered
x2 + y2 = c2(1 + dx2y2) (3.15)
where c, d ∈ k with cd(1− c4.d) 6= 0. However, any such curve is isomorphic to one of the form
x2 + y2 = 1 + d′x2y2 for some d′ ∈ k (3.16)
so it is assumed that c = 1. These curves are referred to as Edwards curves.
Bernstein and Lange showed that if k is finite, a large class of elliptic curves over k (all those
which have a point of order 4) can be represented in Edwards form. To describe the addition law
in more general terms, recall from Section 2.4.1 that for standard operations on the points on any
elliptic curve, such as adding, doubling or tripling points, usually, given two points P and Q on
an elliptic curve, the point P +Q is directly related to the third point of intersection between the
curve and the line that passes through the two points. For Edwards curves this is not the case. The
curve expressed in Edwards form has degree 4, so drawing a line provides not 3 but 4 points of
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intersection on the curve.
In [70], Bernstein et al. introduced the twisted Edwards curves
ax2 + y2 = 1 + dx2y2 (3.17)
where a, d ∈ k are distinct and non-zero, and showed that every elliptic curve with a representation
in Montgomery form [4] is birationally equivalent to a twisted Edwards curve. The projective form
of twisted Edwards are used to again avoid inversion.
These curves are not entirely compliant with standard specifications as NIST [71] only gives one
elliptic curve over a prime field for each size, i.e., the curves P-256, P-384 and P-521. There are
as yet no officially recommended curves in Edwards or twisted Edwards form from the standards
bodiesii. However, these special form curves (also including Montgomery curves [4] and Hessian
curves [73, 74]) have performance advantages over general elliptic curves [3] in relation to faster
scalar multiplication and faster PA and PD.
Algorithm 6: Point Doubling in twisted Edwards Coordinates
input : P (X1, Y1, Z1) ∈ Fq
output : [2]P (X3, Y3, Z3) ∈ E(Fq)
Ensure: (X1 : Y1 : Z1) with Z1 6= 0 satisfy aX2Z2 + Y 2Z2 = Z4 + dX2Y 2
X3 = 2X1Y1(2Z
2
1 − Y 21 − aX21 ),
Y3 = (Y
2
1 − aX21 )(Y 21 + aX21 ),
Z3 = (Y
2
1 + aX
2
1 )(2Z
2
1 − Y 21 − aX21 ).
Note that the projective twisted Edwards curve has two singular points, (1 : 0 : 0) and (0 : 1 : 0),
and the addition law is not defined at these points. An implementation of Edwards or twisted
Edwards curve - based cryptography should not allow either of these points as inputs. For standard
projective twisted Edwards, each PA requires 11M and 8add as shown in Algorithm 6, while the
PD requires 7M and 7add as shown in Algorithm 7. as given in Appendix A.2.
iiThe curve parameters used in this work for twisted Edwards are taken from the literature, namely [66,70,72]
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Algorithm 7: Point Addition in twisted Edwards Coordinates
input : P (X1, Y1, Z1);
Q(X2, Y2, Z2) ∈ Fq
output : P +Q(X3, Y3, Z3) ∈ E(Fq)
Ensure: (X2 : Y2 : Z2) with Z2 6= 0 and T2 = X2Y2/Z2 satisfy
aX2Z2 + Y 2Z2 = Z4 + dX2Y 2
X3 = (X1Y2 − Y1X2)(X1Y1Z22 +X2Y2Z21 ),
Y3 = (Y1Y2 + aX1X2)(X1Y1Z
2
2 −X2Y2Z21 ),
Z3 = Z1Z2(X1Y2 − Y1X2)(Y1Y2 + aX1X2).
3.2.5 Extended Twisted Edwards
In [72], Hisil presented homogeneous projective coordinate building on work presented in [70] on
twisted Edwards curves. He examined homogeneous projective, inverted coordinate, extended ho-
mogeneous projective and mixed coordinate systems. Using this system each point is represented
with four coordinates, (X, Y, T, Z) instead of the standard (X, Y, Z). This auxiliary coordinate T ,
results in a speedup over standard twisted Edwards curves and is defined as T = XY/Z. While
this additional coordinate system results in an increase to the complexity of the point doubling
formula, the cost of the point addition formula decreases and consequently the dedicated addition
can be performed much faster. In this work, the extended homogeneous projective coordinates are
examined.
Algorithm 8: Point Doubling in Extended twisted Edwards Coordinates
input : P (X1, Y1, T1, Z1) ∈ Fq
output : [2]P (X3 : Y3 : T3 : Z3) ∈ E(Fq)
Ensure: (X1 : Y1 : T1 : Z1) with Z1 6= 0 and T1 = X1Y1/Z1 satisfy
aX2Z2 + Y 2Z2 = Z4 + dX2Y 2
X3 = 2X1Y1(2Z
2
1 − Y 21 − aX21 ),
Y3 = (Y
2
1 − aX21 )(Y 21 + aX21 ),
T3 = 2X1Y1(Y
2
1 − aX21 ),
Z3 = (Y
2
1 + aX
2
1 )(2Z
2
1 − Y 21 − aX21 ).
The projective twisted Edwards, requires 9M and 7add for each PA, and requires 8M and 7add
for each PD as given in Algorithm 8 and Algorithm 9. The full breakdown for the twisted and
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Algorithm 9: Point Addition in Extended twisted Edwards Coordinates
input : P (X1, Y1, T1, Z1);
Q(X2, Y2, T2, Z2) ∈ Fq
output : P +Q(X3, Y3, T3, Z3) ∈ E(Fq)
Ensure: (X2 : Y2 : T2 : Z2) with Z2 6= 0 and T2 = X2Y2/Z2 satisfy
aX2Z2 + Y 2Z2 = Z4 + dX2Y 2
X3 = (X1Y2 − Y1X2)(T1Z2 + Z1T2),
Y3 = (Y1Y2 + aX1X2)(T1Z2 − Z1T2),
T3 = (T1Z2 + Z1T2)(T1Z2 + Z1T2),
Z3 = (X1Y2 − Y1X2)(Y1Y2 + aX1X2).
extended twisted Edwards algorithms used to generate the instruction set schedule are given in
Appendix A.2.
3.2.6 Dedicated Algorithm Overview
As a synopsis of each of the Double-and-Add algorithms in different coordinate systems covered
so far, along with the twisted Edwards algorithms, Table 3.1 gives the calculation cost for PA and
PD, where A = Affine, P = Projective, J = Jacobian, tE = twisted Edwards and eE = extended
twisted Edwards. The cost is given in multiplications and squarings in columns 2 and 5, and in
multiplication only in columns 3 and 6.
Table 3.1: Operation Count for Double-and-Add
Point Addition Point Double
Coordinate M and S M only Coordinate M and S M only
A+ A 7→ A 1I 2M 1S 6add 1I 3M 6add [2]A 7→ A 1I 2M 2S 4add 1I 4M 4add
P + P 7→ P 12M 2S 7add 14M 7add [2]P 7→ P 8M 5S 13add 13M 13add
J + J 7→ J 12M 4S 7add 16M 7add [2]J 7→ J 6M 4S 13add 10M 13add
tE + tE 7→ tE 10M 1S 7add 11M 7add [2]tE 7→ tE 3M 4S 7add 7M 7add
eE + eE 7→ eE 9M 7add 9M 7add [2]eE 7→ eE 4M4S 7add 8M 7add
It can be seen from Table 3.1 that the affine coordinates have relatively few multiplications in
comparison to the others but both PA and PD involve a costly inversion. The projectiveDouble-
and-Add has less multiplications for the PA than the Jacobian, but more multiplications for the
PD. By contrast, both the twisted Edwards and extended twisted Edwards require less multiplica-
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tions than the projective and Jacobian, with the twisted Edwards requiring 2M more for addition
and 1M less for doubling than the extended twisted Edwards. It should also be noted that both vari-
ants of Edwards require an additional multiplication by a constant, d, for PD. For PA, standard
twisted Edwards requires two additional multiplications by constants, while the extended variant
requires one. These constants can be set to low values to achieve additional speedup.
There are many more projective coordinate systems, such as Lo´pezDahab, Chudnovsky, and in-
deed many other mixed coordinate systems. The interested reader is directed to [19] for further
information on these curves.
3.3 Elliptic Curve Cryptographic Processor
Next, hardware was developed to implement the various algorithms. The elliptic curve crypto-
graphic processor (ECP), shown in Figure 3.1, is of a similar design to the one used in [75]. It can
be modified to perform any number of different algorithms in Fq. It consists of control circuitry,
BlockRAM for storage of results and a user defined number of computation units, namely field
multipliers, squarers, inversions, adders and subtracters for the operations described in previously,
all generated for FPGA using the Xilinx ISE 12.3 design suite.
This generic architecture is used in the thesis to perform baseline comparisons between each of
the different elliptic curve algorithms and allows the development of a performance based ranking
system describing the hierarchy of the different algorithms.
3.3.1 Control
The controller section consists of an finite state machine (FSM), an instruction set stored in ROM,
the register for storage and manipulation of the key value and associated logic. The ROM block
was generated with Xilinx BlockROM and contains the instructions necessary to run a particular
algorithm, namely the address locations in RAM to be accessed and the particular computation
units required for each particular control step. Using this method, only minor changes to the FSM
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Figure 3.1: Elliptic Curve Processor
and the target algorithm instructions need to be changed to generate the ECP for any particular
algorithm; thereby allowing for accurate comparison of the different implementations.
3.3.2 Modular Arithmetic
The adder and subtracter circuitry is generated using single clock carry propagate adders, and is
defined as the computation of S = A + B(mod p). For modular addition, the modular addition
operation adds A and B in the first adder and subtracts the modulus p from the sum. To subtract
the modulus from the intermediate result, the modulus is bitwise inverted and added to (A + B)
with the carry-in set to 1, thus performing a two’s complement subtraction. The carry-out of the
second adder controls which intermediate result is the correct result. If (A + B) is in the correct
range, the result of the first adder is the correct result. Otherwise, the result from the second adder
is correct. For modular subtraction,B is bitwise inverted and added toA with the carry in set to 1.
If the carry-out of this adder is low, the modulus p is added to give an output in the correct range.
The architecture is shown in Figure 3.2, and the circuit performs an addition or subtraction in four
clock cycles, comprising two clocks for the additions and two clocks for move operations from
and to the RAM.
These arithmetic units are connected to the ECP as shown in Figure 3.1. The instruction set stored
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in ROM selects the address locations in the RAM along with any arithmetic units required to
perform the calculations for a given step. When the calculations are completed, the result is stored
back in RAM. It is clear from the diagram that any number of these units can be added in parallel
to the circuit, at a cost of additional area and a larger ROM address bus to allow selection between
them.
3.3.3 Modular Multiplication
For modularmultiplication, again designed using carry propagate adders and following the process
described in the Montgomery multiplication algorithm [76], the binary number can be computed
while avoiding the need to perform a division by the modulus.
The result of a Montgomery multiplication is out by a factor of 2−pb+2, where pb is the field size
in bits. Due to the large number of multiplications required for calculation by the elliptic curve
processor, it is more cost effective to initially convert all values to the Montgomery domain. At
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Algorithm 10:Montgomery Multiplication
input : A =
∑pb
i=0 ai2
i;B =
∑pb
i=0 bi2
i;M =
∑pb
i=0 pi2
i
output: R = AB2−pb+2(mod p)
Initialise: R← 0; bpb + 1← 0
for i← 0 to pb + 1 do
qi = Ri−1 + biA(mod p)
Ri = (Ri−1 + qiM + biA)/2
end
the beginning of a point scalar multiplication, the input points are converted to the Montgomery
domain and all subsequent arithmetic operations are carried out in this domain. The final result of
the point scalar multiplication is then converted back to the integer domain. The number is Mont-
gomery multiplied by 22pb+2(mod p) for conversion to the Montgomery domain. For conversion
from the Montgomery domain, the number is Montgomery multiplied by 1. The Montgomery
modular product is defined as:
R =Mont(A,B, p) = AB2−pb+2( mod p) (3.18)
where Mont is a Montgomery multiplication. The original proposal of Montgomery has a con-
ditional subtraction at the end of the algorithm. In this work, the number of iterations performed
is pb + 2 in order to bound the output in the range [0, 2p− 1] for multiplicands up to twice the
modulus [77]. This allows it to be used as an input to further multiplications without the need for
the conditional subtraction.
The Architecture is shown in Figure 3.3 and Montgomery multiplication is performed according
to Algorithm 10. The inputs to the first adder are BiA and the previous result Ri−1. qip is added
to the sum of the first adder if the LSB of the sum, qi, is equal to 1. A shift register scans each bit
of B for BiA and the final result is right shift divided by 2. The circuit performs a multiplication
in pb + 2 cycles, inclusive of move operations.
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3.3.4 Modular Inversion
The Extended Euclidean Algorithm (EEA) forms the basis for computing inversion using the
Montgomery inverse [78]. The Montgomery modular inverse of an integer A ∈ [1, m − 1] is
given by
R = A−12k (modM)
where k is the bit length of the modulus. The methods presented by Crowe [78] and Kaliski [79]
of breaking the algorithm into two distinct phases, as shown in Algorithms 11 and 12 are used in
this work.
For Phase 1:
• The While loop performs the EEA.
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• For each iteration of the EEA:
– The U2 and
V
2 variables are compared, and subtracted dependent on which value is
greater.
– A switch variable is used to determine whether the variables RSa or RSb should be
doubled in each operation.
• Continue until V = 0.
• The final steps perform a modular correction to bring the output into the correct range
[1,M − 1].
– RSb is subtracted from RSa, performing a conditional subtraction of the modulus.
– M is added to the result if a negation of the result is necessary.
• Following this, the output should be R = −A−12t, where R ∈ [1, 2M − 1] and t is the
number of iterations performed.
• t is dependent on A andM , and is in the range [k, 2k].
For Phase 2:
• The output from phase 1 is doubled 2k − t times.
• This gives a final output R = A−12k (mod M).
The total amount of clock cycles for phase 1 is t + 2 and the total amount of clocks for phase 1
and 2 together is 2t− k + 2. Again, similar to Montgomery multiplication, it is more practical to
leave the result in the Montgomery domain and convert back to the integer domain at the end of
the calculation.
3.3.5 Scheduling and Efficiency
The schedule, defines the time-steps during which operations are to be executed. As such it di-
rectly controls the throughput, and therefore the speed of an algorithms calculation. Similarly,
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Algorithm 11:Montgomery Inverse (Phase 1)
input : A ∈ [1,M − 1],M, gcd(A,M) = 1
output: R = A−12t (mod M), k ≤ t ≤ 2k
U ⇐M, V ⇐ A,RSa⇐ 1, RSb ⇐ 0, t⇐ 0, switch⇐ 0;
while (V > 0) do
if (U0 = 0) then
U ⇐ U2 − 0;
if (switch = 0) then
RSb ⇐ 2(RSa);
else
RSb ⇐ 2(RSb); switch⇐ 1;
end
else if (V0 = 0) then
V ⇐ V2 − 0;
if (switch = 0) then
RSb ⇐ 2(RSb);
else
RSb ⇐ 2(RSa); switch⇐ 0;
end
else if (U2 >
V
2 ) then
U ⇐ U2 − V2 ;
if (switch = 0) then
RSb ⇐ 2(RSa);
else
RSb ⇐ 2(RSa);RSa⇐ RSa +RSb; switch⇐ 1;
end
else if (V2 ≥ U2 ) then
V ⇐ V2 − U2 ;
if (switch = 0) then
RSb ⇐ 2(RSb);
else
RSb ⇐ 2(RSa);RSa⇐ RSa +RSb; switch⇐ 0;
end
t⇐ t+ 1
end
RSa ⇐ RSa −RSb;
if (RSa < 0) then
RSa ⇐ RSa +M ;
else
R⇐ RSa;
end
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Algorithm 12:Montgomery Inverse (Phase 2)
input : R and t from Phase 1
output: R = A−12k (modM)
RSa ⇐ R;
for i = 0 to 2k − t do
RSa ⇐ R;
if (RSa ≥M ) then
RSa ⇐ RSa −M ;
end
by examining the scheduling of multipliers working in parallel, the area-speed tradeoff can be
optimised, and the best-fit number of multipliers for each particular algorithm can be selected.
A list-based scheduling (LBS) technique [80] was adopted here. In list scheduling, the number
of functional units of each type are constrained and each control step, processed sequentially,
attempts to choose the optimum operation to perform, subject to resource constraints. The LBS
maintains a list of operations whose predecessors have already been scheduled. At each time step
of the algorithm, operations are scheduled to the arithmetic units until the available resources are
exhausted. Once an operation, or set of operations have been scheduled at a given time step, the
list is updated. The process continues until all operations are scheduled. It can be clearly seen from
Table 3.2, that a schedule which allows a number of multipliers to operate in parallel can reduce the
number of multiplication stages required, thereby improving the speed of the algorithms execution.
Although the ECP can be configured to run any number of multipliers in parallel, some operations
in a particular formula are dependent on the results of other operations, which creates a limit
to the amount of parallelism that can be exploited. This leads to redundancy in the design, as
a point is reached where the addition of extra multipliers leads to a decrease in the efficiency,
and results in a small increase in speed at the cost of a large increase in area. The efficiency is
defined as the number of multiplicationoperations that can be run in parallel at each particular time
stage, in relation to the overall number of multipliers available for parallel processing for a time
stage. Parallel addition or subtraction results in a saving of only 4 clock cycles, therefore making
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Table 3.2: Multiplier Efficiency for Dedicated Doubling and Addition
Algorithm no. of no. of Mult. no. of Inv. Eff. no. of Mult. no. of Inv. Eff.
mults Stages Stages % Stages Stages %
Point Doubling Point Addition
Affine 1 4 1 100 3 1 100
Double 2 4 1 50 3 1 50
and 3 4 1 33 3 1 33
Add 4 4 1 25 3 1 25
Projective 1 13 0 100 14 0 100
Double 2 7 0 92 7 0 100
and 3 5 0 86 6 0 77
Add 4 4 0 81 4 0 87
Jacobian 1 10 0 100 16 0 100
Double 2 6 0 83 8 0 100
and 3 5 0 66 6 0 88
Add 4 5 0 50 5 0 80
Dedicated 1 8 0 100 13 0 100
Twisted 2 4 0 100 7 0 92
Edwards 3 3 0 88 5 0 86
4 3 0 66 5 0 65
Dedicated 1 9 0 100 10 0 100
Extended 2 5 0 90 5 0 100
Twisted 3 4 0 75 4 0 83
Edwards 4 3 0 75 3 0 83
the parallelisation of additions or subtractions not area-speed cost effective. As such, referring
back to Figure 3.1, the arithmetic units would normally comprise single addition, subtraction and
inversersion blocks and multiple multiplier blocks.
As stated in Section 3.3.1, the minimum number of BRAM required for any pb = 192 is identical
for any number of addresses between 2 and 1024. Not being constrained by a finite amount of
register/RAM address locations, the scheduler was allowed as many addresses as necessary to suit
the best schedule. This was between 16 and 25 for each of the algorithms under investigation here.
It can be seen from Table 3.2, using the Jacobian Double-and-Add algorithm as an example, that
when there is only 1M operating for all 10 Multiplication stages in PD, the efficiency is at 100%,
i.e. always in use. Similarly forPA the 1M is used for all 16 multiplicationstages. Twomultipliers
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in parallel operate at 83%, so the number of Multiplication stages is reduced to 6 for PD. For
PA, both multipliers are used 100% of the time, halving the number of stages to 8. For 3M,
the efficiency begins to decrease with the number of stages for PD only reducing by one to 5
and for PA only reducing by two to 6. For 4M, there is no reduction for PD and only one
multiplication stage is reduced for PA with the efficiencies dropping to 50% and 80% for PD
and PA respectively.
It is clear from Table 3.2 that the Double-and-Add in affine coordinates cannot be speeded up any
further by the addition of extra multipliers. It is also seen that as multipliers in parallel are added
to the Jacobian and projective coordinates, the efficiency of any more than three multipliers in
parallel does not result in significant speedup in the designs, and in some cases there is a general
reduction in efficiencies for four multipliers.
The efficiency of the parallelisation of dedicated extended twisted Edwards can be seen from the
table. With the standard 1M , the dedicated PD twisted Edwards has one less multiplication stage
than the extended twisted Edwards, but three extra multiplication stages for PA. An increase
in parallelisations leads to an increased performance in both, resulting in the extended twisted
Edwards having, at 3M , a similar performance to the standard twisted Edwards. However at 4M,
it has three multiplication stages for a PD and a PA compared to standard twisted Edwards which
while also having three multiplication stages for a PD has five for a PA.
From this point on, the worst performing algorithms deduced from Table 3.2 can be excluded
since clearly they will not perform adequately when implemented. These would include all of the
parallel affine implementations with performances of 50% or less. The Jacobian for 4M also has
relatively poor efficiency for PD but is retained due to adequate performance for PA.
3.3.6 Algorithmic Cost of Field Operations
It was stated in Section 3.2 that field addition and subtraction costs are generally ignored as being
negligable in comparison to multiplications or inversions. This is in general true in a one-to-one
conversion, i.e. 4 clock cycles for an add versus pb+2 clock cycles for a multiplication. However,
61
3.3. ELLIPTIC CURVE CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROCESSOR
Table 3.3: Clock cycle count for Dedicated Doubling and Addition
Algorithm Hardware no. of Mult. no. of Inv. no. of other Total no. of Mult. no. of Inv. no. of other Total
Multipliers clks clks clks clks clks clks clks clks
Point Doubling Point Addition
Affine 1 776 391 72 1232 582 391 55 1021
Projective 1 2522 0 175 2697 2716 0 160 2879
Double 2 1358 0 157 1515 1358 0 139 1497
and 3 970 0 151 1121 1164 0 136 1300
Add 4 776 0 148 924 776 0 130 906
Jacobian 1 1940 0 148 2088 3104 0 178 3282
Double 2 1164 0 136 1300 1552 0 154 1706
and 3 970 0 133 1103 1164 0 148 1312
Add 4 970 0 133 1103 970 0 145 1152
Dedicated 1 1552 0 106 1658 2522 0 151 2673
Twisted 2 776 0 94 870 1358 0 133 1491
Edwards 3 582 0 91 673 970 0 127 1097
4 582 0 91 673 970 0 127 1097
Dedicated 1 1746 0 117 1863 1940 0 126 2066
Extended 2 970 0 105 1075 970 0 111 1081
Twisted 3 776 0 102 878 776 0 108 884
Edwards 4 582 0 99 681 582 0 105 687
as shown in [68], these operations are not insignificant for hardware devices, especially when
taken alongside other relatively small (but numerous) operations, e.g. move operations. Table 3.3
gives the full cost in clock cycles for each algorithm, subdivided into the cost of the multiplications
and the cost of the other operations using the curve parameters secp192r1 [81]. This is also shown
graphically in Figure 3.4 for an equal Hamming weight message. The dotted lines signify the M
and I calculations only while the solid lines represent the full number of clock cycles required
inclusive of additions, subtractions and move operations (×1000).
While for the single multiplier, adder, subtracter circuit, the ratio of multiplier clocks to other
clocks is on average approximately 14 : 1, it is also clear that as the number of multiplier clocks
reduce due to the scheduling of additional multipliers, the impact of the other clocks attain much
more significance. This can be clearly seen from Figure 3.4. For example, in the case of Jacobian
for four multipliers, the ratio is approximately 7 : 1, thereby giving a big impact on the overall
speed of the algorithm. The results here reflect the previous table where the total final clock count
for the extended twisted Edwards with 4M is approximately 685 for a PA or a PD. The standard
twisted Edwards PD has an additional cost of approximately 400 extra clock cycles per point
addition operation than the extended twisted Edwards using the auxiliary coordinate T .
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Figure 3.4: Clock Count for Dedicated Doubling and Addition
Again, the data presented in Table 3.3 and Figure 3.4 can be used to exclude a number of designs
from further study by examining the performance of the clock cycle count, and predicting how the
final set of results should be expected to perform relative to each other. The full examination of
the Jacobian clock count shows that the performance increase from 3M to 4M is negligible and
so can be excluded. It can also be seen that an increase from 3M to 4M results in no decrease in
clock cycles for the standard twisted Edwards and so while it would appear to outperform most of
the other algorithms this 4M variant can also be excluded as it underperforms in relation to its 3M
counterpart.
3.3.7 Area Results for Dedicated Doubling and Addition
Next, the area of the ECC algorithms was examined for a key and field size of 192 bits. For cases
where average results were to be measured, randomly generated keys each of Hamming weight
of k/2 were used. The number of Occupied Slices is the complete and full measurement of the
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FPGA area in Slices. The Slice Registers and Slice LUTs are secondary area measurements used
simply to give a deeper breakdown of the area. The main differences in circuitry between the
different algorithms is in the control section. As such, there is very minimal divergence in area
measurements, mainly due to how the compiler performed the routing (with the only change being
in the instruction set). Obviously, the area increases as more multipliers are added. For affine
coordinates, only the 1M case is examined as the addition of extra multipliers does not result
in any speedup as previously shown. The area here is also higher due to the additional inverter
circuitry. Similarly, the Jacobian and standard twisted Edwards for 4M have been omitted.
The Block RAM, used to generate the RAM and ROM blocks is measured seperately. In all cases
the instruction set BROM requires a single 18K block, while the BRAM address block require
five 36K blocks and a single 18K block.
Table 3.4: Dedicated Doubling and Addition Area Results
Mult. Algorithm Occupied Slice Slice Algorithm Occupied Slice Slice
Units Slices Reg LUT Slices Reg LUT
1 Affine D&A 1470 3605 5416 - - - -
1 Projective 965 2611 3593 Dedicated 955 2610 3600
2 Double 1551 3195 4565 Extended 1470 3195 4577
3 and 1643 3779 5158 Twisted 1672 3779 5175
4 Add 2012 4364 6128 Edwards 1800 4364 6139
1 Jacobian 973 2609 3618 Dedicated 1167 2609 3598
2 Double 1449 3195 4563 Twisted 1470 3195 4577
3 Add 1643 3779 5158 Edwards 1672 3779 5175
3.4 Measuring the Power Dissipation
The aim of this section was to measure the power and energy consumption of the architecture
described in Section 3.2 when implementing the various different algorithm and coordinate com-
binations. The target implementation platform was the SASEBO-GII cryptographic evaluation
boardiii and results were measured using randomly generated keys each of Hamming weight of
iiiAlthough the SASEBO-GII using the Xilinx Virtex-5 was used to perform the testing, the results obtained through-
out should be equivalent for any different FPGA device.
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k/2 to measure iterations of each of the algorithms from post initial data load to algorithm com-
plete. The onboard Sasebo 24Mhz clock was used and an external power supply was directly
connected for the core voltage of the cryptographic FPGA via an external power meter, namely
the Agilent N6705A. Results were taken from both this meter and a LecroyWaverunner 104Xi os-
cilliscope, measured across the Sasebo’s 1 ohm shunt resistor on the Vcore line and were generated
as follows:
resistor = 1;
meanResistorV oltageDrop = mean(trace);
calculatedCurrent = meanResistorV oltageDrop/resistor;
resistorPower = calculatedCurrent2 × resistor;
meanFpgaV oltage = suppliedV oltage−meanResistorV oltageDrop;
meanFpgaPower = meanFpgaV oltage× calculatedCurrent;
checkFpgaPower = meanFpgaPower + resistorPower
energy = sum((time(end)− time(1))×meanFpgaPower)
(3.19)
In order to obtain a realistic measurement of the power consumption, the circuit must be provided
with appropriate inputs. An IO interface between a host computer and the Sasebo board requires
additional control circuitry. In order to minimise testing time, a test wrapper was created for the
EC processor in place of an IO interface. A diagram of this wrapper is shown in Figure 3.5
The test wrapper, implemented on the Virtex-5 cryptographic FPGA on the Sasebo, consists of a
ROM, counter and FSM. The ROM contains the inputs to the processor i.e the input point P =
(x, y), the curve parameters and the scalar k. The input point and curve parameters need only be
read into the processor once. Then the FSM will load in a scalar k and start the processor. When
the processor has completed the calculation it will load in another scalar and repeat the process.
The wrapper FSM continues on a loop, performing point scalar multiplications with each value of
k. There are two input pins to the wrapper. The reset pin allows the wrapper and EC processor
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Figure 3.5: Power Wrapper
to be reset. It is connected to a switch on the board. The clock pin allows an external oscillator
to clock the design (however, the results presented here are for the onboard Sasebo 24Mhz clock).
The start and end trigger signal is routed to an output pin. This is used to trigger the oscilloscope
to capture the current waveform as the EC processor performs a calculation. The cost of the
wrapper in terms of FPGA resources is only two BRAM and a few hundred slices. This cost is
low in comparison to the cost of the EC processor. It is also noted that the wrapper overhead is
constant for each of the algorithm and coordinate choices and therefore will not bias any particular
set of choices. With the wrapper and the EC processor implemented on the cryptographic FPGA,
the current drawn can be measured via a shunt resistor. This allowed the average current to be
measured. This is the current of interest when considering energy consumption.
It is noted that the very act of measurement will alter the current drawn by the FPGA due to the
voltage drop across the Sasebo’s 1 ohm shunt resistor on the Vcore line which is connected in
series. However, experimental measurement found that this voltage drop was very small and that
for all the designs tested the voltages supplied to the FPGA remained within the recommended
operating levels as specified in [82].
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3.4.1 Dedicated Doubling and Addition Power Results
The results generated are given in Table 3.5. Columns 3 gives the reading from the power meter.
Both the current and the power supplied use the same values due to the voltage being 1V and
P = I × V . Subsequent columns give the results calculated using Equation 3.19. Column 4
gives the mean power (µ), while the final two columns present the time taken to perform a full
calculation of the algorithm and the energy expended to perform that calculation. In both cases,
the lower the value, the better the result, with the best results in each category highlighted in bold.
Table 3.5: FPGA Power and Timing Results for Double-and-Add
Algorithm Mult. Supplied µ FPGA Calc. Energy
Units Current-Power Power Time
mA - mW mW mS mJ
Affine D&A 1 151.9 120.2 13.9 1.7
Projective 1 150.0 119.5 32.6 3.9
Double 2 157.2 124.0 17.8 2.2
and 3 164.8 130.0 13.9 1.8
Add 4 171.3 132.4 10.8 1.4
Jacobian 1 148.9 118.8 25.4 3.0
Double 2 156.3 123.5 16.9 2.1
Add 3 164.5 130.2 13.8 1.8
Twisted 1 150.7 119.2 23.6 2.8
Edwards 2 157.1 123.4 12.7 1.6
Dedicated 3 165.6 130.4 9.6 1.2
Extended 1 148.2 118.8 22.8 2.7
Twisted 2 156.2 123.4 12.8 1.7
Edwards 3 164.6 129.7 10.4 1.3
Dedicated 4 167.5 131.1 8.0 1.1
Immediately obvious from the table is that the mean power is similar, regardless of the algorithm,
for each of the four multiplier units. However the energy differs betweem them due to the com-
putation time difference. Indeed it is also clear from the results that there is a strong correlation
between the calculation time and the energy. As such, either metric could be used to categorise
the algorithms. It can also be seen from the table that the affine coordinates give quite good tim-
ing and energy results when compared to the other coordinate systems for 1M for a key with an
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average Hamming weight. However, as it does not scale with parallelisation, it is overtaken in
both the calculation time and energy usage by the other coordinate systems by additional parallel
multipliers. The Jacobian coordinates initially are faster for 1M with more energy efficiency than
the projective coordinates, but the latter makes better use of parallelisation to overtake the former
in timing, albeit at a greater cost in energy. The standard twisted Edwards perform best at 2M
and 3M, but the extended twisted Edwards give the best performance at 4M and indeed the best
performance overall.
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Figure 3.6: Average Power Dissipation
Figures 3.6(a) and 3.6(b) show the average power dissipation for the results, giving the quiescent
power and the dynamic power. The quiescent power is the power that the board is drawing when
the design is programmed and the clock is connected but reset is held active, thereby preventing
any switching from occurring in the circuit. It is a measure of the standby power drawn by the
FPGA. The larger the amount of logic resources used, the higher the quiescent power. By contrast,
the dynamic power is the power dissipated by logic switching within the FPGA. It is calculated
as the difference between the total average power and the quiescent power. The energy results
presented in Table 3.5 are calculated using the total power.
Immediately striking from the graphs is the large quiescent power compared to the dynamic power.
This is mainy due to the fact that the quiescent power encompasses all of the components on
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the Sasebo board, while the dynamic power increase is due only to the operation of the Virtex
5 cryptographic FPGA. Also noticeable is that while the dynamic power is small for a single
multiplier, it increases as additional multipliers are added. This is due to the fact that in each
architecture, the critical path is through the long carry propagate adders (CPA) as described in
Section 3.3.2. These adders are implemented on FPGA using long carry chains in the CLBs
organised in columns. The ripple effect of adding two inputs (and a carry) with these adders
creates a large amount of switching activity. It is also due in part to the additional switching due
to the larger circuit area.
As seen in Figure 3.6(b), the average dynamic power differs between the different algorithms. This
is due in part to both the multiplier efficiency as shown in Table 3.2, i.e. how often the multipliers
are operational, and the multiplier usage as shown in Table 3.3, i.e. how long the multipliers are
operational. Examining the designs individually shows that the affine double and add has a large
average power due to the inverter, the projective version has the next highest average dynamic
power for 1, 2 and 4M. The reduction at 3M is mostly due to the drop off in efficiency for three
multipliers. The Jacobian variant follows a similar pattern to the the projective, with a slightly
lower power in most cases. The standard twisted Edwards give the highest average power at 3M
due to the relative high efficiency at this setup as seen by the calculation time in Table 3.5. While
the extended twisted Edwards efficiency is high throughout, its multiplier usage is also quite low,
thereby resulting in the lowest average power throughout.
3.4.2 Area-Time and Area Energy Product
It can be seen from Figure 3.6(b) and Table 3.5 that a high average power does not necessarily
result in a high energy result. Indeed, with three multipliers, the twisted Edwards results in the
highest average power usage but the lowest energy usage due to its shorter calculation time relative
to the other designs. As a method of further comparing the designs examined so far, the metrics
from Section 2.10 were used. The area-time product (ATP) was calculated to get a representation
of any speed decrease relative to the increase in size. This gives a more accurate representation
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of the cost that each increase in multiplier has in relation to the overall system. The area-energy
product (AEP) was calculated using the dynamic power to give a representation of the energy
increase against the increase in size. The power naturally increases with an increase in area,
however the energy costs are reduced due to the calculation being performed faster. This therefore
shows the best increase in area for a decrease in energy. In both cases, the lower the value, the
better the performance. These are shown graphically in Figure 3.7 and Figure 3.8.
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A number of things can be seen from Figure 3.7. Firstly, the Affine Double-and-Add gives the
best ATP for a single multiplier. This outperforms the Projective and Jacobian Double-and-Add
algorithms, however it must be noted that this result is determined on the key value, and a different
key could cause a large increase in the timing cost for the inversion. In contrast, the two twisted
Edwards algorithms outperform the Affine coordinates from 2M onward and subsequently greatly
outperform the Projective and Jacobian Double-and-Add algorithms. They have the same result
for 2M, while the standard twisted Edwards performing best for 3M and the extended twisted
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Edwards performing best (and best overall) at 4M.
Figure 3.8 gives the AEP. It is seen that there is a general increase in the AEP for each additional
multiplier for each of the algorithms. The extended twisted Edwards and the Jacobian perform
best with a single multiplier followed closely by the affine coordinates and the standard twisted
Edwards. From 2M onwards, both twisted Edwards have much better performance when compared
to the Projective and Jacobian forms of the Double-and-Add algorithm and at 4M the extended
twisted Edwards actually shows a slight reduction in the AEP compared to its 3M equivalent.
Figure 3.9 provide a comparison between what was expected, with Figure 3.9(a) giving a reduced
graph of the clock cycle count presented in Figure 3.4, and Figure 3.9(b) giving the full set of
measured results from Figure 3.7. It can be seen in this case that the measured results do somewhat
follow the same trend as the expected results, with each algorithm in the same hierarchy from 2M
onwards, after allowing for the affine increase in area with no reduction in time. For 1M, the
Jacobian performs better than the standard Edwards due to the larger area associated with the
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latter.
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Figure 3.9: Estimated Dynamic Versus Measured Results
In conclusion, it has been shown that the basic elliptic curve processor design with a single mul-
tiplier gives good performance using the affine coordinates. Even though affine gives a larger
average power and area due to the inverter circuitry, its computation time is sufficiently fast com-
pared to the other double and add algorithms that it outperforms the others in area-time, and the
other Double-and-Add algorithms in area-energy. For multipliers in parallel, the two Edwards
special form curves outperform the standard curves, and the speed advantages over general elliptic
curves in relation to faster scalar multiplication are clear to see from the area-time and area-energy
products. However, all of these algorithms are susceptible to power analysis attacks as is described
in Section 3.5.
3.5 Power Analysis Attacks
It was shown in Section 2.9.1 that simple and differential power analysis (SPA and DPA) [59]
attacks measure leaked power consumption of a cryptographic device. From this leaked data, an
attacker tries to deduce the inner workings of the algorithm, and in so doing, deduce the hidden
information. SPA works on the premise that the amount of power drawn from a circuit is dependent
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(indirectly) on the operation being performed. As such, various data can be gleaned, such as the
Hamming weight, individual bits or bit sequences and memory addressing. Avanzi states in [83]
that observing a single trace of leaked emissions, one can reconstruct the sequence of elementary
instructions performed by the processor, and thus infer the sequence of group operations. In an
elliptic or hyperelliptic curve implementation with distinguishable group addition and doubling,
and with a simple double-and-add scalar multiplication scheme, it is possible to reconstruct the
secret scalar just from the observed sequence of distinct group operations.
Section 3.2 described dedicated doubling and addition formulæ standard algorithms for perform-
ing scalar multiplication, whereby the binary algorithm scans the bits and performs a point dou-
bling operation for every bit. If a bit is a “1”, it also performs a point addition operation. These
algorithms, while being simple and efficient, are susceptible to power analysis attacks as defined
above since the power trace for a point doubling is different from that of a point addition.
To reduce this side channel attack (SCA), some methods of making the observable information
independent of the secret scalar are examined. The following sections describe some of these
methods, namely dummy arithmetic instructions, unified formulas and regular algorithms and
again attempts to find the best performance algorithm when implemented in hardware.
3.6 Dummy Arithmetic Instructions
One such method of ensuring SPA resistance is theDouble-and-Add-Always [84] algorithm, given
in Algorithm 13, where a dummy point operation is completed for every “0” bit, thus making
a regular succession of point doublings followed by point additions. This dummy arithmetic
operation method is universal and works for all groups, making them homogenous.
However, while securing against SPA, an increase in calculation time and hardware resources is
also introduced. In certain situations, such as elliptic curves in affine coordinates, where the PA
and PD operations are quite similar, this method is quite attractive as the cost overhead of the
dummy operations is minimal. For other coordinate systems where PA and PD differ greatly, it
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Algorithm 13: Double-and-Add-Always
input : p ∈ E(Fq); k =
∑nk−1
i=0 ki2
i
output: Q = [k]p ∈ E(Fq)
Initialise: Q = p
for i← nk − 2 to 0 do
Q[0] = 2Q[0]
Q[1] = Q[0] + p
Q[0] = Q[ki]
end
can be a quite expensive protective measure. Also, it has been proven that dummy point operations
can be insecure against fault attacks [85,86], i.e. introducing faults into a device in order to produce
an erroneous output.
3.7 Unified Doubling and Addition
The unified approach, suitable for elliptic curves, involves using the same set of formulas in the
scalar multiplications for both point addition and point multiplication. The main benefit of this
type of operation is that there are no dummy operations, thus making them secure against fault
attacks. There can however be a reduction in speed, compared to the standard algorithms, due to
the nature of the unified formulas. As such, certain representations of the Weierstraß elliptic curve
can perform much faster than others, and other non-Weierstraß curves may not profit at all [60].
Along with an increase in calculation speed, an additional advantage of Edwards and twisted
Edwards curves is that the addition laws defined on them can be made unified, i.e., a single addition
formula can be used to add points and double points, with no exception for the identity. [3].
The unified versions of both the standard twisted Edwards and the extended twisted Edwards are
examined, and compared against the standard curves using dummy arithmetic and regular scalar
formulæ. Algorithm 14 give the unified formula for standard twisted Edwards, while Algorithm 15
for extended twisted Edwards.
The unified single point operation, processes the same formula for both PA and PD, thereby giving
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Algorithm 14: Unified Addition in twisted Edwards Coordinates
input : P (X1, Y1, Z1);
Q(X2, Y2, Z2) ∈ Fq
output: P +Q(X3, Y3, Z3) ∈ E(Fq)
X3 = Z1Z2(X1Y2 +X2Y1)(Z
2
1Z
2
2 − dX1X2Y1Y2),
Y3 = Z1Z2(Y1Y2 − aX1X2)(Z21Z22 + dX1X2Y1Y2),
Z3 = (Z
2
1Z
2
2 − dX1X2Y1Y2)(Z21Z22 + dX1X2Y1Y2).
Algorithm 15: Unified Addition in Extended twisted Edwards Coordinates
input : P (X1, Y1, T1, Z1);
Q(X2, Y2, T2, Z2) ∈ Fq
output : P +Q(X3, Y3, T3, Z3) ∈ E(Fq)
Ensure: Z2 6= 0 and T2 = X2Y2/Z2 satisfy aX2Z2 + Y 2Z2 = Z4 + dX2Y 2
X3 = (X1Y2 + Y1X2)(Z1Z2 − dT1T2),
Y3 = (Y1Y2 − aX1X2)(Z1Z2 − dT1T2),
T3 = (X1Y2 + Y1X2)(Y1Y2 − aX1X2),
Z3 = (Z1Z2 − dT1T2)(Z1Z2 + dT1T2),
it the same power trace for either operation, at a cost of 12M and 7add per point operation. The
extended unified formula performs better at 9M and 7add. Comparing this against the dedicated
twisted Edwards formulæ from Section 3.2.4, as shown in Table 3.6, shows an increase of 2M
for the standard twisted Edwards and only an additional multiplication by a constant, d, for the
extended case.
Table 3.6: Operation Count for twisted Edwards
Point Addition Unified
Coord. M and S M only M and S M only
tE 10M 1S 1d 7add 11M 7add 11M 1S 2d 7add 12M 7add
eE 9M 1d 7add 9M 7add 9M 2d 7add 9M 7add
The full breakdown for the Edwards algorithms, directly used to generate the instruction set for
the elliptic curve processor are described in Appendix A.2.
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3.8 Regular Scalar Multiplication
Using scalar multiplication algorithms which use a fixed sequence of group operations, indepen-
dent of the scalar, is another method of protecting against SSCA. Two such binary algorithms,
which provide efficient regular scalar multiplication without the use of dummy operations are
the Montgomery ladder [4], given in Algorithm 16 and the Joye Double-and-Add [5], given in
Algorithm 17.
Algorithm 16:Montgomery Ladder
input : P ∈ E(Fq) and k = (kn−1, . . . , k0)2 ∈ N
output: Q = kP
R0 ← O, R1 ← P
for i = n− 1 down to 0 do
b← ki, R1−b ← R1−b +Rb, Rb ← 2Rb
end
return R0
Algorithm 17: Joye’s Double-Add
input : P ∈ E(Fq) and k = (kn−1, . . . , k0)2 ∈ N
output: Q = kP
R0 ← O, R1 ← P
for i = 0 to n − 1 do
b← ki, R1−b ← 2R1−b +Rb
end
return R0
Each iteration of the Montgomery ladder performs a PA followed by a PD, so to an attacker, the
side channel information is viewed as an alternating series of doublings and additions. There is of
course a performance penalty associated with this similar to the Double-and-Add-Always along
with adding to the storage requirements, as stated earlier, an important constraint in software.
Alternatively, the Joye Double-and-Add, while also repeating a pattern of doublings and additions,
requires only two point registers, and so is a cheaper memory alternative in software compared to
the Montgomery ladder.
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In [87], Meloni proposed adding two pointswhile sharing the same Z coordinate, thereby allowing
faster addition. The key observation in Meloni’s addition is that the computation of R = P +Q
yields for free an additional representation for P . This operation is referred to as the ZADD
operation.
Goundar et al. [63,88,89] introduced the co-Z operationsZADDU requiring 7M (5M+2S+6add),
and conjugate co-Z addition and denoted ZADDC (for ZADD conjugate), using the efficient
caching technique described in [90, 91]. The total cost for the ZADDC operation is 9M (6M +
3S + 15add).
Furthermore, Hutter et al. [64] presented a co-Z version of x-coordinate only formulæ referred to
as differential addition-and-doubling and denoted as AddDblCoZ. These formulæ take two input
points, P = (X1, Z) and Q = (X2, Z) on EH, sharing the same Z-coordinate, and outputs a pair
of points, their addition P ′ = P + Q = (X ′1, Z
′) and doubling Q′ = 2Q = (X ′2, Z
′), sharing
the same Z-coordinate. The cost of this formula is 15M (11M+ 4S + 1Ma + 1M4b + 14add) as
detailed in [64].
They optimise this formula by replacing the multiplication expression X1X2 with the equivalent
(X21 +X
2
2 − (X1 −X2)2)/2 and later multiplied with a factor of 2. The cost of this optimisation
is 14M (9M+ 5S+ 1Ma + 1M4b + 14add).
They further optimise the formula for cases where the curve parameters a and b are dynamic by
initialising three additional coordinates Ta = aZ
2, Tb = 4bZ
3 and TD = xDZ to finally obtain
algorithm 6 in [64]. The given formula reduces the memory by one register and increases the
performance by 1M ifMa =Mb = 1M . The cost of this is 15M (10M+ 5S+ 13add).
The full algorithms can be found in Appendix A.3 and the interested reader is referred to [63,64,
88,89] for an in-depth explanation on how to efficiently carry out these computations using co-Z
arithmetic for elliptic curves.
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3.8.1 Co-Z Arithmetic
In the original Montgomery ladder, registers R0 and R1 are respectively initialised with point at
infinityO and input point P . SinceO is the only point with its Z-coordinate equal to 0, assuming
that kn−1 = 1, the loop counter is started at i = n − 2 and R0 is initialised to P and R1 to 2P .
Next, ensure that the representations of P and 2P have the same Z-coordinate. This is achieved
through the use of the DBLU which requires 6M (1Mul + 5Squ).
Putting together the DBLU algorithm with ZADDU and ZADDC (from Appendix A.3), the im-
plementation depicted in Algorithm 18 is obtained for the Montgomery ladder.
Algorithm 18:Montgomery ladder with Xo-Z Addition Formulæ
input : P = (xP , yP ) ∈ E(Fq) and k = (kn−1, . . . , k0)2 ∈ N with kn−1 = 1
output: Q = kP
(R1, R0)← DBLU(P )
for i = n− 2 down to 0 do
b← ki, (R1−b, Rb)← ZADDC(Rb, R1−b)
(Rb, R1−b)← ZADDU(R1−b, Rb)
end
return R0
In Algorithm 19, the main loop of the Montgomery ladder is replaced by the differential addition-
and-doubling formulæ of Hutter et al. Their algorithm (i.e. algorithm 3 in [64]) is modified by
substituting the initialisation step for (X,Z)-only coordinate of a new efficient formula referred
to as doubling addition with update in homogeneous coordinates, and denoted DBLUH, which
requires 9M (4M + 5S). The notationDBLUH
∗ refers toX and Z coordinates only (excludes Y
coordinate) and the cost of which is 8M (3M+ 5S).
The function recoverfullcoordinates recovers the full projective coordinates of the output point
Q = kP , from the x-coordinatesR0 = (X1, Z) and R1 = (X2, Z) at the end of the Montgomery
ladder, details of which appear in Appendix A.3.
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Algorithm 19:Montgomery Ladder with (X,Z)-Only Co-Z Addition Formulæ
input : P = (xP , yP ) ∈ E(Fq) and k = (kn−1, . . . , k0)2 ∈ N with kn−1 = 1
output: Q = kP
(X1, X2, Z)← DBLUH∗(P )
for i = n− 2 down to 0 do
b← ki, (X2−b, X1+b, Z)← ADC(X2−b, X1+b, Z)
end
Q←recoverfullcoordinates(X1, X2, Z)
return (Q)
3.8.2 Combined Double-Add Operation
A point doubling-addition is the evaluation ofR = [2]P+Q. This can be done in two steps as T ←
P+Q followed byR← P+T . If P andQ have the sameZ-coordinate, this requires 14M (10M+
4S) by two consecutive applications of the ZADDU function.The resulting algorithm ZDAU (co-
Z double-add with update) operation only requires 9M+7S and is detailed in Appendix A.3. The
triple of P = (X1 : Y1 : 1) can be evaluated as [3]P = P + [2]P using co-Z arithmetic [92].
The combined ZDAU operation immediately gives rise to an alternative implementation of Joye’s
double-add algorithm. The resulting algorithm is presented in Algorithm 21 Compared to the first
implementation (Alg. 20), from a software perspective, the cost per bit now amounts to 9M+ 7S
instead of 11M + 5S, an obvious speedup using the S = 0.8M metric. In hardware however,
both require 16M, and so the scheduling of the algorithm will be the deciding factor for which
algorithm is the faster.
3.8.3 (X,Y)-only operations
The co-Z Montgomery ladder can be rewritten so as only to process X- and Y -coordinates. Op-
eration ZACAU′iv is defined as the combination of operation ZADDC′ followed by operation
ZACAU′. This is used to obtain an (X, Y )-only implementation of the Montgomery ladder, Al-
gorithm 22. Using this formula, the cost per bit amounts to 14M (8M+ 6S).
(X, Y )-only co-Z operations can also be used with left-to-right signed-digit algorithms. Specifi-
ivThe prime symbol ′ is used to denote operations that do not involve the Z-coordinate.
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Algorithm 20: Joye’s Double-Add Algorithm with Co-Z Addition formulæ
input : P = (xP , yP ) ∈ E(Fq) and k = (kn−1, . . . , k0)2 ∈ N with k0 = 1
output: Q = kP
b← k1,
(R1−b, Rb)← TPLU(P )
for i = 2 to n − 1 do
b← ki,
(Rb, R1−b)← ZADDU(R1−b, Rb)
(R1−b, Rb)← ZADDC(Rb, R1−b)
end
return R0
Algorithm 21: Joye’s Double-Add Algorithm with Co-Z Addition Formulæ (II)
input : P = (xP , yP ) ∈ E(Fq) and k = (kn−1, . . . , k0)2 ∈ N with k0 = 1
output: Q = kP
b← k1,
(R1−b, Rb)← TPLU(P )
for i = 2 to n − 1 do
b← ki,
(R1−b, Rb)← ZDAU(R1−b, Rb)
end
return R0
cally, a ZADDU′ followed by a ZADDC′ can be performd to obtain an (X, Y )-only double-add
operation with a co-Z update: ZDAU′. The total cost of this operation is 14M (8M + 6S). The
complete algorithm is detailed in Algorithm 23 [67,89], or from the author [93].
Table 3.7 gives a summary of scalar multiplication algorithms which are implemented on co-Z ad-
dition formulæ. Not taken into account in the designs presented here, and indeed for the Edwards
curves, are cases where speed-up is acquired by setting certain curve parameters to constants, such
as those described in [66, 94, 95]. While the existence of these are acknowledged, the aim of this
work is to determine the underlying performance of the general case. As such, these optimised
cases are not examined here. For further reading on the above three methods of mathematically
securing algorithms against SPA attacks, the interested reader is directed to the 2005 paper by
Avanzi [83] and the Lange chapter on mathematical countermeasures of [20].
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Algorithm 22:Montgomery Ladder with (X, Y )-Only Co-Z Addition Formulæ
input : P = (xP , yP ) ∈ E(Fq) and k = (kn−1, . . . , k0)2 ∈ N with kn−1 = 1
output: Q = kP
(R1, R0)← DBLU′(P )
C ← (X(R0)−X(R1))2
for i = n− 2 down to 1 do
b← ki, (Rb, R1−b, C)← ZACAU′(Rb, R1−b, C)
end
b← k0
(R1−b, Rb)← ZADDC′(Rb, R1−b), (xP , yP )← P
Z ← xPY (Rb)(X(R0)−X(R1)), λ← yPX(Rb)
(Rb, R1−b)← ZADDU′(R1−b, Rb)
return( λZ )
2X(R0), (
λ
Z )
3Y (R0))
Algorithm 23: Left-to-Right Signed-Digit Algorithm with (X, Y )-Only co-Z addition for-
mulæ
input : P = (xP , yP ) ∈ E(Fq) and k = (kn−1, . . . , k0)2 ∈ N≥3 with k0 = kn−1 = 1
output: Q = kP
(R0, R1)← TPLU′(P ) for i = n − 2 down to 1 do
b← ki ⊕ ki+1, R1 ← (−1)bR1, (R0, R1)← ZDAU′(R0, R1)
end
R1 ← (−1)1+k1R1
(xP , yP )← P
λ← yPX(R1)
xP Y (R1)
return (λ2X(R0), λ
3Y (R0))
Table 3.7: Operation Usage for Various Co-Z Addition Formulæ
Algorithm Main op. Other op.
Left-to-right algorithms:
Mont. ladder co-Z addition (Alg. 18) ZADDC, ZADDU DBLU
Mont. ladder (X,Z)-only (Alg. 19) AddDblCoZ DBLUH
∗, recoverfullcoordinates
Mont. ladder (X, Y )-only (Alg. 22) ZACAU′ DBLU′, ZADDC′, ZADDU′
Signed-digit (X, Y )-only (Alg. 23) ZDAU′ TPLU′
Right-to-Left algorithms:
Joye’s double-add co-Z I (Alg. 20) ZADDU, ZADDC TPLU
Joye’s double-add co-Z II (Alg. 21) ZDAU TPLU
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3.9 Algorithmic Cost of SPA Secure Algorithms
Table 3.8 gives the efficiency costs for the SPA secure algorithms based on their response to par-
allelisation. This response, based on the count of the clock cycles, allows a general comparison
of how each of the algorithms are expected to perform independent of the technology used. The
table shows that the Double-and-Always-Addalgorithm responds well to parallelisation. It is clear
from the table that while the Joye II algorithm would appear to have a better computation time in
software due to the ratio of S to M, in a hardware based system with an equal number of M, the
Joye I algorithm appears to make more efficient use of parallelisation. In the case of the Joye
I and the Montgomery Ladder co-Z algorithms, neither the ZADDC or the ZADDU algorithm
benefits greatly from parallelisation. Similarly the algorithms for Joye II and Signed Digit also do
not benefit much. The Montgomery Ladder XZ algorithms perform better with increased paral-
lelisation. Contrasting against the Edwards algorithms; the unified twisted Edwards, the standard
algorithm does not perform so well, while the extended twisted Edwards algorithmmakes best use
of parallelisation of all the algorithms with 91%multiplier usage for 2M to 4M.
The clock count associated with this is given in Table 3.9. Again, it is seen that the algorithms
with the lowest clock counts, such as the AddDblCoZ and extended twisted Edwards algorithms
will give the best time performance. It is also seen that the algorithms associated with the Joye I
and the Montgomery Ladder co-Z, namely the ZADDC and ZADDU, fail to give any speed-up
from 3M to 4M. As such, the 4M case can be omitted in both cases. Similarly the difference in
clock cycles between the ML (X,Z)1 and ML (X,Z)2 are minimal for the AddDblCoZ algorithm
for 3M and 4M. As such, both of these algorithms are merged going forward for the 3M and 4M
cases, with the best results given.
For the ML (X,Z)3, there is no reduction in clock cycles from 3M to 4M for the AddDblCoZ3,
however, there is a speed-up for the second part of the algorithm, the recoverfullcoordinates2,
so this algorithm is kept.
A graphical representation similar to that of Figure 3.4 is again presented. Figure 3.10 gives a
ballpark estimate of the expected hierarchy of the SPA secure algorithms based on their clock
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Table 3.8: Multiplier Efficiency for SPA Secure Algorithms
Algorithm no. of no. of Mult Eff. no. of Mult Eff.
Mult. Stages % Stages %
PD-PAdummy PD-PA
Double 1 26 100 26 100
and 2 13 100 13 100
Always 3 9 96 9 96
Add 4 8 81 8 81
Standard Extended
Unified 1 14 100 11 100
Twisted 2 9 77 6 91
Edwards 3 7 66 4 91
4 6 58 3 91
ZADDU (Alg. 38) ZADDC (Alg. 38)
ML co-Z 1 7 100 9 100
(Alg. 18) 2 4 87 5 90
Joye I 3 3 77 3 100
(Alg. 20) 4 3 58 3 75
ZDAU (Alg. 43) ZDAU′
Joye II 1 15 100 14 100
(Alg. 21) 2 9 88 8 87
SD (X,Y) 3 7 76 6 77
(Alg. 23) 4 6 66 5 70
AddDblCoZ1 (Alg. 40) AddDblCoZ2 (Alg. 41)
ML (X,Z) 1 17 100 16 100
(Alg. 19) 2 9 94 8 100
3 6 94 6 88
4 5 85 5 80
AddDblCoZ3 (Alg. 42) ZACAU′ (Alg. 44)
ML (X,Z) 1 15 100 14 100
(Alg. 19) 2 8 93 7 100
ML (X,Y) 3 5 100 5 93
(Alg. 22) 4 5 75 4 87
cycle count. From this it would seem that the unified extended twisted Edwards should perform
strongly compared to the rest and the Double and Always Add should perform worst.
3.10 Area and Power Results for SPA Secure Algorithms
The area results for the dummy algorithm, regular algorithms and unified algorithms are omitted
due to them being very similar to those given for the dedicated case in Table 3.4. In most cases the
M requires between 900 and 1200 occupied slices and increases by approximately 200 slices per
additional multiplier. The instruction set BROM requires a single 18K block, while the BRAM
address block requires five 36K blocks and a single 18K block. In the case of the Double and
Always Add, an additional 36K block is required.
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Table 3.9: Clock Cycle Count per SPA Secure Algorithm
Hardware No. of Mult. No. of other Total No. of Mult. No. of other Total No. of Mult. No. of other Total
Multipliers clks clks clks clks clks clks clks clks clks
PD-PAdummy Standard tw Ed Extended tw Ed
1M 5044 320 5364 2716 148 2864 2134 135 2269
2M 2522 281 2803 1746 133 1879 1164 120 1284
3M 1746 269 2015 1358 127 1485 776 114 890
4M 1552 266 1818 1164 124 1288 582 111 693
ZADDU ZADDC ZDAU
1M 1358 103 1461 1746 141 1887 3104 264 3368
2M 776 94 870 970 129 1099 1746 243 1989
3M 582 91 673 582 123 705 1358 237 1595
4M 582 91 673 582 123 705 1164 235 1398
AddDblCoZ1 AddDblCoZ2 recoverfullcoordinates1
1M 3298 215 3513 3104 206 3310 2328 146 2474
2M 1746 191 1937 1552 182 1734 1164 128 1292
3M 1164 182 1346 1164 176 1340 970 125 1095
4M 970 179 1149 970 176 1143 776 122 898
AddDblCoZ3 recoverfullcoordinates2 ZACAU′
1M 2910 197 3107 2522 155 2677 2716 292 3008
2M 1552 176 1728 1358 137 1495 1358 271 1629
3M 970 167 1137 970 131 1101 970 265 1235
4M 970 167 1137 776 128 904 776 262 1038
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Figure 3.10: Clock Count for SPA Secure Doubling and Addition
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Table 3.10 gives the timing, power and energy results. The results in bold again represent the
lowest and best values for each set of parallelisation case. The Double-and-Always-Add, while
being the slowest at 1M performs quite well for parallelisation and the speedup performance is
quite acceptable at 4M. The Signed Digit algorithm performs best with the lowest computation
time and energy for the standard 1M case. The Montgomery ladder (XY) gives the best results
for the 2M case, while the Montgomery ladder (XZ) for three multipliers in parallel. For four
multipliers, the extended twisted Edwards and theMontgomery ladder (XY) have the same energy
usage, but the extended twisted Edwards has a faster computation time.
Table 3.10: SPA Secure Power and Timing Results
No of. Alg. Suppl. µ Calc. Energy No of. Alg. Suppl. µ Calc. Energy
Mult. I-P Power Time Mult. I-P Power Time
mA - mW mW mS mJ mA - mW mW mS mJ
1 Double 150.6 119.8 42.3 5.1 1 Twisted 148.8 119.7 33.8 4.1
2 and 157.3 123.8 22.0 2.7 2 Edwards 154.7 123.3 22.2 2.7
3 Always 163.9 129.0 15.8 2.0 3 Unified 165.1 130.6 17.5 2.3
4 Add 169.1 132.1 14.2 1.9 4 168.5 156.6 15.2 2.0
1 Extended 148.7 119.5 26.8 3.2 1 Montgomery 148.9 119.2 26.6 3.2
2 Twisted 154.5 123.6 15.1 1.9 2 Ladder Co-Z 158.1 124.8 15.6 2.0
3 Edwards 165.3 130.8 10.5 1.4 3 163.5 129.1 10.9 1.4
4 Unified 169.1 131.9 8.1 1.1 1 Joye’s 150.1 119.6 26.7 3.2
1 Joye’s 151.3 119.8 26.8 3.2 2 Double-Add I 157.3 123.9 15.7 1.9
2 Double-Add 157.7 123.7 15.8 2.0 3 164.2 129.7 11.0 1.4
3 with Co-Z 163.9 129.4 12.7 1.6 1 Montgomery 147.3 119.0 26.5 3.2
4 Addition II 169.3 131.9 11.1 1.5 2 Ladder(X,Z)1 155.3 123.7 13.9 1.7
1 Montgomery 147.5 119.0 24.9 3.0 1 Montgomery 147.4 118.8 28.1 3.3
2 Ladder 155.6 124.1 13.9 1.7 2 Ladder 155.1 123.6 15.5 1.9
3 (X,Z) 2 163.1 129.1 9.1 1.2 3 (X,Z) 3 162.3 127.7 10.8 1.4
4 169.2 132.0 9.1 1.2 4 169.1 132.0 9.1 1.2
1 Montgomery 148.7 119.4 24.1 2.9 1 Signed 147.3 119.0 23.6 2.8
2 Ladder 156.0 124.4 13.0 1.6 2 Digit 155.8 124.2 14.2 1.8
3 (X,Y) 167.4 131.7 9.9 1.3 3 164.6 129.9 11.0 1.4
4 169.8 132.2 8.3 1.1 4 170.2 132.2 9.5 1.3
Figure 3.11(a) presents the dynamic power results for 1M and 3.11(b) for 2M. The quiescent
power remains the same as that shown in Figure 3.6(a). Similar to the non SPA secure algo-
rithms, the average power increases as more multipliers are added. While the Joye algorithms
start off with a relatively high dynamic power, this reduces compared to the other algorithms for
subsequent parallelisation. The Montgomery Ladder (XZ) algorithms in comparison have lower
average power throughout. The Double and Add Always and the Edwards algorithms remain
relatively high throughout.
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Figure 3.11: Average Dynamic Power
Figures 3.12 and 3.13 give the Area-Time product and Area-Energy product. It can be seen from
the Area-Time product graph that the Signed Digit algorithm performs best for 1M. The Mont-
gomery ladder (XY) gives the top performance for 2M. The third iteration of the Montgomery
ladder (XZ) is lowest for 3M, with the extended twisted Edwards slightly outperforming theMont-
gomery ladder (XY) at 4M. Most of the rest show similar time performance metrics, with the
Double-and-Always-Add and the standard unified Edwards both being outliers on the graph. In
this case the Area-Energy product shows similar results, except for the fact that The second it-
eration of the Montgomery ladder (XZ) is lowest for 3M and the Montgomery ladder (XY) and
extended twisted Edwards both show a reduction in the AEP for 4M from 3M.
Figure 3.14 shows again a comparison between the expected and measured results, in this case for
the SPA resistant algorithms. It is seen that the different sets of results deviate somewhat more than
those presented in Figure 3.9. For 1M it is clear that both of the unified twisted Edwards algorithms
are expected to perform better than they actually do. Examining the measured results shows that
the standard unified Edwards gives equivalent performance levels to that of theDouble and Always
Add. However, excluding the Edwards algorithms results in the best and worst performers for each
M stage being equivalent between the expected and measured graphs, and the hierarchy of the rest
of the algorithms roughly conform between the two. Based on the metrics and results presented
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Figure 3.12: SPA Resistant Area-Time Product
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here, it has been shown that it should be possible, as long as care is taken, to estimate their relative
performance based on their expected performance. This can be used to reduce test times through
an analysis of the expected performance in the case of future algorithms.
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Figure 3.14: SPA Reistant Estimated Versus Measured Results
3.10.1 Comparing Dedicated Addition & SPA Secure Algorithms
A recap is made here and the relative performances of the dedicated addition algorithms are com-
pared against the SPA secure algorithms. Recalling Table 3.5, along with Figure 3.6(a) and Fig-
ure 3.6(b) it is seen that in most cases, there is only a slight increase in the iteration time between
the different sets of algorithms, which naturally results in only a slight increase in the energy costs.
Indeed the best performing dedicated addition algorithm, the extended twisted Edwards at with an
ATP at 4M of 14.7 and an AEP at 1M of 54.4 is roughly equivalent to the Montgomery Ladder
(XY) and the extended twisted Edwards, both with an ATP at 4M of 14.8 and the Signed Digit at
1M with an AEP of 59.8. As long as care is taken when choosing the correct algorithm, it can be
seen that some particular SPA secure algorithms can perform as well as, if not better, than some
of the non SPA secure variants through the correct use of scheduling and parallelisation.
88
3.11. LARGER KEY AND FIELD SIZES
3.11 Larger Key and Field Sizes
It was described earlier that the hardware can be configured by the user for any characteristic p,
and field extensionm, as well as the respective memory sizes. In this work so far, a field size (pb)
and a key size (k) of 192, defined by ECRYPT II [42] as the current standard (protection from
2009 to 2020), are used throughout for each of the target algorithms using the curve parameters
secp192r1 [81].
Table 3.11: 256 & 521 Area-Time, Area-Energy Product
Alg. Key & Area Time ATP Energy AEP
Field (Slices) (mS) (Slice.mS) (mJ) (Slice.mJ)
SD (X,Y) - 1M 256 1641 41.0 67281 6.9 11388
(Alg. 23) 521 3310 161.2 533572 30.0 99452
ML (X,Y) - 2M 256 1828 22.1 40398.8 3.9 7147
(Alg. 22) 521 3985 83.8 333943 16.3 65226
ML (X,Z) - 3M 256 2049 15.5 31759.5 2.7 5696
(Alg. 19)(Alg.42&46) 521 4032 59.3 239097.6 11.9 48182
ML (X,Y) - 4M 256 2284 13.8 31519.2 2.5 5755
(Alg. 22) 521 4893 50.2 245628.6 10.3 50593
Next, the best results for each of the SPA secure parallel cases v are taken and implemented for a
field size and a key size of 256 (protection from 2009 to 2040; defined by NIST [41] as equivalent
security to AES-128 [26]) using curve parameters secp256r1 [81], and a field size and a key size
of 521 (protection for the foreseeable future) using curve parameters secp521r1 [81] to examine
larger more secure implementations and to allow an analysis of scaling.
The results are presented in Table 3.11 and the AT product for all three cases is graphed in Fig-
ure 3.15. Evident from Table 3.11 compared with Table 3.4 is the fact that the area is essentially
doubled in each case (additionally, the BRAM stays the same for the 256 case but increases to six-
teen 36K blocks for the 521). The time and the energy required to process each algorithm is also
approximately ×2 between 192 and 256, but increases to ×4 between 256 and 521. Table 3.11
and Figure 3.15 also show how each of the algorithms roughly scale equivalently with the larger
key and field sizes. While there is no significant change in order between the algorithms for the
vThe unified extended twisted Edwards, while having equivalent results with the Montgomery ladder (XY) in the
4M case were excluded on the grounds that there is as yet no recommended curves in Edwards or twisted Edwards form
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Figure 3.15: Area-Time Product: 192, 256 & 521
different key and field sizes, as the computations become larger it is clear that the differences in
ATP between the algorithms also increases.
3.12 Conclusions
In this chapter a number of algorithms and parallel hardware implementations for them were pre-
sented. Initially dedicated point doubling and point addition algorithms were examined for dif-
ferient coordinate systems for the Double-and-Add algorithm. A reconfigurable elliptic curve
processor was then presented and methods for performing modular addition and multiplication
were described. Next, the aforementioned algorithms were implemented on this processor and
observations were made. It was shown that the affine coordinate system performs best for a circuit
containing a single multiplier, however, this did not scale well with additional multipliers and was
overtaken at 3M in computation time and energy usage by its projective and Jacobian equivalents.
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Performing best of these dedicated point doubling and point addition algorithms were curves of a
special form, the twisted Edwards and the extended form of the twisted Edwards.
A brief look at power analysis attacks was then performed and how the algorithms examined
so far are susceptible to this type of side channel attack. Following on from this, various SPA
secure methods were then examined, namely dummy arithmetic instructions, unified doubling and
addition and regular algorithms. The algorithmic cost and area, energy and timing results of these
SPA secure algorithms were examined and some further observations were made. A comparison
of the expected and measured results was performed and it was shown that the heirarchy of results
in the expected case can be used to estimate how the measured results should roughly perform
relative to each other and can be used to alleviate test time. It was also shown that through careful
selection of the algorithm, along with through good use of parallelisation and scheduling, that
some SPA secure algorithms can be made to perform as well as, or even better than their non SPA
secure equivalents.
The best performing algorithms were then selected for further analysis with larger key and field
sizes based on NIST specifications. Additional power, energy area and timing results were ac-
quired and comparisons between the differing security levels were made.
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Hash Functions
4.1 Introduction
Cryptographic hash functions are another type of cryptographic primitive from layer 4 of the
hierarchical model shown in Figure 1.2. This chapter examines an implementation method for the
SHA-3 hash functions [96]. Different implementation options are examined, a wrapper used to
interface to the designs is described, and area, throughput and power results are presented.
A hash function H maps a message x of variable length to a string of fixed length. The process
of applyingH to x is called ‘hashing’, and the outputH(x) is called the ‘message hash’ or ‘mes-
sage digest’. Cryptographic hash functions are hash functions that possess the following specific
4.1. INTRODUCTION
properties [23]:
• Pre-image Resistance. This requirement means that for a given hash value y, it should be
computationally infeasible for an adversary to find an input x such that H(x) = y. Pre-
image resistance is also known as ‘one-wayness’.
• Second Pre-image Resistance. This implies that for a given input x1, it should be compu-
tationally infeasible to find another input x2, such that H(x1) = H(x2). This property is
also known as ‘weak collision resistance’.
• (Strong) Collision Resistance. It should be computationally infeasible for an adversary to
find any two distinct inputs x1 and x2, such thatH(x1) = H(x2).
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Figure 4.1: Generic Hash Function Internals
Figure 4.1 shows an overview of a generic hash function. A hash algorithm essentially consists
of three stages: message padding and parsing; expansion; and compression. The binary message
to be processed is appended and padded until it reaches the required bit length. The counter and
salt are additional inputs, used in some hash functions to further obfuscate the input; for example,
in HAIFA (Hash Iterative Framework) [97] based designs, a counter is fed in with the message,
whereas, for Merkle-Damga˚rd [98] [99], it is not.
The resultant padded message is parsed into m-bit blocks. These message blocks are passed
individually to the message expansion stage where various rotations and shifting of the data blocks
takes place.
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The n-bit blocks from the message expansion stage are then passed to the hash compression func-
tion, or the hash core, fC . The output of the compression function is a p-bit intermediate hash
valueHi. A number of iterations, or rounds, of the compression function are then performed with
the round data, Hi, further rotated and shifted using the hash expansion stage before being re-
input to the compression function, fC . The hash compression algorithm then repeats and begins
processing another block from the message padding stage. After all m-bit data blocks have been
processed, the output is formed by a concatenation of the final hash values up to the digest size
required.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2 begins with a brief overview of cryp-
tographic hash functions and the SHA-3 competition.
Section 4.3 briefly described the characteristics of the hash functions and examines different im-
plementation options using example designs from the SHA-3 competition. Following this is a brief
description of the round two and subsequent round three hash designs and their implementation
methodologies in Section 4.4.
Section 4.5 presents the hash wrapper used to interface to the designs presented here. The inter-
face, communications and padding protocols for the round two implementations used in this work
are then presented.
Section 4.6 presents area and throughput results for each round two design, and gives a brief
synopsys of how the best results selected here compare with those selected by NIST for the third
round of the competition.
Section 4.7 gives an overview of the round three designs and begins by comparing the differences
between the round two and round three variants. This section also contains updated area, timing,
power and energy results for each of the designs.
Section 4.8 provides a comparison of the work presented here against the current state of the art.
Finally, Section 4.9 concludes this chapter.
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4.2 Background to the SHA-3 Hash Functions
The family of Secure Hash Algorithms (SHA) [100] began in 1993 when the National Institute
of Standards and Technology (NIST) published the Secure Hash Standard. This version, known
as SHA-0, was withdrawn by the National Security Agency (NSA) and replaced in 1995 by the
SHA-1 algorithm after it was found to be insecure [6–8]. Both algorithms produce message hashes
of length 160 bits. In 2002, NIST published three new hash functions with longer hash lengths:
SHA-256, SHA-384 and SHA-512. In 2004, SHA-224 was added to the standard, and these four
algorithms form the SHA-2 family of hash functions [101]. Although the standard still includes the
SHA-1 hash function, its security has been compromised through cryptanalytic attacks. The trend
in the cryptographic community was to move away from using older hash functions like SHA-1,
towards newer functions like those in the SHA-2 family [102]. However, when insecurities were
found following attacks against reduced versions of the SHA-2 family [103], the National Institute
of Standards and Technology (NIST) started a competition for a new hash algorithm [96], namely
SHA-3, similar to the former AES effort [26], with the intention of developing a more secure
family of hash functions.
The contest initially received 64 submissions from designers worldwide. 51 of these designs pro-
gressing through to round one of the contest which began on November 1st 2008. Approximately
a year was given for each round of the competition, with round one being used to examine the
security of the applicants. Round two candidates were announced on July 24th of 2009 and the
number of competing designs were reduced to 14 [104].
For round two, the NIST competition specifications [96], 6.C, Round 2 Technical Evaluation gave
the criteria for hardware and software testing; ”Round 2 testing by NIST will be performed on
the required message digest sizes” and ”the calculation of the time required to compute message
digests for various length messages”.
On December 9th 2010, round twowas completed and the field was reduced further to 5 competing
designs, BLAKE, Grøstl, JH, Keccak and Skein for round three [105]. Finally, on October 2nd
2012, Keccak was selected as the winner of the SHA-3 hash function competition [106].
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4.3 Implementating SHA-3 Hash Functions
The initial 64 submissions recieved by NIST were accepted solely on being complete and proper
submissions. Other factors, such as security, cost, and algorithm and implementation characteris-
tics of the candidates did not enter the review process prior to the first round, nor did cryptanalysis
or performance data of a submission impact the acceptance of the first-round candidates. How-
ever, NIST stated in the status report at the end of the first round [104], after selecting 14 of these
designs for round two, that there were many candidate algorithms with new and interesting de-
signs, and with unique features that are not present in the SHA-2 family of hash algorithms and
felt that the diversity of designs will provide an opportunity for cryptographers and cryptanalysts
to expand the scope of ideas in their field, and it will also be less likely that a single type of attack
will eliminate the bulk of the candidates remaining in the competition.
From an implementation point of view, it was clear that this diversity of designs would require
significantly different design methodologies. Each hash function would need to be tailored differ-
ently to achieve its best results. While some of the round two designs contained similar features
(and indeed shared some basic components), no two designs could be implemented using the same
methodology. Table 4.1 gives the constructions of the round two SHA-3 hash functions and their
variants as well as the various inputs and state sizes in bits. The Structure loosely defines the hash
function overview. The Type describes the design of the hash functions. The Counter, Message
and Salt all form the inputs to the hash functions, while the State describes the internal size of
each of the hash functions. As the {224} variant is almost identical to the {256} and similarly, the
{384} to the {512} these values are omitted. The only notable differences being Keccak, where
the message size increases to 1152-bits for {224} and 832-bits for {384}, and Luffa, where the
state size decreases to 1024-bits for {384}. Also, each of the hash functions and their variants
have an initial vector (IV) as part of the input, but for the SHA-3 competition each of these IV’s
are fixed to a specific value throughout, and as such they are not considered as part of the input but
rather as stored constants within each hash function itself.
Due to the large number of differing designs, a standard metric was needed to allow a baseline
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Table 4.1: Hash Function Internals
224/256 384/512
Design Structure Type Counter Message Salt State Counter Message Salt State
SHA-2 Merkle-Damga˚rd Add-XOR-Rotate 64 512 0 512 128 1024 0 1024
Blake HAIFA Add-XOR-Rotate 64 512 128 512 128 1024 256 1024
BMW Iterative Add-XOR-Rotate 64 512 - 2048 64 1024 - 4096
Cubehash Iterative Add-XOR-Rotate - 256 - 1024 - 256 - 1024
Echo HAIFA AES based 64 1536 128 2048 64 1536 128 2048
Fugue Iterative AES based 64 32 - 96 64 32 - 1148
Grøstl Iterative AES based 64 512 - 512 64 1024 - 1024
Hamsi Conc-Permute Serpent based 64 32 - 512 64 64 - 1024
JH Iterative Block Cipher based 128 512 - 1024 128 512 - 1024
Keccak Sponge Add-XOR-Rotate - 1088 - 1600 - 576 - 1600
Luffa Sponge S-box based - 256 - 768 - 256 - 1280
Shabal Iterative Add-XOR-Rotate - 512 - 1408 - 512 - 1408
SHAvite-3 HAIFA AES based 64 512 256 256 128 1024 512 512
SIMD Iterative Block Cipher based 64 512 - 512 64 1024 - 1024
Skein UBI Add-XOR-Rotate 96 512 - 512 96 512 - 512
comparison between them. The goal decided upon was to explore area-speed trade-offs in the
implementations of the hash functions, and to compare the efficiency of the designs by examining
the throughput per unit area (TPA) metric as described in Section 2.10. High-throughput hash
function implementations are beneficial in network server applications, for example. Analysing
the throughput per slice of the architectures, determines which hash function implementations
make the most efficient use of FPGA area. The throughput is calculated as follows:
Throughput =
# Bits in a message block×Maximum clock frequency
# Clock cycles per message block
Within each of these hash architectures, various area-speed trade-offs were investigated through
an exploration of the design space in an attempt to find the best throughput for the least amount
of area used. Selecting implementation and performance metrics is nontrivial. It was described
in Section 2.6 how resources in FPGA differ not only between different vendors, but also be-
tween different families of the same vendor. Results for a particular hash function architecture
on different FPGA platforms cannot be directly compared, since any two platforms have different
underlying technologies. As such, dedicated resources specific to a particular FPGA family or
vendor were not used in the analysis. All implementions were performed using only slice logic,
i.e. distributed memory blocks used instead of BRAM blocks etc. Using this methodology, diffi-
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cult comparisoni is avoided, and a single value can be allocated to a result (e.g. area in slices). A
wrapper interface was designed to enable fair comparison of the different hash functions when op-
erating in a standardised and constrained environment. Starting from a basic iterative architecture
various implementation methods were examined, some examples of which are:
• Loop Unrolling. This involves running multiple rounds of a loop in the same clock cycle.
The number of loops to be completed will decrease with each unroll, however the area will
increase and the critical path will get longer, causing a reduction in the maximum frequency
and thus reducing the clock speed.
• Parallelised Design. In some designs, e.g. Grøstl, the permutations are identical except
for the execution of the AddRoundConstant step, where different round constants are used.
Therefore, when implementing fC , one design choice is to compute Q in parallel by repli-
cating the hardware for P .
• Interleaved Design. This approach is the opposite of above, and re-uses the hardware for
P to compute Q, resulting in extra clock cycles but a lower area.
Two examples of this examination method are presented in Sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.2 for the 256-bit
versions of Cubehash and Shabal as updated versions of those presented in [107].
4.3.1 CubeHash
CubeHash was submitted by Bernstein to the SHA-3 contest [108]. FPGA implementations of
the CubeHash compression function, fC , were designed. The rotation and swapping operations
are implemented in hardware by simply re-labelling the relevant signals. Since the state comprises
1024 bits, the same architecture can be used to produce message digests with any of the lengths re-
quired for SHA-3. Therefore, a CubeHash8/32-256 implementationwill have the same throughput
and throughput per slice performance as a CubeHash8/32-512 implementation.
iSuch as comparing BRAM and CLB area results as described in Section 2.6.2.
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Figure 4.2: Cubehash Compression Function
The critical path through the compression function, consists of two modulo 232 additions and two
XOR operations, as indicated by the heavy lines in Figure 4.2. The compression function is used
r = 8 times for each message block Mi (i.e. for each message byte in this case, since b = 1).
CubeHash architectures were investigated where fC is unrolled by various degrees. The lowest
area design iteratively uses a single fC unit and takes 8 clock cycles to process a single message
block, and the highest area design uses a chain of four fC units in series to process a singlemessage
block in two clock cycles. The results are shown in Table 4.2. Note that the figures quoted for
each design include the initial XOR of the message block with the state, and also include the area
of the output register that stores the result of the last fC calculation in the chain.
Table 4.2: CubeHash Implementation Results
Architecture Area Max. Freq. #Cycles TP TP-Area
(slices) (MHz) (Mbps) (Mbps/slice)
Iterative 1025 166.66 17 2509.7 2.45
Virtex-5 2×-unrolled 1440 55.14 13 1085.8 0.75
4×-unrolled Congested Design
As expected, the critical path of each design increases with the degree of unrolling. However each
increase in the critical path is greater than the corresponding benefit of a decrease in the number
of clock cycles, so an overall increase in throughput (TP) is not obtained. The iterative design
provides the best TP-Area result. The longer critical paths in the unrolled designs are caused
by routing delays between the long chains of adders on the FPGA. Indeed a 4× unrolled design
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results in a congested design, where the design exceeds the available resources or the compiler
fails to optimise the design during place-and-route. A comparison with other Cubehash designs
shows that other groups, such as Matsuo et al. [109,110] and Homsirikamol et al. [111] also chose
to present iterative design implementations.
4.3.2 Shabal
Shabal was submitted by the Saphir research project to the SHA-3 contest [112]. Shabal, Fig-
ure 4.3(a), uses a sequential iterative hash construction, to process messages in blocks of ℓm = 512
bits, as shown in Figure 4.3(b).
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Figure 4.3: Shabal
The Shabal compression function is based on a Non-Linear Feedback Shift Register (NLFSR)
construction. The precomputed initialisation vector (IV) was used to remove the configuration
stage and thus remove the initial two message block from the latency. When designing Shabal, the
XOR, addition and subtraction operations were all implemented in parallel. In the permutationP ,
the rotation operations were implemented through simple wiring. In order to realise the central part
of the permutation, a shift-register based approach was adopted, where the state words are shifted
along chains of 32-bit registers. The multiplication operations U and V form the non-linear part
of the NLFSR; these were implemented using the shift-then-add method. Once the shift registers
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have been loaded with the appropriate initial values, the central permutation result is calculated
after 48 clock cycles. The final part of the permutation P adds words from the A and C states.
For these modulo 232 additions, two design choices were investigated. In the first design, the
NLFSR is used together with a single adder to compute A[0]⊞ C[3], and the result is fed back to
A[15]. Note that the direction in which the C word is shifted must be reversed. This design takes
a further 36 clock cycles to produce the final result. The second design for this stage of P expands
the addition into 12 × 3 series additions, e.g. A[0] ← A[0]⊞ C[3] ⊞ C[15] ⊞ C[11]. Using this
approach, the final result is computed without requiring any extra clock cycles, but at the expense
of area for 35 additional adders.
Table 4.3: Shabal Implementation Results
Final Additions Area Max. Freq. #Cycles TP TP-Area
in P (slices) (MHz) (Mbps) (Mbps/slice)
Virtex-5 Series 2119 222.22 86 1322.9 0.624
Parallel 2512 143.47 50 1469.1 0.584
The area, timing and throughput results for Shabal are shown in Table 4.3. In the lower-area
implementations, the critical path is within the NLFSR construction, from register A[11] to reg-
ister B[15]. The higher-area implementations have a longer critical path, due to the three series
additions used to compute the final result. However, these higher-area implementations still at-
tain better throughputs than the lower-area implementations, due to the lower number of clock
cycles required. Both designs have similar throughput per slice metrics, with the lower-area im-
plementation more efficient on the Virtex-5 platform (it is also noted here that the higher-area
implementation was found to be more efficient on a Spartan-3 platform). While some designers
implemented similar methods to the ones presented here [110, 111], others such as Julien Francq
and Ce´line Thuillet [113] unfolded Shabal a number of times and found their best result at an
unfolding factor of 3. So while the work presented here found the best results to be for the low
area approach, it is seen that further examination of the design space can result in improvements
to the throughput and throughput-area.
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4.4 SHA-3 Round Two Implementations
Next follows a brief overview of some of the SHA-3 hash functions. An overview of the algorithm
is first presented followed by a description of the architecture used to implement the design. While
the work presented here [114,115] discusses results for all four hash variants (224, 256, 384, 512)
of all of the round two hash designs, attention in this section is focused on the five designs which
were selected for round three of the competition; Blake, Grøstl, JH, Keccak and Skein. Here
follows a brief description of the make-up and implementation of those designs emphasized for
the second round of the competition.
4.4.1 BLAKE
Algorithm: The BLAKE hash function was developed by Aumasson et al. [116]. It uses the
HAIFA iteration mode. A large inner state is initialised using a counter and a salt along with
the input message. The data block is then injectively updated by message-dependent rounds, and
finally compressed to return the next chain value. The inner state of the compression function is
represented as a 4 × 4 matrix of words. A round comprises updating this matrix; first, all four
columns are updated independently, followed by four disjoint diagonals. In the update of each
column or diagonal, two message words are input according to a round-dependent permutation.
Each round is parametrized by predefined constants. After the sequence of rounds, the state is
reduced to half its length with feedforward of the initial data block and the salt. It is based on
LAKE [117] and ChaCha [118] and uses a wide pipe construction where the size of the internal
state is significantly larger than the size of the output.
Architecture: For the implementation of BLAKE the compression function was further subdi-
vided into two identical sections, to allow re-use of the component blocks and thereby reducing
the area. This subdivision increases the latency of the hash permutation to complete a round from
two to four clock cycles, but reduces the critical path from four adders to two adders thus increas-
ing the maximum frequency of the permutation. For the larger variant which requires 32 clocks
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Figure 4.4: Blake Architecture
to load a 1024 bit message, it ensures there is no delay where the hash function needs to wait for
loading to complete. Figure 4.4 shows the modified design where V is the compression function.
The Adders and XORs are generated using standard operators (using the ’+’ operator of the
IEEE.std logic unsigned package) and the rotation operations were implemented through sim-
ple wiring, with multiplexers to select the particular subround rotation. The 16 constants required
by the initialisation and round stages are stored in distributed ROM.
4.4.2 Grøstl
Algorithm: Grøstl was submitted by Gauravaram et al. [119]. It is an iterated hash function with
a compression function built from two fixed, large, distinct permutations using a wide-trail design
strategy. Grøstl uses components from the AES [26]; the same S-box is used and the diffusion
layers are constructed in a similar manner to those of the AES. Similar to BLAKE, Grøstl is
a so-called wide-pipe construction. The initial message is padded and split into n-bit message
blocks and each message block is processed sequentially. The compression function maps two
inputs of n-bits each to an output of n-bits. The first input is called the chaining input, and the
second input is called the message block. The compression function is based on two underlying
n-bit permutations P and Q. In the Grøstl permutations, a total of four round transformations
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are defined for each permutation; AddRoundConstant, SubBytes, ShiftBytes and MixBytes. The
output transformation truncates the final bits to the required digest size.
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Figure 4.5: Grøstl P/Q Permutation
Architecture: The architecture for the P and Q permutations of Grøstl is illustrated in Figure 4.5.
The first stage in each permutation is the AddRoundConstant block which simply performs an
XOR on one byte of the ℓ-bit input state. The round constants are stored in distributed memory
on the FPGA. The SubBytes stage transforms the state, byte by byte, using the AES S-box gen-
erated using distributed ROM. The ShiftBytes transformation was realised in hardware by simply
re-labelling the bytes of the state. MixBytes is the final stage of the permutation function, and
processes each column of the state matrix separately and in parallel using combinational logic. An
output register was used to store the state at the output of the MixBytes transformation.
The compression function fG for the Grøstl implementation consists of two permutation functions,
P and Q. Permutations P and Q are identical except for the execution of the AddRoundConstant
step, where different round constants are used. Therefore, the design choice in this case was to
computeQ in parallel by replicating the hardware for P . TwoXOR arrays are required to complete
the compression function for the input to P , and for the final outputHi.
4.4.3 JH
Algorithm: The hash function JH, was developed by HongjunWu [120]. Its compression func-
tion is constructed from a bijective function (a block cipher with constant key) and the generalized
AES design methodology is used to design large block ciphers from small components. The com-
104
4.4. SHA-3 ROUND TWO IMPLEMENTATIONS
pression function combines a 1024-bit previous hash block (Hi−1), a 512-bit message block (Mi)
to produce a 1024-bit hash block (Hi). The compression function (CF
JH ) is applied to each
message block,Mi. The bijective function consists of 35 rounds, each consisting of an S-box, lin-
ear transformation and permutation, and a single final round consisting of just the S-box. The JH
block cipher combines the most important features of AES, namely the substitution-permutation
network (SPN) and Maximum Distance Separable (MDS) code, and Serpent [121], namely SPN
and bit-slice implementation.
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Figure 4.6: JH Architecture
Architecture: JH uses the same design for all four variants and is based on simple components.
Two 4-bit S-boxes are used; the selected table depending on the value of a round constant. It can
also be viewed as a 5-bit to 4-bit substitution. The linear transformation implements a (4, 2, 3)
maximum distance separable (MDS) code over Fq(2
4), and the permutation shuffles the output
according to three distinct smaller permuations. The 256-bit round constants can be generated
either in parallel with the data path or pre-computed and stored in memory where they can be
re-used. In the design presented, the full 1024-bit data state is operated on at once. Each round
completes in one clock cycle. The 256-bit sub-key state is calculated in parallel, as illustrated in
Figure 4.6.
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The S-box and linear transformation functions are implemented as combinational logic as out-
lined in the submission documentation, and the grouping and permutation functions are rewiring
circuits. In the round constant data path, only the S-box corresponding to select bit ’0’ is required.
Three registers are required for data storage, one each for the round constant, message block and
data block respectively.
4.4.4 Keccak
Algorithm: Keccak, submitted by Bertoni et al. [122] is a hash function based on the sponge
construction [123]. The design philosophyunderlyingKeccak is the hermetic sponge strategy [124],
where, a (cryptographic) sponge function is a class of algorithms with finite internal state that take
an input bit stream of any length and produce an output bit stream of any desired length, during
an absorbing stage and a squeezing phase. The Keccak sponge function is built from three com-
ponents; a state memory, S, a function, f , of fixed length that permutes or transforms the state
memory and a padding function. The sponge construction state memory is divided into two sec-
tions, bitrate, R of size r-bits, and capacity C of size c-bits. After padding of the initial message,
the first r-bit block is XORed with R, and S is replaced by f(S). This repeats until all padded
blocks are ’absorbed’. The R portion of the state memory provides the output in ’squeezed’ out
blocks of r-bits during the squeezing phase. The sum r + c determines the width of the keccak-f
permutation used in the sponge construction and for the SHA-3 competition is selected by the
designers to be 1600. The Keccak hash function uses five functions θ, ρ, π, χ and ι, which are
consecutively computed during each round. The functions θ, χ and ι are designed using XOR,
AND and NOT operations, while ρ and π provide the permutations.
Architecture: The NIST submissions use the same KECCAK-f permuation for all variants, with
different capacity (c), bitrate (r) and diversifier (d) values, where smaller digest sizes have a greater
bitrate. The five steps of the permutation consist of addition andmultiplicationoperations inFq(2).
The full round computes in a single clock cycle, and an extra clock is required for loading in of
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the message. The padded message of length r is loaded in by XOR’ing it with r bits of the state.
The 64-bit round constants are defined as the output of a linear feedback shift register and can
be pre-computed or generated as required. In the design, presented here in Figure 4.7, they are
pre-computed and stored in distributed ROM. Only one register is required and is used to store the
state value. The HDL implementation provided in the specification documentation was used as a
reference for the permutation steps in the design.
4.4.5 Skein
Algorithm: Skein was submitted by Ferguson et al. [125] and Skein-512 is the primary proposal
of the Skein family of algorithms. It is based on the Threefish algorithm, a tweakable block
cipher [126]. A Unique Block Iteration (UBI) chainingmode takes in the chain value, the message
and a ’Tweak’ defined by an 128-bit configuration string derived from the message counter and
UBI constants as shown in Figure 4.8(a). The Threefish algorithm has 72 rounds consisting of
four sets of four MIX functions followed by a permutation of the eight 64-bit words. Each MIX
function consists of a single addition, a rotation by a constant, and an XOR. The rotation constants
repeat every eight rounds. The key schedule generates the subkeys from the chain and a tweak. A
finalisation UBI stage consisting of a null message, a Tweak and the previous chain.
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Architecture: For this design of Skein-512 four rounds of threefish were unrolled, Figure 4.8(b).
In this way, a UBI message block of Skein takes 18 clocks for the rounds to complete, plus 5 for
preprocessing and data loading. The precomputed IV was used to remove the configuration stage
and thus remove the initial message block from the latency. Each subsequent message block
and the output block are calculated identically. The tweak, which ensures each message block
is different, is generated by the counter in the padding.The Adders and XORs were generated
in a generic fashion and the rotation operations were implemented through simple wiring, with
multiplexers to select the particular subround rotation.
4.5 Hash Interface
Cryptographic hash functions have many information security applications, such as digital signa-
tures, message authentication codes (MACs), and other forms of authentication, the purpose of
which is:
• Confidentiality. Privacy.
• Authentication. Who created or sent the data and password verification.
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• Integrity. Confidence that the data has not been altered.
• Non-repudiation. The order is final, and it was sent at a certain time or sequence.
The purpose of the Hash function in these applications is to produce a fingerprint. It is usually
used as one part of an overall security system. As such, along with a standard metric of TPA to
allow a baseline comparison between the different designs, a standard interface was also required
to enable fair comparison of the different hash functions when operating in a standardised and
constrained environment.
The work next presents a wrapper [127] that can be used to interface between any particular
hash function algorithm and the outside world where the padding is included in the wrapper as
opposed to the hash function block itself. In this way, ’fully autonomous’ designs can be easily
and efficiently inserted inside the wrapper thereby allowing fast testingii. It allows re-use of any
padding scheme used in multiple hash functions which cuts down on design time. It also alleviates
any issues concerning designs which do not take into account bandwidth limitations or extra area
or timing due to external stages such as loading, initialisation and finalisation.
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iiSpeed estimate for the algorithms required by NIST were simply defined as; at a minimum, the number of clock
cycles required to generate one message digest, and set up the algorithm [96] Section 6.B.
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Figure 4.9 shows a block diagram of the interface architectureiii. It comprises an input register
which includes any padding required, an output parallel load shift-register and control circuitry.
The input data can be set to any size, w, but for a representation of a real world communications
system, it is set to 32-bits, a standard word size such as that used in the FSL bus. The input shift-
register reads in and stores these w-bit values to the size required,m, which is the message block
size of the hash function under test. If a message ends prior to this register being completely filled,
padding is added to the partial message to bring it to the required size. The output shift-register
performs a similar task, holding the hashed message digest of size d, while the output bus reads it
out w bits at a time. The control circuitry synchronises the shift register operation, padding, and
all communication signals.
Because of the different design methods and message sizes that comprise all the hash functions, as
shown previously in Table 4.1, a number of user defined constants are specified at the top level of
the implementation code and as such can be easily modified by the user to synthesize the message
size and padding scheme necessary to run a particular hash function. These constants are defined
as:
• The hash function required.
• The counter size required for message length addition during padding.
• The message digest size required.
• The input message block size of the hash function.
The hash function for a given digest size is then synthesized according to these constants. As
stated earlier, each of the hash functions and their variants have an initial vector (IV) as part of the
input, but for the SHA-3 competition each of these IV’s are fixed to a specific value throughout,
and as such they are not considered as part of the input but rather as stored constants within each
hash function itself.
iiiNote that variants on the design shown here were also developed which include extra bus lines from the control
block to the hash function block where necessary, i.e. for designs which require counter or salt values to be input as
part of the message.
110
4.5. HASH INTERFACE
The performance of the implementations on Virtex-5 were based on the following targets: the data
bus was defined to be 32-bits wide and the padding explicitly included as part of the hardware
interface block. Both decisions were shown to have an impact on the latency, throughput and area
of the different hash function implementations. The results presented are post-place and route.
4.5.1 Communications Protocol
Table 4.4 defines the various communication signals between the wrapper and the external world.
It can be seen from Figure 4.9 that the communications protocol between the hash function and
wrapper, as well as between the wrapper and the outside world is similar to that suggested by
Gaj [128]. It differs however in the fact that a user wishing to hash a message does not need to do
any preprocessing to their plaintext before sending the message, such as adding message length
data, but only needs to set an end of message (EOM) signal high, in this case defined as a last
block lb in signal either simultaneously with the last block of the message or at any time after
transmission of the last message block.
Table 4.4: Wrapper Interface
Signal IO Description
clk in Global clock
rst in Global reset, Active HIGH. Initialises the
circuitry to begin hashing a new message
d in in The input bus
dp in in Data present on the input bus
ack in out Data present on the input bus has been read
lb in in Data present on the input bus is the
last block of the message to be hashed
d out out The output bus
dp out out Data present on the output bus
ack out in Data present on the output bus has been read
lb out out Data present on the output bus is the last
block of the hashed message
While there is valid data on the line, a data present dp in flag is set high. To avoid the need to
transmit a count of the number of valid message bits in the input block, and thus needing to know
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the lengths of message sections prior to transmission, the data present signal is set high when all
of the data on the input bus are valid message bits, i.e. each message blocks read in is of size
w. When the wrapper reads in the data on d in it acknowledges that the data has been read in
by setting ack in high. It is then ready to receive the next block of data. Conversely, when the
message digest is ready to be read out on the output bus, dp out is set high by the function wrapper.
This data will remain on the output bus until a return acknowledge ack out is received. The system
then returns to its initial state in preparation for the next hash message.
Table 4.5 defines the various communication signals between the hash function and the wrapper.
These closely mirror the external signal lines, and in most cases perform equivalent functions
between the hash block and the interface as the externals do between the interface and the outside
world. However, there is no lb out equivalent as the hashed digest, d, is output to the output
shift-register as one complete block.
Table 4.5: Hash Interface
Signal IO Description
clk in Global clock
rst in Global reset Active HIGH
mes in in Data-in bus
dp h in in Valid data on Data-in bus
Set when buffer-in shift-register is full
ack h in out Data present on Data-in bus has been read
lb h in in Last block is present on Data-in bus
Inclusive of padding where required
hash out out Data-out bus
ack h out in Data present on Data-out bus has been read.
dp h out out Message digest is present on Data-out bus
4.5.2 Padding Protocol
There are many different padding schemes utilised by the designers of the hash functions, and
in some cases varying padding schemes between the different sizes of the same hash function.
Table 4.6 gives a brief outline of the various padding schemes used by the different round two
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Table 4.6: Padding Schemes per SHA-3 Type
Design Padding Scheme
SHA224/256 1, 0’s until congruent (448 mod 512), 64-bit message length
SHA384/512 1, 0’s until congruent (896 mod 1024), 128-bit message length
Blake224 1, 0’s, until congruent (448 mod 512), 64-bit message length
Blake256 1, 0’s, until congruent (447 mod 512), 1, 64-bit message length
Blake384 1, 0’s, until congruent (895 mod 1024), 128-bit message length
Blake512 1, 0’s, until congruent (894 mod 1024), 1, 128-bit message length
BMW224/256 1, 0’s until congruent (448 mod 512), 64-bit message length
BMW384/512 1, 0’s until congruent (960 mod 1024), 64-bit message length
Cubehash 1, 0’s until a multiple of 256 (256 = 8 * b, b=32)
Echo224/256 1, 0’s until congruent (1392 mod 1536), 16-bit message digest, 128-bit message length
Echo384/512 1, 0’s until congruent (880 mod 1024), 16-bit message digest, 128-bit message length
Fugue 0’s until a multiple of 32, 64-bit message length
Grøstl224/256 1, 0’s until congruent (448 mod 512), 64-bit block counter
Grøstl384/512 1, 0’s until congruent (960 mod 1024), 64-bit block counter
Hamsi224/256 1, 0’s until a multiple of 32, 64-bit message length
Hamsi384/512 1, 0’s until a multiple of 64, 64-bit message length
JH 1, 0’s until congruent (384 mod 512), 128-bit message length, min 512-bits added
Keccak224 1, 0’s until a multiple of 8, append 8-bit representation of 28,
append 8-bit representation of 1152/8, 1, 0’s until a multiple of 1152
Keccak256 1, 0’s until a multiple of 8, append 8-bit representation of 32,
append 8-bit representation of 1088/8, 1, 0’s until a multiple of 1088
Keccak384 1, 0’s until a multiple of 8, append 8-bit representation of 48,
append 8-bit representation of 832/8, 1, 0’s until a multiple of 832
Keccak512 1, 0’s until a multiple of 8, append 8-bit representation of 64,
append 8-bit representation of 576/8, 1, 0’s until a multiple of 576
Luffa 1, 0’s until a multiple of 256
Shabal 1, 0’s until a multiple of 512
SHAvite3-224/256 1, 0’s until congruent (432 mod 512), 64-bit message length, 16-bit digest length
SHAvite3-384/512 1, 0’s until congruent (880 mod 1024), 128-bit message length, 16-bit digest length
Simd224/256 0’s until a multiple of 512, extra block with message length
Simd384/512 0’s until a multiple of 1024, extra block with message length
Skein 0’s if multiple of 8, else 1, 0s, until a multiple of 512
candidates.
As can be seen from Table 4.6, similarities between most of the different padding schemes allow
for generation of a generic block for variants of Merkle-Damga˚rd strengthening [23] padding
schemes, as well as paddings types of all-zeros or one-and-trailing-zeros.
Figure 4.10 shows the block diagram of the padding unit used to implement some of the padding
schemes. The input word w is read into a multiplexor and combined with them− w least signif-
icant bits of the current register value. If no input value is available on the input bus, the current
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register value is held, or if the message is fully read in, the appropriate padding bits are appended.
Input blocks consisting of just counter values and/or padding bits are also catered for. For example
in the case of Fugue, the register is filled twice more, firstly with all zeros, followed by an m-bit
representation of the number of message blocks. In the case of Shabal, the extra message block
simply consists of 100 . . .0 of the sizem. Note that not all hash functions require extra message
blocks.
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Figure 4.10: Padding Block
4.6 Round Two Results
Next, the round two results are examined. All of the round two algorithms were designed using
the wrapper described in Section 4.5 and implemented on the Xilinx Virtex-5 (xc5vlx50-3ff324)
FPGA and evaluated on the SASEBO-GII cryptographic evaluation board [48]. A brief definition
and presentation of the clock cycle count required to perform a hash is discussed followed by area,
frequency and throughput results for each of the round two hash functions and their variants.
Table 4.7 gives the clock count for the various designs. As can be seen from the table, some
hash designs require extra time to load in the padding scheme, while others have finalisation
stages comprising a number of rounds. For calculating the throughput, as the size of the message
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to be hashed increases, these padding and finalisation stages will have less of an impact on the
overall calculation time. However for short messages, they have a big impact. A short message is
therefore defined as the time required to process the padding, initialisation, a single message
block and finalisation, and a long message as just the time to process the message block. Note
that each hash function operates over the state size given in Table 4.1, and so designs with smaller
state sizes will require a larger number of rounds to hash the same amount of data as a design with
a large state size. This is also reflected in the throughput.
The larger state sizes however are affected by the loading latency as explained in Section 4.5.
Where the time required to hash the message is larger than the time required to load the message
this only affects the initial message loading, but in cases where the load latency is longer than the
hash latency (denoted ∗ in Table 4.7), there will be a delay as the hash waits for data to load. In this
scenario the clock count for the throughput needs to take this additional delay into consideration.
Not given here is the output message load time, which in all cases is the hash digest size/output
bus size.
The area, frequency and throughput results, as presented in Equation 2.13 given are inclusive
of the wrapper with TP-s using Table 4.7’s clock count for a short message, and TP-l using
the clock count for a long message where the padding and finalisation stages will have little
impact on the message. SHA-2 is presented as the benchmark to compare the others against. The
full area, frequency and throughput results inclusive and exclusive of the wrapper are presented
and compared in Appendix B.1 to allow a comparison of the designs exclusive of the padding
implemented in hardware or constrained by a fixed size input bus.
The bar graphs, shown in Figure 4.11(a) and Figure 4.11(b) present a graphical representation
of throughput/area results for both long and short messages for 256-bit, inclusive of the wrap-
per. Appendix B.2 presents the hash results for the 512-bit cases along with results for padding
implemented in software both inclusive and exclusive of the wrapper.
The performance of the hash functions in each of the scenarios presented in Appendix B.2 for
throughput-area, compared to SHA-2 is used as a metric to determine best design. All scenarios
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Table 4.7: Hash Function Timing Results
Hash 32-bit load Extra Padding Message Round Long Msg Final Final Short Msg
Design #Cycles Padding #Cycles Rounds #Cycles #Cycles Rounds #Cycles #Cycles
SHA224/256 16 0 0 64 1 65 0 0 65
SHA384/512 32 0 0 80 1 81 0 0 81
Blake224/256 16 0 0 10 4 40 0 0 40
Blake384/512 32 0 0 14 4 56 0 0 56
BMW224/256∗ 16 0 0 1 4 4 1 3 7
BMW384/512∗ 32 0 0 1 4 4 1 3 7
Cubehash 8 0 0 16 17 17 160 161 178
Echo224/256∗ 48 0 0 8 1 8 1 1 9
Echo384/512∗ 32 0 0 10 1 10 1 1 11
Fugue224/256 1 2 1 1 7 7 13 91 98
Fugue384 1 2 1 1 10 10 20 180 190
Fugue512 1 2 1 1 13 13 22 264 277
Grøstl224/256∗ 16 0 0 10 1 10 0 0 10
Grøstl384/512∗ 32 0 0 14 1 14 0 0 14
Hamsi224/256 1 3 1 3 2 6 6 24 31
Hamsi384/512 2 3 1 6 2 12 12 48 61
JH 16 1 1 35 1 38 0 0 38
Keccak224∗ 36 0 0 24 1 25 0 0 25
Keccak256∗ 34 0 0 24 1 25 0 0 25
Keccak384∗ 26 0 0 24 1 25 0 0 25
Keccak512 18 0 0 24 1 25 0 0 25
Luffa224/256∗ 16 0 0 8 1 8 1 8 16
Luffa384∗ 16 0 0 8 1 8 2 16 24
Luffa512∗ 16 0 0 8 1 8 2 16 24
Shabal 16 0 0 1 50 50 3 150 200
SHAvite3-224/256 16 0 0 12 3 36 1 1 37
SHAvite3-384/512 32 0 0 14 4 56 (70) 1 1 71
Simd224/256 16 1 1 4 8 32(41) 0.5 4 36(45)
Simd384/512 32 1 1 4 8 32(41) 0.5 4 36(45)
Skein 16 0 0 18 22 22 18 22 44
were considered in the analysis to enable a fair and full comparison, allowing equal weighting
for both specific and generic bus sizes along with padding implemented directly in hardware or
in software. Examining which designs outperform SHA-2 reveal some interesting conclusions.
Three designs consistently outperform SHA-2 for all of the categories; Keccak, Grøstl and JH.
The next best designs according to these metrics were Echo, Cubehash, Skein, Luffa and Blake.
NIST stated in [104] that cost is of particular concern for constrained platforms, and Echo is a
good deal larger in area than most of the other designs as shown in Table 4.8. Indeed NIST cited
this large area as one of the reasons for excluding it from round three [105]. An argument can
be made to exclude Luffa on the grounds that, while although performing adequately, it is very
similar to Keccak, the other sponge construction, but does not perform as well. Excluding these
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Table 4.8: Hash Function Implementation Results
Hash Area Max.Freq TP-l TP-l/Area TP-s TP-s/Area
Design (slices) (MHz) (Mbps) (Mbps/slice) (Mbps) (Mbps/slice)
SHA-2-256 1019 125.06 985 0.966 985 0.966
SHA-2-512 1771 100.04 1264 0.713 1264 0.713
BLAKE-32 1653 91.34 1169 0.707 1169 0.707
BLAKE-64 2888 71.04 1299 0.449 1299 0.449
BMW-256∗ 5584 14.30 457 0.081 457 0.081
BMW-512∗ 9902 8.98 287 0.028 287 0.028
Cubehash 1025 166.66 2509 2.447 239 0.233
ECHO-256∗ 8798 161.21 5158 0.58 5158 0.58
ECHO-512∗ 9130 166.66 8000 0.876 8000 0.876
Fugue-256 2046 200 914 0.446 60 0.029
Fugue-384 2622 200.08 640 0.244 33 0.012
Fugue-512 3137 195.81 481 0.153 22 0.007
Grøstl-256∗ 2579 78.06 2498 0.968 2498 0.968
Grøstl-512∗ 4525 113.12 3619 0.799 3619 0.799
Hamsi-256 1664 67.19 358 0.215 69 0.041
Hamsi-512 7364 14.93 79 0.01 15 0.002
JH 1763 144.11 1941 1.1 1941 1.1
Keccak-224∗ 1971 195.73 6263 3.17 6263 3.17
Keccak-256∗ 1971 195.73 6263 3.17 6263 3.17
Keccak-384∗ 1971 195.73 3063 1.55 3063 1.55
Keccak-512 1971 195.73 4509 2.28 4509 2.28
Luffa-256∗ 2796 166.66 2666 0.953 2666 0.953
Luffa-384∗ 4233 166.75 2668 0.63 1778 0.42
Luffa-512∗ 4593 166.66 2666 0.58 1777 0.58
Shabal 2512 143.47 1469 0.584 367 0.146
SHAvite3-256 3776 82.27 1170 0.309 1138 0.301
SHAvite3-512 11443 63.66 931 0.081 918 0.08
SIMD-256 24536 107.2 1338 0.054 1338 0.054
SIMD-512 44673 107.2 2677 0.059 2677 0.059
Skein-512 3027 83.57 1945 0.706 973 0.353
two designs leaves Keccak, Grøstl, JH, Cubehash, Skein and Blake. Five of these six were selected
for round three of which Cubehash was disqualified on potential security issues [129–131]. It is
also interesting to note that each of these selected designs has a completely different structure or
type (as given in Table 4.1) to every other round three selected design.
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Figure 4.11: 256-bit Wrapper Throughput-Area
4.7 Round Three Analysis
For the round three hardware implementations presented here, minor changes were made to the
finalist designs implemented here to bring them more in line with results from other developers.
This necessitated some changes to the round two wrapper design. While the fixed size of the bus
was unchanged, it was decided to implement the padding in software. This allowed for a com-
parison with other groups, most of which neglected padding in their calculations. Methods were
initially tested whereby the first message block defined the message size and counter, however this
led to both an unnecessary extra latency in the load time along with extra logic increasing both the
complexity and the area. As such, software was generated in C to generate the padding prior to
the message being loaded to the hash function.
4.7.1 Round Three Changes
Of the five designs selected for round three of the competition; Blake, Grøstl, JH, Keccak and
Skein, the designers were allowed to tweak the round two versions with minor changes.
For Blake, the number of rounds for the 224 and 256-bit digest versions was changed from 10
to 14 and the number of rounds for the 384 and 512-bit digest versions was changed from 14 to
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16. The BLAKE naming convention was also changed from BLAKE-28, BLAKE-32, BLAKE-
48, and BLAKE-64 to, respectively, BLAKE-224, BLAKE-256, BLAKE-384, and BLAKE-512.
These extra rounds result in an increase in timing for the Blake designs and a slight change to the
area due to routing.
For round three Grøstl, new Shift Values were selected. In the original Grøstl-224/256, the trans-
formation ShiftBytes was used in both P512 and Q512. In the round three version, different Shift-
Bytes values are used inQ512. An equivalent update is applied to Grøstl-384/512 and Q1024. New
Round Constants were also selected. In the original Grøstl-224/256, the round constants C[i] of
P512 and Q512 used in the transformation AddRoundConstant in round i were sparse with only a
single byte value different from zero. In the tweaked Grøstl-224/256, additional round constants
are added for P512 and additional round constants are added for Q512 along with an xor by FF.
Similar tweaks are applied to Grøstl-384/512 round constants. These updates appear to result in
no significant increase in the timing or area.
In the case of JH, the number of rounds is changed from 35.5 to 42 rounds. This tweak results in
an increase in the timing due to the additional rounds but a decrease in the area as the additional
circuitry required for the final half block is removed.
For Keccak, the padding rule has been shortened and simplified. The new padding rule is the
pad10*1 rule. This update only affects the padding, and as such the timing and area results remain
the same.
The only change to the Skein hash function is in the key schedule parity constant where the Skein
tweak constant is changed. This tweak results in no change to timing and area results.
4.7.2 Comparing Different Round Results
The new implementations of the round three designs and their round two counterparts are pre-
sented for Post-Place and-Route results in Table 4.9. Both long and short messages produce the
same TP and TPA results with the exception of Skein where the throughput reduces to 1117.9 and
1190.2 for round two and round three respectively. The biggest contrast between the tweaked de-
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signs is in the 512 variant of Blake where the additional rounds from the tweak result in a reduced
TPA. Blake-256 does also have a reduced throughput but a similar TPA to that of Blake-32. Inter-
estingly, round three JH, while having a reduced area at a cost of an increased number of rounds,
results in an almost identical TPA as that of the round two version. Round three JH has the lowest
area of all of the implementations. All of the other round three designs remain similar to their
round two equivalents. Hence, confident analysis of round two holds.
Table 4.9: SHA-3 Round 2 & 3 Results Comparison
Algorithm Round Area Max.Freq TP TP/Area
# (slices) (MHz) (Mbps) (Mbps/slice)
Blake-256 2 1584 119.2 1525.7 0.963
3 1568 118.5 1444.5 0.921
Grøstl-256 2 4124 210.3 6732.1 1.632
3 3137 200.8 6427.2 2.048
JH-256 2 1752 313.5 4224.2 2.411
& 512 3 1426 311.7 3546.6 2.487
Keccak-256 2 1551 244.4 7820.8 5.042
3 1551 246.0 7872.0 5.075
Skein-256 2 2842 101.2 2355.8 0.828
& 512 3 2718 102.2 2380.4 0.875
Blake-512 2 2757 107.0 1956.5 0.709
3 2799 102.4 1807.8 0.645
Grøstl-512 2 6675 171.1 5475.5 0.820
3 6673 167.3 5353.9 0.802
Keccak-512 2 1551 244.1 5624.0 3.620
3 1553 242.5 5588.1 3.598
4.7.3 SHA-3 Power and Energy
As an additional set of metrics on which to base the selection criteria, the power and energy results
were analysed. The updated round three designs were implemented on the SASEBO and a similar
method to that in Section 3.4 along with Equation 3.19 were used to get the timing, power and
energy measurements. The area results, presented in Table 4.9, give the Post-Place and-Route
results of the hash block as a stand-alone entity. Results were taken for both short (S) and long
(L) messages, with a short message comprising a message up to 512-bit blocks (or 1088-bit in
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Table 4.10: FPGA Power and Timing Results for SHA-3 at 24MHz
Algorithm Supplied µ FPGA Calc. Energy
Current-Power Power Time
224/256 mA - mW mW mS mJ
Blake S 169.3 138.5 4.34 0.601
Blake L 151.4 121.4 92.25 11.20
Grøstl S 263.6 203.5 2.80 0.570
Grøstl L 319.9 210.8 33.78 7.11
JH S 157.7 128.2 6.78 0.870
JH L 157.4 125.2 77.0 9.64
Keccak S 157.9 128.8 4.32 0.557
Keccak L 132.7 107.7 42.92 4.62
Skein S 226.1 182.0 3.93 0.715
Skein L 164.0 130.4 59.02 7.57
384/512
Blake S 204.5 161.9 65 1.057
Blake L 224.6 168.4 70.56 11.88
Grøstl S 440.3 229.3 4.50 1.008
Grøstl L 440.5 249.1 35.05 8.725
JH S 158.6 128.6 7.10 0.913
JH L 159.5 127.7 77.50 9.89
Keccak S 159.7 131.7 3.29 0.433
Keccak L 168.5 134.6 54.76 7.37
Skein S 239.6 189.4 4.20 0.806
Skein L 207.1 159.0 59.44 9.45
the case of Keccak), and a long message comprising a randomly selected (from the KAT values
(where available)) 11624-bit message. In both cases, the messages tested required padding, and in
the latter case a number of rounds is required to process the hash.
Table 4.10 gives the time, power and energy results for the round three designs. It is shown that for
a digest size of 256 that Grøstl has the shortest processing time for both long and short messages.
It also has the highest mean FPGA power but a low energy usage due to this short processing
time. Keccak has the lowest energy for both message types. For the 512-bit designs, Keccak has
the lowest energy and shortest processing time for short messages, while Grøstl again gives the
shortest processing time for long messages.
The average power dissipation of the processor was measured for a throughput of each of the
121
4.7. ROUND THREE ANALYSIS
designs running at the Sasebo onboard 24MHz clock frequency. The current being drawn by the
FPGA was measured for a supply voltage of 1V . These voltage and current measurements were
then used to calculate the total power consumed on both lines. The full set of power measurements
and results are presented in AppendixB.3 to allow a full analysis of the energy and iteration timing.
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Figure 4.12: Average Power Dissipation at 25MHz
The average power dissipation for the 256-bit designs is shown in Figure 4.12(a) and for the 512-
bit designs in Figure 4.12(b). This is further subdivided into the quiescent power and the dynamic
power. The quiescent power is the power that the board is drawing when the design is programmed
and the clock is connected but reset is held active, thereby preventing any switching from occurring
in the circuit. It is a measure of the standby power drawn by the FPGA. The larger the amount of
logic resources used, the higher the quiescent power, a case in point being Grøstl where the area
is × 2 or 3 that of the other designs. The 512 designs quiescent power is also on average higher
than that of their 256-bit counterparts also due to larger areas. The dynamic power is the power
dissipated by logic switching within the FPGA. It is calculated as the the difference between the
total average power and the quiescent power. Skein has the highest dynamic power of the designs,
probably due to the large 64-bit adder circuitry. Similarly so for the adders in Blake. It is clear
from the graphs that the quiescent power is the dominant factor, comprising on average 86% of
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the total power for the hash.
Graphing the Area-Energy product for the implementations, based on the average power dissipa-
tion, in Figures 4.13(a) and 4.13(b), show that Keccak has the lowest and best Area-Energy product
for all digests and message sizes. JH again performs strongly, showing quite similar AEP results
to Keccak in the 512-bit case. Blake outperforms Skein in the 256-bit case, however the opposite
occurs for the 512-bit. Grøstl, while having good computation time and energy is penalised due to
its large area and performs worst for the AEP.
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Figure 4.13: Area-Energy Product
4.8 Comparison with Other Work
NIST stated that computational efficiency of the algorithms in hardware, over a wide range of
platforms, was to be addressed during the second round of the contest [96]. The cryptographic
research community responded by dedicating a lot of resources in performance evaluation. There
are roughly four areas which are of primary interest:
• Software implementations on typical desktop and server hardware
• Software implementations on microcontrollers
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• FPGA implementations
• ASIC implementations
The first two categories are comprehensively covered by benchmarking suites based on the work
of Bernstein (SUPERCOP [132]) and Wenzel-Benner et al. (XBX [133]). The implementations
come from many different designers, and all results are publicly available [132,134].
In the third and fourth categories, various research teams implemented all of the second round
candidates, and a web page called the ‘SHA-3 Zoo’ was set up by the Institute for Applied Infor-
mation Processing and Communications (IAIK) in Graz to track these hardware implementation
results [135]. Each report itself contains a fair comparison between the candidates. However, com-
paring the results between different reports is difficult, due to technological differences, varying
quality of the implementations and the variations between different hardware interfaces.
For FPGA implementations in particular, the significance of inter-report comparisons is weak.
Similar to the work presented here, several research groups attempted to improve this situation by
defining a standard interface and applying their methodology to their own implementations. Again
each methodology only applies to their own results and comparisons with other reports continues
to be difficult, due to each groups placing different emphasis on particular metrics, bus sizes and
approaches to padding and area usage. Of the different groups which fully evaluated the round
two designs for FPGA using a standard interface, each used a number of different design and
constraint metrics which they felt most fairly and accurately described a true evaluation. However,
each group formulated a different approach as to how this was to be achieved.
For example, Homsirikamol et al. [111] implemented the 256 and 512 hash variants using an
optimization toolkit called ATHENa [136] using the interface defined in [128]. ATHENa attempts
to find the optimal combination of options and seed of the implementation tools. They set the data
bus width to 64 bit where possible to ensure that the throughput would not be the limiting factor.
For the cases where a larger bus width was necessary, they used two synchronized clocks and an
internal serial-in-parallel-out register. They also assume that the padding is completed outside of
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the hash cores and thus will not affect the speed of the core hash function. The results presented
are post-place and route.
A second group to provide an FPGA evaluation were Knezˇevic` et al. [137] using the hash func-
tion wrapper of Kobayashi et al. [109]. They define a 16-bit data bus best suited for their target
evaluation board, the SASEBO GII. Similar to Homsirikamol et al., they leave the padding to be
completed outside of the hardware module. They compare all 256 bit version candidates. The
results presented are measured from the FPGA and include power and energy results.
Another group provided FPGA evaluations (Guo et al. [138]) using the wrapper presented in [139].
They compare all 256 bit candidates, use a 16 bit data bus and exclude the padding. The results
presented are post-place and route. They also presented estimated power results.
The Third SHA-3 Candidate Conference took place onMarch 22-23, 2012 and a number of groups
again implemented the round three tweaked versions of the remaining contestants. For FPGA
based designs, George Mason University [140,141] presented a comprehensive comparison of all
the candidates. They implemented each algorithm using multiple architectures based on the con-
cepts of iteration, folding, unrolling, pipelining, and circuit replication. The major performance
metrics used were throughput, area, and throughput to area ratio. Latif et al. [142] were another
group to implement all of the round three designs and also showed their results in the form of chip
area consumption, throughput and throughput per area. Similarly, Bernhard Jungk also evaluated
the designs [143] and presented results for lightweight area-efficient designs and used the area and
throughput-area metric.
Kaps et al. [144], also of George Mason University, also presented implementations on resource-
constrained platforms, adhering to an area constraint of 800 slices or 400-600 slices and one Block
RAM. This group measured the power consumption of all 256 versions of the implementations on
Spartan-3 to evaluate the efficiency of the algorithms.
The UCL crypto group in Louvain also presented resource constrained analysis of the round three
designs [145] using a similar approach to the one used in [144]. Area, throughput and efficiency
of the 512-bit variant results were obtained for Virtex-6 and Spartan-6 devices.
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4.8.1 Comparison of Round Three Results
To allow a snapshot of how the results presented in this thesis stand, a comparison against some
the other implementations from Section 4.8 is presented. Throughput and throughput-area was
used as the standard metric given by the other implementations. Where this was not completely
clear, the throughput metric was examined and the best estimate was used to classify the work.
The load time cycle count was also removed as none of the other designers appeared to take it into
account (although it is referenced in their respective interfaces). The number of clock cycles was
recorded using a Microblaze XPS timer as described in Section 2.8.1. The area was taken for only
the hash function without the wrapper interface at Place-and-Route and the clock frequency was
taken from the Post-Place-and-Route static timing report inclusive of the wrapper.
Table 4.11 presents area, throughput and throughput-area results for the Virtex-5 implementa-
tionsiv.
The short message metric gives a clearer more realistic set of results. While the long message met-
ric just takes into account the round time, the short message metric takes into account initialisation
and finalisation stages. For example, Skein and Grøstl both have finalisation rounds of length
equal to the round time given for long messages, thus at the very least, halving the throughput
for a single block message. JH, likewise requires two message blocks to process a single 512-bit
message, thereby doubling the process time and again halving the throughput. Therefore, it is
suggested that more weight is associated to the short message metric. However most groups only
presented results for the long message metric (probably due to the simplicity of calculation).
Gaj et al. [141] presented many results using their ATHENa (Automated Tool for Hardware Eval-
uatioN) [136] database. The best results as given in [141] are presented here. For a breakdown
of the variants and their methodologies the interested reader is directed to [140,141]. The metrics
use by Gaj would closer reflect those of long messages than the time required to process a single
message block, although finalisation clock cycles are included. Load times are not included, and
ivIn an effort to reduce clutter, only the similar Virtex-5 round three implementations were taken of the many results
presented by the different groups. Those implemented using other than slice logic, i.e. with BRAM blocks, were also
neglected due to the inability to perform fair comparison
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short message metrics are not given. Results including padding (as presented in the appendix) are
not considered here as other groups did not include them. The clock count here is estimated as a
metric of number of rounds is used in the documentation.
The results from Latif [142] are given for both 256 and 512-bit digests. Although it is not ex-
plicitely stated, it is clear from the paper that the results are taken for one execution of the com-
pression function, i.e. long messages, and load times are not included.
The results from Kaps [144] are only given for SHA-3 variants with 256-bit digest, as they felt that
these are the most likely variants to be used in area-constrained designs. The low area can clearly
be seen from the area column when compared against the others. Both long and short throughput
results are given, with the short messages including the load times, initialisation and finalisation,
and the long messages excluding initialisation and finalisation but including the load time. To
allow standardisation between the results, the load times were removed (where possible; in certain
cases, i.e. JH and Keccak, processing takes place during the load in cycle, and in other cases, i.e.
Blake, processing takes place during the load out cycle) and the results were recalculated in line
with the comparison.
The results from Jungk [143] are only given for SHA-3 variants with 256-bit digest. Similar
to Kaps, they are lightweight implementations. Although it is not explicitely stated, it is clear
from the paper that the results are taken for one execution of the compression function, i.e. long
messages and load times are not included.
Two things are immediately clear from Table 4.11. Firstly that the designs presented in this thesis
are not as optimised for throughput or area when compared to the others (Throughput/Area in the
case of Gaj and Latif, minimal area in the case of Jungk and Kaps), and as such, the performance
metrics show this. The other thing that is clear is that the work presented in this thesis attempts to
cover all possible implementation versions, whereas the other implementations, due to their nature
of being specifically tailored, are only examined and presented for their percieved optimal oper-
ating performance (i.e. 256-bit for area constrained, long message variant to present throughput).
Therefore, while the results presented here are not the most area or throughput efficient, they do
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Table 4.11: Comparison of SHA-3 Round 3 Implementations
256 512
Clk Count Area Max.Freq TP TPA Clk Count Area Max.Freq TP TPA
#Cycles (slices) (MHz) (Mbps) (Mbps/slice) #Cycles (slices) (MHz) (Mbps) (Mbps/slice)
Blake S 42 1118 118.5 1444.5 1.292 58 1718 102.4 1807.8 1.05
Kaps [144] 277 271 253.8 469.11 1.731 - - - - -
Blake L 42 1118 118.5 1444.5 1.292 58 1718 102.4 1807.8 1.05
Gaj [141] 14 3495 210.04 7547 2.16 272 386 148.81 560 1.45
Latif [142] 28 1382 125.55 2290 1.66 32 2582 100.02 3210 1.24
Jungk [143] 115 374 163 725 1.94 - - - - -
Kaps [144] 258 271 253.8 503.66 1.858 - - - - -
Grøstl S 10 2391 200.85 10283.5 4.3 14 4845 167.311 12237.6 2.524
Kaps [144] 720 313 317.4 225.7 0.721 - - - - -
Grøstl L 10 2391 200.85 10283.5 4.3 14 4845 167.311 12237.6 2.524
Gaj [141] 10 2971 243.724 12479 4.2 58 2336 272.777 4816 2.06
Latif [142] 10 1419 121.03 6200 4.37 14 2523 101.22 7400 2.94
Jungk [143] 160 368 305 975 2.64 - - - - -
Kaps [144] 357 313 317.4 455.2 1.45 - - - - -
JH S 45 1291 311.72 3546.6 2.74 45 1291 311.72 3546.6 2.74
Kaps [144] 1618 183 250.6 79.29 0.433 - - - - -
JH L 43 1291 311.72 3711.6 2.87 43 1291 311.72 3711.64 2.875
Gaj [141] 43 982 416.146 4955 5.05 43 992 393.546 4686 4.72
Latif [142] 42 865 287.44 3500 4.05 42 888 292.48 3570 4.02
Jungk [143] 168 377 278 847 2.24 - - - - -
Kaps [144] 800 183 250.6 160.38 0.88 - - - - -
Keccak S 25 1358 246 10705.9 7.883 25 1361 242.54 5588.1 4.10
Kaps [144] 2395 275 259.7 117.97 0.429 - - - - -
Keccak L 24 1358 246 11152 8.212 24 1361 242.54 5820.96 4.27
Gaj [141] 24 1369 294.204 13337 9.74 24 1320 317.158 7612 5.77
Latif [142] 24 1333 275.56 12490 9.37 24 1197 263.16 6320 5.28
Jungk [143] 200 379 159 864 2.29 - - - - -
Kaps [144] 2392 275 259.7 118.1 0.43 - - - - -
Skein S 46 1786 102.283 1138.45 0.637 46 1786 102.283 1138.45 0.637
Kaps [144] 4461 246 176.6 19.39 0.078 - - - - -
Skein L 19 1786 102.283 2756.25 1.543 19 1786 102.283 2756.25 1.543
Gaj [141] 19 1858 198.098 5338 2.87 19 2026 199.561 5378 2.65
Latif [142] 19 1492 113.78 3070 2.05 19 1544 113.6 3060 1.95
Jungk [143] 584 519 299 262 0.5 - - - - -
Kaps [144] 2366 246 176.6 38.21 0.155 - - - - -
tend in a lot of cases to give similar enough TPA results to those of the Throughput/Area compared
designs, and in all cases except Blake give a better TPA than the minimal area compared designs.
Similarly, Table 4.12 presents the power and energy comparison results. The only other groups
to present power results were Kaps et al. [144] for round 3 and Knezˇevic` et al. [137] and Guo et
al. [138] for round two. In all of the cases, power and energy results were only examined for
the 256-bit variant (additionally Guo only presents power and not energy results). The results
presented here can be most directly compared against the round two results of Knezˇevic`, as while a
different method was used to calculate the energy, similar hardware, i.e. the Sasebo, was used. The
round three results from Kaps cannot be so directly compared against the results presented in this
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work, as both a different chip (Spartan-3)v and designmethodology (constrained implementations)
were used. Also, only a metric for measuring the power and energy for long messages is used.
However as the only other set of round three power and energy results available, a presentation
and comparison are attempted.
Table 4.12: Power Comparison of SHA-3 Implementations
Area Power Energy AEP Area Power Energy AEP
(slices) mW nJ/bit nJ/bit.slice (slices) mW nJ/bit nJ/bit.slice
Blake S 1118 138.5 1.173 1311.4 1718 161.9 1.280 2199.0
Knezˇevic` [137] 1660 270 0.98 1626.8 - - - -
Blake L 1118 121.4 0.964 1077.7 1718 168.4 1.020 1752.3
Knezˇevic` [137] 1660 270 0.49 813.4 - - - -
Kaps [144] 631 42.9 0.486 306.6 - - - -
Guo [138] 1612 139.8 - - - - - -
Grøstl S 2391 203.5 1.110 2654.0 4845 229.3 0.984 4767.4
Knezˇevic` [137] 2616 310 1 2616 - - - -
Grøstl L 2391 210.8 0.611 1460.9 4845 249.1 0.750 3633.7
Knezˇevic` [137] 2616 310 0.25 645 - - - -
Kaps [144] 766 39.8 0.605 463.43 - - - -
Guo [138] 3308 364.36 - - - - - -
JH S 1291 128.2 1.699 2193.4 1291 128.6 1.780 2297.9
Knezˇevic` [137] 2661 250 1.6 4257.6 - - - -
JH L 1291 125.2 0.829 1070.2 1291 127.7 0.850 1097.3
Knezˇevic` [137] 2661 250 0.8 2128.8 - - - -
Kaps [144] 558 43.8 1.369 763.9 - - - -
Guo [138] 2406 225.93 - - - - - -
Keccak S 1358 128.8 0.511 693.9 1361 131.7 0.751 1022.1
Knezˇevic` [137] 1433 290 1.16 1662.2 - - - -
Keccak L 1358 107.7 0.397 539.1 1361 134.6 0.634 862.8
Knezˇevic` [137] 1433 290 0.29 415.5 - - - -
Kaps [144] 766 27.7 1.22 934.5 - - - -
Guo [138] 1556 147.99 - - - - - -
Skein S 1786 182.0 1.390 2482.5 1786 189.4 1.574 2811.1
Knezˇevic` [137] 1370 300 1.86 2548.2 - - - -
Skein L 1786 130.4 0.651 1162.6 1786 159.0 0.812 1450.2
Knezˇevic` [137] 1370 300 0.47 643.9 - - - -
Kaps [144] 766 36 3.372 2616.6 - - - -
Guo [138] 788 88.65 - - - - - -
A general rule of thumb to get the timing or energy results per bit is to divide the result by the
vThe Kaps area and throughput results presented earlier in this section are for Virtex-5 similar to this work. However
power measurements were only taken for the Spartan-3. Again, the logic only version is chosen for comparison.
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message size. Table 4.12 presents the energy per bit results calculated from Table 4.10. The
Area-Energy Product is then recalculated and compared against the other implementations.
The results show that Knezˇevic` [137] and Guo [138] have a higher power result in the majority of
cases but Knezˇevic` has similar energy per bit results. This difference in results, while implemen-
tation dependent, decreases for the short messages. This is due to the fact that the power results
presented in this work, for both long and short messages are inclusive of loading, initialisation,
hashing and finalisation stages, while those of Knezˇevic` are taken just for hashing in the case of
long messages, and are exclusive of loading for short messages.
So while the results are more similar for short than for long messages, one would expect the results
presented in this work to result in lower energy for a similar throughput as the average power is
lower if all stages were included. For example, using the FSL bus requires 16 load in 32-bit
message blocks (18 in the case of Blake and 19 in the case of Skein (i.e. 512-bit input message
(16 × 32) plus 96-bit counter (3 × 32))) each of two clock cycles. load out in all cases requires
8× 2 for 256 and 16× 2 for 512. When this is added to the clock count to process a message, the
overhead results in a large additional cost (approximately ×2 extra, e.g. Skein requires 46 clock
cycles to hash a 224/256-bitmessage and 54 clock cycles to load the message) to the iteration time
and therefore also to the energy calculation.
The round three results from Kaps et al. [144], obviously show the lowest area and energy per
bit results, as the implementations are for area constrained devices with low power, low area and
low throughput. Only the long message metric was calculated, however, and the AEP results
show a similar enough pattern as that of this work and Knezˇevic`, with Blake, Grøstl and Keccak
performing strongly.
4.9 Conclusions
In this chapter a method for examining the performance of hardware implementations of hash
functions was presented, specifically those selected for round two and round three of the SHA-3
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hash competition. While some of the round two designs contained similar features, no two designs
could be implemented using the same methodology. Starting from a basic iterative architecture
various implementation methods were examined and an optimal solution was explored for each of
the hash functions.
A brief examination of the various platforms used along with an overview of the different FPGA
implementations for the round two designs was presented. This overview included the interface,
communications and padding protocols for the round two implementations used in this work. It
was shown how the interface was important not only to enable fast testing, but also to allow a
uniform and constrained environment in which all hash functions could be tested equally.
A brief description of the hash designs and their implementationmethodologieswas then provided
and a presentation of the results was presented. These results were then compared against the
selection process used by NIST to select the finalist designs for round three of the competition.
It was seen that the three best performing hash functions presented here, Keccak, Grøstl and JH,
were also selected by NIST as finalists. Two other strong performers Skein and Blake were also
selected for round three by NIST.
An overview was then provided of the updated designs for round three, and area, throughput, area-
throughput, timing, power and energy results of these implementations were presented. Keccak
continued to perform the best for the metrics chosen and indeed was subsequently pronounced the
overall winner of the SHA-3 competition by NIST.
Finally a comparison of the current state of the art and how it compares against the work presented
here was provided. Interestingly, it was seen that while Keccak performed best using throughput
and throughput-areametrics, its performance was not so good compared to the other designs when
implemented for area constrained systems.
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Cryptographic Processor
5.1 Introduction
The Internet, while widely used, is not very well understood from a security point of view for the
average user. Complex software hides many security flaws and adversaries can actively exploit
these flaws to access supposedly secure data. Due to this complex nature, networking and inter-
net protocols have been developed along with frameworks, which allow both standardisation and
transparancy between the different layers of a network. This allows communicating entities to
use whichever algorithms provide security appropriate for any given communication. The Internet
protocol suite [146] is the set of communications protocols used for the Internet and similar net-
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works. It is commonly referred to as TCP/IP due to its two main protocols; Transmission Control
Protocol (TCP) and Internet Protocol (IP). It consists of four abstraction layers, each with its own
protocols [147,148]:
• The Link layer. Contains communication technologies for a local network.
• The Internet layer (IP), or network layer. Connects local networks
• The Transport layer (TCP). Handles host-to-host communication.
• TheApplication layer. Contains all protocols for specific data communications services on
a process-to-process level.
HTTP FTP SMTP
TCP
IP/IPSec
HTTP FTP SMTP
TCP
TLS or SSL
IP
Kerberos
SET
HTTP
S/MIME PGP
SMTP
UDP TCP
IP
(b) Transport Layer (c) Application Layer(a) (Inter)Network Layer
Figure 5.1: Security in the TCP/IP stack
Figure 5.1 highlights some of the various security measures in the different layers of TCP/IP. SSL
and TLS are two cryptographic protocols used to encrypt network connections at the Applica-
tion Layer for the Transport Layer, using asymmetric cryptography for key exchange, symmetric
encryption for confidentiality, and message authentication codes for message integrity. SSL was
developed by Netscape and was made publicly available in 1994 [149] and after various updates,
formed the basis of TLS [150,151] (i.e. the first version of TLS can be viewed as SSL v3.1).
The Secure/Multipurpose InternetMail Extensions (S/MIME) [152], Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) [153]
and Secure Electronic Transaction (SET) protocols can be used to send messages confidentially
by combining symmetric-key encryption and public-key encryption. Message authentication and
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integrity checking is performed using digital signatures. The most important part of the protocols
from a security point of view is the secure key agreement protocol containing entity authentication
and key distribution [154–156]. NIST state that each entity in an authentication exchange must
use an approved digital signature algorithm to generate and/or verify digital signatures and each
entity acting as a claimant must be bound to a public/private key pair [157].
The goal of this chapter is to present a cryptographic architecture that is capable of supporting
multiple types of cryptographic algorithms and architectures. For a more general understanding of
the cryptosystem, an overview of a commonly used application for performing public key cryptog-
raphy, namely the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) [158], is presented. Using
this algorithm, sensitive documents are made secure by encrypting and signing in real time using
the proposed cryptographic hardware. The background theory behind the ECDSA is presented in
Section 5.2, while Section 5.3 presents the mathematical background.
Section 5.4 presents another component of ECDSA, namely the random key generation. Various
forms of entropy are proposed and a pseudo random number generator, Fortuna, is presented,
along with an implementation method.
The architecture also necessarily needs to support the underlying field operations performed by
ECC. In addition to this, the curve parameters, algorithm used, number of arithmetic units and key
size all are user definable prior to runtime, thus enabling flexibility in the selection of both the
underlying algorithm, the security level and the area-throughput requirements. Additionally, the
cryptographic architecture can also support all of the SHA-3 algorithms and their variants. These
cryptographic blocks can then be used along with ancillary components as building blocks for
cryptographic protocols, e.g. authentication, key exchange, and other cryptographic applications
as shown in layer 5 of the model in Figure 1.2. Section 5.5 describes a cryptographic processor
based on Microblaze. The insertion of the hash functions described in Chapter 4 and the elliptic
curve processor described in Chapter 3 as hardware accelerators or SOC into the Microblaze
are also described here, followed by a brief description of the additional coordinate conversions
required for converting between domains.
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Section 5.6 investigates the performance of the various ECC algorithms presented in Chapter 3
in software and in a hardware-software co-design implementation. This allows a comparison
between software only, hardware-software co-design and the dedicated hardware results presented
in Chapter 3.
Section 5.7 presents an implementation of the ECDSA using the previously described blocks and
results are given. Comparisons to the current state of the art are presented in Section 5.8. Finally,
Section 5.9 concludes the chapter.
5.2 Background to Signature Algorithms
In this section an example application is described to show the workings of the cryptographic
processor, namely the EllipticCurve Digital Signature Algorithm. It was described in Section 2.5.6
that digital signature schemes provide the digital equivalent of handwritten signatures. By first
signing the message with their private key, prior to encrypting it with the recipients public key, the
receiver can verify the authenticity of the message using the senders public key. Essentially, the
sender performs the digital equivalent of a handwritten signature.
For digital signing:
• Alice computes the signature s = SAm for a message m ∈ M , where M is the set of
messages, S is the set of signatures and SA is the transformation fromM to S
• Alice sends the pair (m, s)
For digital verification:
• Bob calculates the verification function VA, based on Alices public key
• Bob receives the pair (m, s) and performs the calculation r = VA(m, s)
• Bob accepts the signature and message as being from alice if r is true, and rejects if false
As well as providing security against adversaries, digital signatures are also used to provide data
origin authentication and timestamping, data integrity and non-repudiation. Alice cannot deny
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that she sent a message and Bob cannot change the contents of that message after receiving and
subsequently verify that it originated from Alice if it includes a valid signature.
5.2.1 The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) is the elliptic curve version of the DSA.
It was first proposed by Vanstone [158] in 1992 in response to the NIST request for public com-
ments on the first proposal for DSS. As its security is based on the computational intractability of
the ECDLP, as presented in Section 2.5.5, it is considered significantly more secure than the DSA
for an equivalent security level. The ECDSA is the most widely standardised elliptic curve based
signature scheme, used in ANSI X9.62 [38], FIPS 186-3 [71], IEEE 1363-2000 [39], ISO/IEC
15946-2 [40]. The principles of the DSA can be applied to the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature
Algorithm (ECDSA). Again, it includes a signature generation process to generate a digital signa-
ture on the data and a signature verification process to verify the authenticity of the signature, as
shown in Figure 5.2. The private key is used in the signature process, and the public key is used
in the verification process, thereby stopping fraudulent signatures.
Hash Function Hash Function
Message/DataMessage/Data
Private
Key
Public
Key
SignatureGeneration
Signature
ECC
Verification
Signature
ECC
Message DigestDigestMessage
Signature Generation Signature Verification
Valid
Invalid
Figure 5.2: Digital Signature Process
Figures 5.3(a) and 5.3(b) give an indepth description of the signature generation and signature
verfication blocks from Figure 5.2.
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5.2.2 ECDSA Domain Parameters
The domain parameters for ECDSA consist of a suitably chosen elliptic Curve E defined over
a finite field Fq of characteristic p, and a base point P ∈ E(Fq). The domain parameters are
comprised of:
• The order of the underlying field is either q = p, an odd prime, or q = 2m.
• Having selected an underlying field Fq, a sufficiently large prime n (n > 2160) is selected.
• An indication FR (field representation), of the representation used for the elements of Fq
• A cryptographic hash functionH of bitlength≤ n
• Two field elements a and b which define the equation of the elliptic curve E over Fq
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5.3 Implementing ECDSA
Before implementing ECDSA, several basic choices need to be considered:
• Type of underlying finite field Fq
• Field representation (e.g. polynomial or normal basis)
• Type of elliptic curve E over Fq
• Cryptographic hash functionH
Algorithm 24: ECDSA Signature Generation
input : Domain Parameters D = (q, FR, S, a, b, P, n, h), private key d, messagem
output: Signature (r, s)
Select k ∈ r[1, n− 1]
kP = (x1, y1)
x1 7→ x¯1 (conversion to integer)
r = x¯1 mod n
if r = 0 then restart
e = H(m)
s = k−1(e+ dr)mod n
if s = 0 then restart
return (r, s)
Algorithm 24 gives the ECDSA signature generation, Breaking it down into its component parts
gives:
5.3.1 Key Pair Generation
The private and public key required are generated as follows:
k ∈ r[1, n− 1]
Q = kP
(5.1)
where, k, the signer Alices A private key, is a randomly selected integer from [1, n− 1] and Q is
Alices public key. This computation requires one random integer generation and one elliptic curve
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point multiplication operation.
5.3.2 Signature Generation
To generate the signature for a message,m, Alice computes:
k ∈ r[1, n− 1]
R = [kP ]x mod n
e = H(m)
s = k−1(e+ dr) mod n
(5.2)
The signature for the messagem is (r, s). If s is equal to zero then Alice must restart the process.
[kP ]x defines the x-coordinate of the result point of kP . Alices private key k is used as part of
the signature generation. As such, other entities cannot produce the same signature as they have
a different value for k. Message signing requires one random integer generation, one hashing
operation and elliptic curve computation operations, namely inversion, addition and two modular
multiplications.
5.3.3 Signature Verification
Algorithm 25 gives the ECDSA signature verification, where q is the field size,FR is an indication
of the basis used, a and b are two field elements that define the equation of the curve and H is a
cryptographic hash function of bitlength≤ n.
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Algorithm 25: ECDSA Signature Verification
input : Domain Parameters D = (q, FR, S, a, b, P, n, h), public key Q, messagem,
signature (r, s)
output: Accept/Reject
Verify (r, s) ∈ R[1, n− 1], Reject if false;
e = H(m);
w = s−1 mod n;
u1 = ew mod n;
u2 = rw mod n;
X = u1P + u2Q;
Reject ifX =∞;
x1 7→ x¯1;
v = x¯1 mod n;
if v = r then Accept;
else Reject
The verifier Bob B, verifies Alices signature (r, s) for the messagem using Alices public key Q:
e = H(m)
w = s−1 mod n
u1 = ew mod n
u2 = rw mod n
X = [u1P + u2Q]x
(5.3)
If X = r then Bob accepts the signature. Otherwise it is rejected. The verification stage requires
one hashing operation and elliptic curve computation operations, namely, two point multiplica-
tions, point addition, modular inversion and two modular multiplications.
5.3.4 ECDSA Implementation Options
It is clear from above, that the main requirements for implementing ECDSA are elliptic curve
cryptography, hash functions and random number generators. In this thesis, the hardware used to
implement the designs is presented in Chapter 2, the different types of elliptic curves to be used
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were presented in Chapter 3, the different types of hash functions were presented in Chapter 4, a
field size (pb) and a key size (k) of 192 are used throughout for each of the target algorithms, and
the curve parameter selected for use is secp192r1 [81].
A number of design options were examined initially. The elliptic curve processor was imple-
mented entirely in software using the Microblaze soft-core processor [54] and also in software
with a hardware multiplier. These implementations are described fully in Section 5.6. These
implementations were then compared against the previous dedicated hardware results from Chap-
ter 3. In this way, an examination is made of the performance levels associated with each design
strategy.
It was decided the hash functions were best implemented in dedicated hardware due to the large
file size associated with holding and storing large amounts of data while a message is being hashed.
Additionally, a method for random number generation was examined, allowing re-use of the pre-
viously implemented components. This is examined further in Section 5.4.
5.4 Random Key Generation
An important process in signature verification is the generation of random keys. In [159], NIST
state that A new nonzero secret random number k shall be generated prior to the generation of each
digital signature for use during the signature generation process. To generate the key material,
random data must be acquired. There are two fundamentally different strategies for generating
random bits [160]. One strategy is to produce bits non-deterministically, where every bit of output
is based on a physical process that is unpredictable; this class of random bit generators (RBG)
is commonly known as non-deterministic random bit generators (NRBGs), i.e. True Random
Number Generators. The other strategy is to compute bits deterministically using an algorithm;
this class of RBGs is known as Deterministic RandomBit Generators (DRBGs) i.e. Pseudorandom
Number (or Bit) Generators.
NRBG data is not considered truly random in a cryptographic sense. Although the literature
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presents an indepth analysis of pseudorandom generators [21, 161], the generators are analysed
for statistical randomness only, and of little security benefit if an adversary knows the algorithm
used to generate the random data.
A DRBG includes a source of entropy input. A DRBG mechanism uses an algorithm (i.e. a
DRBG algorithm) that produces a sequence of bits from an initial value that is determined by a
seed that is determined from the entropy input. Once the seed is provided and the initial value is
determined, the DRBG is said to be instantiated and may be used to produce output. Because of
the deterministic nature of the process, a DRBG is said to produce pseudorandom bits, rather than
random bits. The seed used to instantiate the DRBG must contain sufficient entropy to provide an
assurance of randomness. If the seed is kept secret, and the algorithm is well designed, the bits
output by the DRBG will be unpredictable, up to the instantiated security strength of the DRBG.
5.4.1 Entropy
While the task of generating random or pseudorandom numbers from a seed is fairly simple,
acquiring the random seed and its secrecy is inherently more difficult [162]. The measure of
randomness in a message is called entropy, defined by Shannon in terms of a cryptosystem in [22,
163], and is defined as a measure of the disorder, randomness or variability in a closed system.
The most common definition of entropy for a variableX is:
H(X) := −
∑
P (X = x)log2P (X = x) (5.4)
where P (X = x) is the probability that the variableX takes on the value of x.
There have been many suggested sources of entropy. A hardware random number generator is an
apparatus that generates random numbers from a physical process, rather than an algorithm. This
typically consists of a transducer to convert some aspect of the physical phenomena to an electrical
signal, an amplifier to increase the amplitude of the random fluctuations to a macroscopic level,
and an analog to digital converter to convert the output into a digital bit. The physical process
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can be derived from many sources, such as keyboard and mouse access timing, sampling from the
computers microphone or even air turbulence inside the hard drive [164].
However, each source of entropy presented in the literature results in an equal amount of discussion
and debate about the amount of actual randomness or possible insecurity associated with any
potential source [165] and tests have been developed to perform analysis of these [166].
5.4.2 Fortuna
Fortuna is a cryptographically secure DRBG devised by Niels Ferguson and Bruce Schneier [167].
Its design leaves some choices open to the implementer. It comprises four main parts:
• The Accumulator; collects 32 pools of random entropy data from various sources and uses
it to reseed the generator when enough new randomness has arrived.
• The seed file manager; maintains and stores a copy of the state of the pools to enable
immediate generation of random numbers at bootup.
• The source manager; manages the pools of source data.
• The Generator; produces pseudorandom data based on the above.
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Figure 5.4: Fortuna Generator
The Generator, shown in Figure 5.4, converts fixed-size states into arbitrarily long outputs. The
designers specify that any modern block cipher can be used, and indeed, as members of the same
team that developed the Skein hash function, present methods whereby Skein can be used as
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the generator block in a PRNG [125]. This method can also be modified for other similar hash
functions containing a counter and an input, allowing them produce random data at the same speed
that they hash data. The key is changed periodically and is also changed after every data request,
so that a key compromise doesn’t endanger old outputs. Generation is shown in Algorithm 26.
Algorithm 26: Generate Blocks
input : G Generator state; modified by this function.
k Number of random blocks of data to generate.
output: r Pseudorandom. string of 16k bytes
assert : C 6= 0
Start with the empty string;
r← ǫ;
Append the necessary blocks;
for i = 1, . . . , k do
r← r‖H(k, C);
C ← C + 1;
end
return r;
There are 32 pools, P0, . . . , P31. Each entropy source distributes its entropy evenly over the pools
in a cyclic manner. The generator is reseeded every time pool P0 is large enough. One or more
pools are included in the reseed dependent on the reseed number. After a pool is used, it is reset
to an empty string. The seed file stores enough state to enable the computer to start generating
random numbers as soon as boot has occured.
5.4.3 Random Number Generator Block
The hardware implementation of the RNG block is a slightly modified (dependent on the hash
function used) version of Fortuna. For the SHA-3 hash functions, BLAKE offers a dedicated
interface for randomized hashing [116]. The advantage of randomised hashing [168] is that it
relaxes the security requirements of the hash function as the input message to the hash function
can be randomised using a fresh random value for every signature, in order to free the security
of digital signatures from relying on the collision resistance of a hash function. Grøstl also has a
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randomized hashingmode [119]. As stated earlier, Skein can be used as a PRNG and computes the
output function using the state as the chaining input [125]. JH and Keccak, while not explicitely
stated in the literature, should also be able to provide adequate security for the RNG block.
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Figure 5.5: Fortuna Flow Diagram
A description of the implementation of the Fortuna algorithm is given in Figure 5.5. The soft-
ware sections were written and compiled using Xilinx SDK and used the in-built Eclipse software
package. The source manager controls the initialisation, reseed, data generation and start and stop
functionality. The pool manager controls the management of the entropy pools. The seed file
manager updates the seed and writes a new seed to the seed file prior to exiting.
A number of modifications were made to the Fortuna algorithm as set out in the literature. Fer-
guson recommends [167] that the entropy sources be of random sizes and the data hashed while
added to the pools. As this would necessitate 32 running hash calculations for each of the pools
of entropy, and result in a substantial use of resources an alternative method was used. A similar
method to that used and shown to be statistically random in [169] was recreated here where each
pool size was kept to 256 bits and the random data was set to input in 1-byte blocks. The data is
appended to each pool producing a 264-bit string. This string is then hashed and returned to the
pool.
The key is changed periodically and no more than 1Mb of data is generated without a key change.
The generator will then change the key or check for a reseed. The key is also changed after every
data request as shown in Algorithm 27. The output is generated by a call to GenerateBlocks.
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Algorithm 27: Generate Random Data
input : G Generator state; modified by this function.
n Number of random bytes of data to generate.
output: r Pseudorandom. string of n bytes
Limit the output length to reduce the statistical deviation from perfectly
random outputs. Ensure the length is not negative
assert : 0 ≤ n ≤ 220
Compute the output;
r← first-n-bytes GenerateBlocks(G, [ n16]);
Switch to a new key to avoid later compromise of the output;
K ← GenerateBlocks(G, 2)
Two more blocks are then generated to get the new key, to be used the next time it is required to
generate data. Once the old keyK has been erased, there is no way to recompute the result r. The
entropy, input in 1-byte blocks results in 2568 = 32 events having to be added to pool P0 before it
can be used in a reseed.
There are five main operations used to write to the hardware hash block; (i) add random data from
entropy sources, (ii) write from a seed file, (iii) write from pools (iv) write key and (v) write next
key. The seed file of Fortuna ensures that random number generation can begin immediately at
startup, and each block of generation is as fast as the underlying hash function. Through re-use
of the hash function, the area and complexity of the design is further reduced, resulting in a cost
of two or three iterations of the hash function per output block of pseudo-random data. There is a
bottleneck due to the 32-bit FSL bus, requiring 16 clock cycles to load the hash block for the seed
and generator blocks and 18 clock cycles to load the entropy hash.
The different sources of entropy are considered outside of the scope of thework presented here and
it is sufficient to say that external dedicated hardware or software would be used for the collection
and safeguarding of these pools prior to their input to the generator blocki. It must be noted
however that using this method of not gathering the entropy internally in the FPGA could lead to
insecurity if an eavesdropper can get access to the data line between the computer and the FPGA
when the entropy is being input. Another possible source of attack is if an attacker can gain access
iFor examples of methods of performing this on FPGA see e.g. [170–173].
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to the CPU usage of the source manager process and detect the function being performed, then
this theoretically could be used to estimate the fixed amount of data being added to the pools and
hence the pool size. The attacker could then potentially deduce when the generator is (or more
importantly, is not) reseeded, thereby deducing the state of the generator by monitoring the CPU.
5.5 Crypto Processor Using Microblaze
The Microblaze soft-core processor [54] is based on a 32-bit RISC architecture and can be imple-
mented on any of the Xilinx FPGA families. Implementing a processor on the FPGA increases
the flexibility of the overall design and makes communication with the FPGA a simple operation.
For some applications the Microblaze processor may not provide high enough performance, such
as computationally intensive parts of ECC. In this case operations that are slow to perform in
software may be performed much faster in dedicated hardware on the FPGA.
The Microblaze, described in Section 2.7 is used as shown in Figure 5.6 to build the Cryptographic
processor. The design comprises a Random Number Generator (RNG) block, a Hash block, an
Elliptic Curve Processor (ECP) block, an XPS Timer and ancillery components. There is also a
Project Peripheral Repository (PPR) where unused components are stored to allow easy switching
between specified components for a given implementation. It can also be seen how additional
blocks can be easily and quickly added to the repository, and thus to the design. For example, an
AES block would allow SSL/TLS to be implemented.
5.5.1 Hash Block
For the hardware implementations presented here, hash function based on the round three designs
as given in Chapter 4 were implemented for the Microblaze (see Section 2.7.1). The hash block
comprises a user selected hash function. The hash designs used here are the 256-bit designs, but
no changes are required to the overall Microblaze design to allow the 512-bit designs be used.
Each Hash design is stored locally in the project peripheral repository, and the IP is added prior to
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Figure 5.6: Cryptographic Processor using Microblaze
runtime.
This necessitated some changes to the round two wrapper design. Firstly, due to the fixed size
of the FSL bus FIFO, it was easier to implement the padding in software. Methods were initially
tested whereby the first message block defined the message size and counter, however this led
to both an unnecessary extra latency in the load time along with extra logic increasing both the
complexity and the area. As such, software was generated in C to generate the padding prior to
the message being loaded to the hash function. The connections between the Microblaze and the
wrapper from Section 4.5.1 are shown in Table 5.1.
It was described in Section 2.7.2 that the input and output are read in 32-bit blocks on the FSL
bus and require two clock cyclesii, a read and an acknowledge, per block. Therefore each input
iiIn actuality, only the first block requires two clock cycles with subsequent blocks only requiring one. However,
in order to avoid undue complication when reading in messages of different sizes, the two clocks per message block
standard was used
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Table 5.1: Wrapper Interface for Hash and ECC
FSL IO hash ECC
FSL CLK in clk clk
FSL RST in rst rst
FSL S DATA in d in d in
FSL S EXISTS in dp in load
FSL M FULL in ack out RAM addr en
FSL S CONTROL in lb in key en
FSL M DATA out d out d out
FSL M WRITE out dp out done
FSL S READ out ack in -
FSL M CONTROL out lb out -
message requires (MES/32) × 2 clock cycles to load, where MES is the input message size.
Also communication issues occured when loading of a new message and processing of the current
message occured simultaneously. In order to work around this, the load stage and the processing
stage were completely separated out in respect to the round two wrapper. An example description
of the timing is given in Figure 5.7.
FSL_CLK
FSL_S_EXISTS
FSL_RST
FSL_S_DATA
FSL_S_CONTROL
FSL_S_READ
FSL_M_CONTROL
FSL_M_WRITE
FSL_M_DATA
FINAL LOADINITIAL LOAD OUTPUT
Data_1 Data_2 Data_3 Data_N−1 Data_N
Out_1 Out_2 Out_3
Figure 5.7: Timing Diagram for Microblaze I/O
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5.5.2 Elliptic Curve Processor Block
Similar to the hash block, the ECP block uses the designs from Chapter 3 again stored locally
in the project peripheral repository. As the hardware implementation of binary field operations
result in carry-free logic, these fields are better in terms of speed and area for hardware. However,
since ECDSA contains modular operations over Fq along with elliptic curve point operations, the
addition, multiplier and inversion blocks defined in Sections 3.3 can be reused.
A number of points need to be addressed here as regards the designs as presented in Chapter 3. The
designs themselves, in many cases require precomputations to get them to the required state. For
the ECDSA, the designs necessarilly begin in the affine domain and need to be converted, e.g. as
described in Section 3.2.2 and Section 3.2.3. Similarly, for the Montgomery multiplier, the values
need firstly to be converted to the montgomery domain and afterward converted back as described
in Section 3.3.3. This adds additional delays to the design. In most cases in the literature, these
precomputations are neglected from the timing results.
The IP blocks described in Section 2.7.1 were then implemented for the ECC circuitry previously
described. This involves simply defining a wrapper, also described in Table 5.1, to allow compati-
bility and some control logic and has a net result of a small increase in timing due to the coordinate
loading in 32-bit blocks, i.e. six ×2 extra clock cycles per coordinate, resulting in a mostly neg-
ligible increase when compared against the overall timing in respect to the timing results given in
Table 3.9, and a small increase in area due to the control logic.
5.5.3 Coordinate Conversion
As stated above, there is a minor conversion cost associated with converting the various algorithms
described in Chapter 3. Table 5.2 presents the different conversions required for each of the regular
scalar multiplication algorithms presented in Section 3.8.
Twisted Edwards curves are a bit more involved and require an additional conversion from Weier-
straß to twisted Edwards form along with the conversion from Jacobian projective to affine and
vica versa. To convert fromWeierstraß to twisted Edwards form, letEW be a projectiveWeierstraß-
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Table 5.2: Conversion for co-Z addition formulæ
Algorithm Conversion Cost
Left-to-right algorithms:
Mont. ladder co-Z addition (Alg. 18) Jacobian - affine 1I+ 4M
Mont. ladder (X,Z)-only (Alg. 19) homogenous - affine 1I+ 2M
Mont. ladder (X, Y )-only (Alg. 22) (
(
λ
Z
)2
X(R0),
(
λ
Z
)3
Y(R0)
)
1I+ 9M
Signed-digit (X, Y )-only (Alg. 23)
(
λ2X(R0), λ
3Y(R0)
)
1I+ 7M
where λ← yP X(R1)
xP Y(R1)
Right-to-Left algorithms:
Joye’s double-add co-Z I (Alg. 20) Jacobian - affine 1I+ 4M
Joye’s double-add co-Z II (Alg. 21) Jacobian - affine 1I+ 4M
form elliptic curve defined over Fq.
EW : Y
2Z = X3 + AXZ2 + BZ3
where A,B ∈ Fq, 4A3 + 27B2 6= 0. EW is birationally equivalent to the projective twisted
Edwards curve
EE : (3α+ 2t)X
2Z2 + Y 2Z2 = Z4 + (3α− 2t)X2Y 2
where α ∈ Fq satisfies α3+Aα+B = 0 and t ∈ Fq satisfies t2 = 3α2+A, provided such α and
t exist. This is precisely the condition that EW can be represented in Montgomery form [174].
The transformation from EW to EE is given by
XE = (XW − αZW ) (XW + (t− α)ZW )
YE = YW (XW − (t+ α)ZW )
ZE = YW (XW + (t− α)ZW )
(5.5)
(0 : 1 : 0)W 7→ (0 : 1 : 1)E
(α : 0 : 1)W 7→ (0 : −1 : 1)E.
(5.6)
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The transformation from EE to EW is given by:
XW = XE ((t+ α)ZE + (t− α)YE)
YW = t(Z
2
E + YEZE)
ZW = XE(ZE − YE)
(5.7)
(0 : 1 : 1)E 7→ (0 : 1 : 0)W
(0 : −1 : 1)E 7→ (α : 0 : 1)W .
(5.8)
To convert back from twisted Edwards curve to Weierstraß form is more straightforward. Let EE
be the projective twisted Edwards curve over Fq with coefficients a and d, where a and d are
distinct and non-zero.
EE : aX
2Z2 + Y 2Z2 = Z4 + dX2Y 2
EE is birationally equivalent to the projective Weierstraß-form elliptic curve
EW : Y
2Z = X3 + AXY 2 + BZ3,
where
A = −(a
2 + 14ad+ d2)
48
, B = −(a
3 − 33a2d− 33ad2 + d3)
864
,
under the transformation from EE to EW :
XW = (5a− d)XEZE + (a− 5d)XEYE
YW = 3(a− d)(Z2E + YEZE)
ZW = 12XE(ZE − YE)
(5.9)
and
(0 : −1 : 1)E 7→ (a+ d : 0 : 6)W . (5.10)
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The transformation from EW to EE is given by:
XE = (6XW − (a+ d)ZW )(12XW + (a− 5d)ZW )
YE = 6YW (12XW + (d− 5a)ZW )
ZE = 6YW (12XW + (a− 5d)ZW )
(5.11)
and
(0 : 1 : 0)W 7→ (0 : 1 : 1)E
(a+ d : 0 : 6)W 7→ (0 : −1 : 1)E.
(5.12)
It should be noted here that while all Edwards and twisted Edwards curves map to Weierstraß
curves, the inverse is not true, i.e. determining whether α exists is equivalent to determining
whether the curve has a twisted Edwards form. Therefore choosing curve parameters randomly
can be time costly [175]. Otherwise, if starting with a Weierstraß curve with a point of order 4,
the transformation from Bernstein and Lange [3] can be used. The formula for converting from
Weierstraß to Twisted Edwards involves 15M and 10add using constants i = 1/6, j = 1/4 and
k = −1, while for converting from Twisted Edwards to Weierstraß is 25M and 42add using
constants j = 1/48 and k = 1/864.
5.6 Implementing ECC in Software and Co-Design
In this section the performance of the various ECC algorithms presented in Section 3.8 are investi-
gated both in a software and in a hardware-software co-design implementation. These implemen-
tations are then compared against the previous dedicated hardware results from Chapter 3. In this
way, an examination is made of the performance levels associated with each design strategy.
A design for performing elliptic curve arithmetic operations was implemented on a XUPV5-
LX110T development board [49]. The maximum clock frequency of the Microblaze when im-
plemented on the board is 125MHz. The board contains 256MB DDR2 RAM that the Microblaze
can access through an external memory controller. The implemented design uses the DDR2 RAM
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for storing some of the code sections, the heap and stack are placed in 64kB of BRAM internal to
the FPGA. This design was presented in [93].
5.6.1 Dedicated Software Results
Results are first presented for a purely software implementation where the Microblaze does not
make use of the 192, 256 or 521-bit hardware multiplier. The GNU GMP library was compiled for
the Microblaze and used to implement all of the algorithms. Table 5.3 shows the timing results for
the three different field sizes with bit-lengths of 192, 256 and 521, with the Microblaze clocked
at 125MHz. The results include all precomputations and conversion to and from affine coordi-
nates. The results are quite slow for the Microblaze in this setup. This is to be expected as the
Microblaze is not optimised in any way to perform large finite field multiplications. This software
implementation does not perform any computations in parallel and it can be seen that the relative
speed of each algorithm follows the same trend as the hardware results in Section 3.10 when only
1 multiplierwas used. All of these algorithms are designed with software implementations in mind
and the results reflect this with the best result in each field size being the Left-to-right signed-digit
algorithm with (X, Y )-only co-Z (Alg. 23) algorithm.
Table 5.3: Software Results
192-bit 256-bit 521-bit
Alg. Time Time Time
(mS) (mS) (mS)
D&A (Alg. 3) 1060 1976 20330
ML co-Z (Alg. 18) 1083 2033 21220
Joye I (Alg. 20) 1085 2036 21286
Joye II (Alg. 21) 1058 1981 20157
ML (X,Z) (Alg. 19) (Alg. 40 &45) 1134 2141 22355
ML (X,Z) (Alg. 19) (Alg. 41 &45) 1056 1980 20683
ML (X,Z) (Alg. 19) (Alg. 42 &46) 991 1876 19299
ML (X,Y) (Alg. 22) 935 1753 17726
SD (X,Y) (Alg. 23) 924 1737 17668
As can be seen from the results in Table 5.3, performing large multiplications on the Microb-
laze takes a considerable number of clock cycles. This leads to a very slow computation time
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for an Elliptic Curve point multiplication. This is particularly evident in the 521-bit case where
computation times are as long as 22 seconds.
5.6.2 Instruction Set Extensions
To improve the performance of the dedicated software system, a dedicated multiplier was imple-
mented on the FPGA. The multiplier used for this design is again the Montgomery multiplier [76]
that was used in the EC processor. Adding a multiplier for hardware acceleration instead of an EC
processor allows theMicroblaze to use the hardware acceleration block to increase performance on
any ECC algorithm that use 192, 256 or 521-bit Montgomery multiplications. This type of design
is suitable when flexibility and low area are required more than absolute performance. Using the
EC processor described in Section 3.3 to implement the algorithms achieves good performance,
but the design uses a large amount of the available area on the FPGA. If a more flexible design is
required then a trade-off is made where only the large finite field multiplications are implemented
in hardware. This reduces the performance but also decreases the number of slices that are used
for accelerating elliptic curve operations.
The multiplier is connected to the Microblaze through a Fast Simplex Link (FSL). The FSL bus
supplies the clock to the multiplier, therefore the multiplier runs at the same frequency as the
Microblaze which is 100 MHz. The maximum frequency that the multiplier could run at on a
Virtex 5 FPGA is 112 MHz.
The FPGA area usage results for the entire system and the multiplier alone are shown in Table 5.4.
The multiplier is connected to the Microblaze through a Fast Simplex Link (FSL). The FSL bus is
32-bits wide and allows for very fast data transfer to and from the Microblaze through the use of
FIFOs. The FSL bus supplies the clock to the multiplier, therefore the multiplier runs at the same
frequency as the Microblaze, which is 100MHz in the case of the 192-bit implementation and 75
MHz for both the 256-bit and 521-bit implementations. These clock frequencies are determined
by the critical path of each multiplier. A pipeline register was added to the multiplier design for the
521-bit implementation in order to reduce its critical path. This doubles the number of clock cycles
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Figure 5.8: Microblaze with Hardware Multiplier
it takes to perform a multiplication. A diagram of the Microblaze with the multiplier connected is
shown in Figure 5.8. The FPGA area usage results for each entire system and the multipliers alone
are shown in Table 5.4. A timer was also included in the design in order to measure computation
times.
Table 5.4: Microblaze FPGA usage
Design Area BRAM DDR2 DSP48E Freq
(Slices) RAM (MHz)
Microblaze 192-bit 3145 65× 36k 256MB 3 100
Microblaze 256-bit 3454 65× 36k 256MB 3 75
Microblaze 521-bit 3466 65× 36k 256MB 3 75
192-bit mult 334 0 0 0 100
256-bit mult 499 0 0 0 75
521-bit mult 904 0 0 0 75
Table 5.5 shows the results obtained from the Microblaze with hardware acceleration. It can be
seen from comparing Table 5.5 with Table 5.3 that the hardware multiplier reduces the compu-
tation time by on average 89-94% for the algorithms. The large reduction in computation time
is due to the fact that the hardware multiplier performs both the multiplication and Montgomery
modular reduction which are more time consuming than modular additions. The results show the
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timing for performing a full computation of kP including all conversion to and from affine co-
ordinates and also any precomputations for each algorithm. The results assume that the point P
is unknown and therefore no values that could be precomputed and stored in RAM are used. In
both cases the Montgomery ladder with (X,Z)-only co-Z, using the (Alg. 42 & 46) and also the
(Alg. 41 & 45) variants, are the fastest algorithms and both have very similar computation times.
On average the precomputations and conversion to and from affine coordinates take about 9ms
in the 192-bit case. The precomputations are negligible in the software implementation. If the
EC processor from Chapter 3 was used as a hardware acceleration block for the Microblaze, the
precomputations alone would take longer than the actual calculation of kP .
The power consumption could not be physically measured as the design uses external DDR2
memory and the board does not allow access to the Vccint pin of the FPGA, however, the power
consumption of this design should be higher than the EC processor used in Chapter 3 due to the
higher number of slices occupied.
Table 5.5: Microblaze Results
192-bit 256-bit 521-bit
Alg. Time Time Time
(mS) (mS) (mS)
D&A (Alg. 3) 94 228 785
ML co-Z (Alg. 18) 113 296 1053
Joye I (Alg. 20) 114 297 1094
Joye II (Alg. 21) 96 252 956
ML(X,Z) (Alg. 19) (Alg. 40 &45) 74 203 731
ML(X,Z) (Alg. 19) (Alg. 41 &45) 71 166 692
ML(X,Z) (Alg. 19) (Alg. 42 &46) 71 185 681
ML(X,Y) (Alg. 22) 97 250 928
SD(X,Y) (Alg. 23) 87 225 845
The results show, as expected, that the more computations that are performed by dedicated FPGA
slice logic, the faster the design. Using a standard Microblaze setup to perform all of the calcula-
tions is slow but may be of use in non time critical applications. For a very small increase in area
usage, the performance of the Microblaze system can be increased by a factor of ×15.
For the highest performance the dedicated EC processor described in Section 3.3 is the best choice
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as it is designed solely for elliptic curve computations and hence does not suffer from some of the
overhead of a generic processor design. As such, the hardware version explored in Section 3.3 is
the one selected for use in the ECDSA.
5.7 ECDSA Design
A design for ECDSA was implemented on Microblaze. As shown in Section 5.3, the ECDSA
requires a PRNG, a hash block and an elliptic curve block for its operations. A design was se-
lected based on the information available in Tables 3.4, 3.10, 4.9 and 4.10. This design used the
Montgomery ladder (XY), Alg. 22, using the EC processor described in Section 3.3, the round
three version of the Grøstl hash function described in Section 4.7.1, the random number generator
from Section 5.4.3 and the ancillary components described in Section 2.8.1.
For the ECC block, when using four multipliers, the extended twisted Edwards and the Mont-
gomery ladder (XY) have the same energy usage, but the extended twisted Edwards has a faster
computation time. However, the additional conversion to and from the Weierstraß to Edwards
form, as shown in Section 5.5.3 results in an additional time cost. The 192-bit design was chosen
for implementation here.
For the hash block, Grøstl has the shortest iteration time for long and short messages. Its in-built
use of a counter along with its randomized hashing mode as described in Section 5.4.3 allows it to
be re-used for the PRNG block.
In addition, the SASEBO design comprises the base Microblaze, an XPS timer, a clock generator,
BRAM and some ancillary components. This selection, gives a relatively fast design, albeit at a
cost of additional power and area. However all of these components can be easily swapped out
and replaced with any of the other designs presented in this thesis, all stored locally in the project
peripheral repository.
The most computationally intensive operation for signature generation is kP as described in Al-
gorithm 24. For signature verification, shown in Algorithm 25, it is X = u1P + u2Q. Signature
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verification is more computationally intensive due to the need to perform two elliptic curve scalar
operations, compared to only one for signature verification.
An entity wishing to sign a message must first generate a private/public key pair. The private key
is selected at random such that k ∈ r[1, n − 1]. The public key, Q = kP , is then generated
as described in Equation 5.1. The generation of the integer k is done using the random number
generator. The computation of r = [kP ]x mod n described in Equation 5.2 can be completed in
any of the coordinate systems described in Chapter 3. However the obtained point, r, needs to be
converted back to affine coordinates. The computation of e = H(m) can be completed using any
of the hash functions presented in Chapter 4.
Microblaze
Generator
Number
Random
Hash
Function
Processor
Curve
Elliptic
Figure 5.9: Microblaze Signature Platform
Figure 5.9 gives the general layout of the platform for generating and verifying signatures. The
Microblaze processor is implemented to allow an easy method of communication between the
hash, ECC and RNG blocks. In addition to this, the microblaze is also used to implement padding
in the hash block and controls the entropy and managenent sections of the RNG block.
When the ECDSA processor receives a command to generate a signature, the Microblaze sends
an instruction to the hash block to hash the message and an instruction to the RNG requesting an
192-bit random integer, k. Both of these values are sent to the ECP block, where the signature is
generated. Along with the hashed message, e, and the random integer, k, the BlockRAM is loaded
with the generator point, P , and the private key, k. The (r, s) values are returned via the FSL
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bus to the Microblaze, which controls the loading of data. Similarly, for verification, the values
are again loaded along with the signature pair (r, s) to the BRAM. The operations to compute
r = [kP ] are performed mod q. All other operations are performed mod n.
5.7.1 ECDSA Results
The area results for the specified design is shown in Table 5.6. It is seen that the system takes
up approximately half of the FPGA area. Additional multipliers in the ECP design do not add a
large amount of area to the overall circuit. The Grøstl hash function is however the largest user
of area of the hash functions implemented in this thesis. As such, this implementation method
should result in approximately the largest area usage of any of the combination of cryptography
blocks, assuming that the hash block is also used for the PRNG. Obviously a user using different
hash functions for the PRNG and the hash block, or indeed a block cipher in CBC mode for the
PRNG, will result in an additional area cost.
Table 5.6: ECDSA Total Area Usage
Component FF used LUT used BRAM
System 11846 24103 6
ECP 5373 7919 10
Hash 2594 11632 -
Other 2173 2632 -
Total 21986 46286 16
The critical path of the design is through the inverter in the ECP block. Therefore the maximum
operating frequency is 91 MHz. This is the standard operating frequency throughout any com-
bination of blocks used, as the inverter is a standard component used in all of the elliptic curve
processor designs for conversion to and from various domains. Table 5.7 gives the timing results
for each subsequent section.
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Table 5.7: ECDSA Timing using Grøstl & ML (XY)
Component Calc. Time (mS)
PRNG 5.56
Hash 2.83
ECP (Gen.) 9.24
ECP (Ver.) 18.44
5.8 ECDSA Comparison
This section presents a performance comparison with other implementations of ECDSA. While
there are a lot of software implementations, the amount of results available for hardware is again
quite lacking. For example, the System for Unified Performance Evaluation Related to Crypto-
graphic Operations and Primitives (SUPERCOP) [132], an ECRYPT initiative for Benchmarking
of Cryptographic Systems measures the performance of hash functions, secret-key stream ciphers,
public-key encryption systems, public-key signature systems, and public-key secret-sharing sys-
tems, of which eBATS (ECRYPT Benchmarking of Asymmetric Systems) [176] is used to iden-
tify the most efficient public-key systems. These software implementations, while faster than
hardware, require a lot of computation power and expensive dedicated CPUs. Lenstra and Ver-
heul [177] presented analysis which concluded that for curves over Fp, software was over 2000
times more expensive than hardware.
There are also a small number of microcontroller implementations [178, 179]. In general, these
suffer from the same timing constraints as were shown in Section 5.6.2, and result in signature
generation and verification times that range in the hundreds to thousands of milliseconds.
For the FPGA and ASIC implementations, in most cases, the authors neglect the pre and post-
processing steps along with the hashing and simply give the core functionality, i.e. the scalar
multiplications for ECC. While these results can somewhat be compared to the results presented
in Chapter 3, in Table 3.5 and Table 3.10, direct comparison of the entire system performance is
difficult. Glas et al. [180] present a full ECDSA system from which comparisons can be made.
Table 5.8 presents a comparison of the results. It can be seen that the design presented here per-
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Table 5.8: Comparison of ECDSA and Core Functionality for FPGA
Imp. Field Hardware Area Max Gen. Ver.
Size Freq. Time Time
MHz mS mS
Full ECDSA
Grøstl & ML (XY) 192 Virtex-5 21986 LUT (16 BRAM) 91 12.07 21.27
Glas et al. [180] 256 Virtex-5 14256 LUT 20 7.15 9.09
Core Functionality
McIvor et. al [181] 256 Virtex-2 Pro 15755 CLB (256 Mul) 39.5 3.84 -
Orlando and Paar [182] 192 Virtex-E 11416 LUT (35 BRAM) 40 3.0 -
Sakiyama et al. [183] 256 Spartan 3S-5000 27597 LUT 40 17.7 -
O¨rs et al. [184] 160 Virtex-1000E 5614 slices (est.) 91.31 (est.) 42.52 -
Vliegen et al. [185] 256 Virtex-2 Pro 2085 slices 68.17 15.76 -
forms adequately when compared against the current state of the art. For the signature generation,
the design maintains this performance level while also being completely reconfigurable. The field
operations, the curve parameters, algorithm used, number of arithmetic units and key size all are
user definable prior to runtime. A dedicated ECDSA processor could be more easily optimised
for increased speed performance, but would lose this reconfigurability. The results presented here
also greatly outperform the microcontroller implementations [178, 179]. The signature verifica-
tion results presented by Glas et al. [180] also outperform the results presented here. This is done
through a method known as Shamir’s trick [37]. Instead of computing the two scalar multipli-
cations independently in sequence, it is faster to compute them together. In the design presented
in this thesis, the instruction set ROM for the EC processor is generated prior to runtime and so
this method cannot be accomplished without the use of additional instruction set ROM blocks and
control circuitry to select between signature generation and verification instructions.
It is clear that the reconfigurable nature of the processor presented here results in reduced speed
when compared to the dedicated circuitry presented by the comparison against other ECDSA
designs. However, its benefits are from its ability to implement many additional protocols, both as
presented here and through the addition of further hardware blocks such as AES, resulting in a far
more accomplished design, albeit with a greater speed cost associated, than those it is compared
against.
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5.9 Conclusions
In this chapter a cryptographic architecture that is capable of supporting multiple types of crypto-
graphic algorithms and architectures was presented. This architecture can support the underlying
field operations performed by ECC, the curve parameters, algorithm used, number of arithmetic
units and key size, thus enabling flexibility in the selection of both the underlying algorithm, the
security level and the area-throughput requirements. Additionally, the cryptographic architecture
can also support all of the SHA-3 algorithms and their variants. These cryptographic blocks can
then be used along with ancillary components as building blocks to build cryptographic protocols
along with other cryptographic algorithms, e.g. some types of random number generators, and
other cryptographic applications.
An implementation of a cryptographic protocol, the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm,
was presented to allow a more general understanding of the cryptosystem described. Using this
algorithm, sensitive documents are made secure by encrypting and signing in real time using the
proposed cryptographic hardware. The background theory and mathematical background behind
the ECDSA was also presented.
A Microblaze processor used to build the cryptographic processor was also presented. The in-
sertion of the hash functions described in Chapter 4 and the elliptic curve processor described in
Chapter 3 into the Microblaze are also described, along with a brief description of the additional
coordinate conversions required for converting between domains.
The performance of the various algorithms presented in Chapter 3 in software and in a hardware-
software co-design implementationwas investigated. This allowed a comparison between software
only, hardware-software codesign and the dedicated hardware results presented in Chapter 3.
Another part of the ECDSA, random key generation was described. Various forms of entropy
were examined and a pseudo random number generator, Fortuna, was presented, along with an
implementation method.
Finally, an implementation of the ECDSA using the previously described blocks was presented.
Results were given and comparisons to the current state of the art were presented.
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Conclusions
6.1 Contributions of this Thesis
In this section the main contributions of this thesis are summarised. In Chapter 3 a reconfigurable
architecture for a cryptographic processor was introduced. This processor was used to examine
the performance of various algorithms over prime fields, Fp, for elliptic curves and a differing
number of arithmetic units supported by the processor were evaluated. Different dedicated and
doubling algorithms were examined along with a relatively new special form of curve, the twisted
Edwards. It was shown how parallel versions of the twisted Edwards and extended twisted Ed-
wards far outperform the various implementations of the Double-and-Add algorithm in different
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coordinate systems. This work was presented at the 5th InternationalWorkshop on Reconfigurable
Computing, ARC, in 2009 [186] and provided the first implementation results for Edwards curves
in hardware.
SPA secure algorithms were also examined and metrics were presented for selecting the fastest
algorithms for the lowest area and energy cost. Three different methods of SPA secure algorithms
were presented; dummy arithmetic instructions, unified doubling and addition and regular scalar
multiplication algorithms. Point sharing was introduced as a means of speeding up these regular
algorithms. With four multipliers operating in parallel, the best performance was achieved with
the extended twisted Edwards and the Montgomery ladder (XY) giving the same energy usage,
but the extended twisted Edwards having a faster computation time. This portion of the work was
published in the Journal of Cryptographic Engineering, JCEN, in 2012 [93]. This work presented
the first hardware results for the various Co-Z, combined double-add and (X,Y)-only algorithms
along with providing an overall comparison between them.
Additional work based on the elliptic curve processor itself was presented at the Workshop on
Special Purpose Hardware for Attacking Cryptographic Systems, SHARCS, in 2009 [187], and at
the International Conference on Reconfigurable Computing and FPGAs, ReConFig, in 2009 [188].
In Chapter 4 methods for implementing and evaluating the hash functions from theNIST run SHA-
3 competitionwere presented. The contest initially received sixty four submissions from designers
worldwide. Fifty one of these designs progressing through to round one of the contest which began
in November 2008. Core functionality results were presented for five of these designs during the
first round of the competition. Three of the designs implemented were selected for round two of
the competition. These results were presented at the Euromicro Symposium on Digital Systems
Design, DSD, in 2009 [107].
An interface was presented to allow a fair and consistent evaluation of each of the designs. This
wrapper was presented at the IET Irish Signals and Systems Conference, ISSC, in 2010 [127].
The first published full evaluation was carried out for each of the fourteen designs selected for
round two of the competition. This was presented at the International Conference on Field Pro-
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grammable Logic and Applications, FPL, in 2010 [115], and also selected by NIST to be presented
at the Second SHA-3 Candidate Conference [114]. Three of the round two designs implemented
consistently outperformed SHA-2 for all of the metrics selected; Keccak, Grøstl and JH. All of
which were selected by NIST for the final round of the competition. All five round three designs
selected by NIST were in the top eight implementations based on the work presented here.
Updated area and power results for the remaining five designs selected for the third and final round
of the competition were presented on the Cryptology ePrint Archive [189]. The eventual finalist
selected, Keccak, was consistently the top performing hardware design implemented in this work.
Additional work in this area based on an overview of the hardware used by various teams to
implement the hash functions was also presented on ePrint [45].
In Chapter 5 a cryptographic architecture that is capable of supporting multiple types of crypto-
graphic algorithms and architectures is presented. This architecture supports the underlying field
operations performed by ECC. In addition to this, the curve parameters, algorithm used, number
of arithmetic units and key size all are user definable prior to runtime, thus enabling flexibility in
the selection of both the underlying algorithm, the security level and the area-throughput require-
ments. Additionally, the cryptographic architecture can also support all of the SHA-3 algorithms
and their variants. These cryptographic blocks can then be used along with ancillary components
as building blocks to build bigger cryptographic algorithms and applications.
Implementations are presented for performing ECC scalar multiplication in dedicated microcon-
troller software, hardware and hardware-software co-design and comparisons were made. This
work was also selected for publication in the Journal of Cryptographic Engineering, JCEN, in
2012 [93]. The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm was presented and novel implementa-
tions consisting of reconfigurable blocks implemented using the previously defined elliptic curve
algorithms and sha-3 hash algorithms were presented. A pseudo random number generator, For-
tuna, was also designed and implemented using the aforementioned blocks.
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6.2 Future Research Directions
An immediate natural addition to the work presented in this thesis is to implement the top layer
from Figure 1.2, the application layer, and furthermore, to connect the circuitry directly to a net-
work point and perform testing and analysis in a real local area network environment. A number
of additional updates would also benefit from being implemented. These are broken down by
chapter.
The focus of Chapter 3 was to examine the performance of various algorithms used to perform
point scalar multiplication. Not taken into account in the designs presented in this thesis are cases
where speed-up is acquired by setting certain curve parameters to constants, such as those de-
scribed in [66,94,95]. While the existence of these curve parameters was acknowledged, the aim
of the work presented here was to determine the underlying performance of the general case. As
such, these optimised cases were not examined. Interesting future work would involve imple-
menting these special cases in hardware to deduce any increase in speed or decrease in energy
associated with them. Similarly, using Mersenne primes could also help to increase the speed of
the designs [23].
Chapter 4 presents methods for implementing and evaluating the hash functions from the NIST
run SHA-3 competition. The competition has recently ended with Keccak being announced the
ultimate winner. With one defined standard now selected, concentrated work can now begin to
optimise Keccak. However, NIST state [106] that all five finalists would have made acceptable
choices for SHA-3. As such, while not being the SHA-3 standard, the other four designs, Blake,
Grøstl, JH and Skein, are still acceptable for use as hash functions. While a lot of analysis has
been completed on the hash functions in various modes of operation, i.e. low power, high through-
put, etc., there is still more tweaking and different modes of operation that can be examined and
implemented to improve performance for all of the round three designs.
Chapter 5 presents a cryptographic architecture capable of supporting multiple types of crypto-
graphic algorithms and architectures. On speed-up of the cryptographic architecture, implemen-
tations using additional instruction set ROM blocks to differentiate between signature generation
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and verification could be further examined to allow optimisations such as Shamir’s trick [37]
which allows two simultaneous point multiplications be performed, to be implemented at a cost
of additional resources. Other methods which use algorithms to increase the speed and security
and reduce complexity using combinations of mixed coordinates, non adjacent form (NAF) and
variable length sliding window could also be examined for hardware implementations, such as the
Windowing method [190], Addition Chains [191] and the Width-W NAF method [192] amongst
others.
On the security of the cryptographic architecture, some further work can also be done to improve
the security of the device. The security of the signature generation algorithm depends on several
assumptions. From the algorithm side, that; the random number, k, is securely generated; the hash
function used is cryptographically secure; and the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem is
intractable. If any of these assumptions fail then it is possible for an adversary to forge signatures.
For the random number generator, the sources of entropy can be examined in further detail and
best fit solutions found. In the case of the hash functions, use of any of the SHA-3 implementations
is deemed by NIST to be sufficient [106]. For the ECDLP, the use of larger key and field sizes
shouldmaintain the intractability as shown in Table 2.1 and Table 2.2. As such, future work should
also involve implementing the larger ECC variants presented in Section 3.11 for the cryptographic
architecture. While no implementation is completely secure, this, along with the use of SPA secure
algorithms should ensure adequate protection. Indeed, the co-Z formulæ also allow for the use of
projective point randomizationwhich is a countermeasure against DPA attacks. However, since the
value of k is random and changes for every signature generated, this part of the ECDSA algorithm
is sufficiently protected against DPA attacks. For DPA attacks to be applicable the keymust remain
constant for many executions of the algorithm. The main part of the ECDSA susceptible to DPA
is in the generation of the signature, specifically the computation of s = k−1(e + dr) mod n.
Since the signers private key d remains constant, and r can be obtained, this operation is open to
attack [193]. Masking the message e and the private key d offers sufficient protection and this can
be done at a cost of an extra multiplication using k.
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From a hardware security point of view there are also many sources of attack. Since the PRNG is
partially implemented off chip, an attacker may be able to inject some bias into the entropy source.
One alternative to the method described here is to implement the entire PRNG on-chip [170–173].
External RAM in the Microblaze also presents another location for attack. Additionally, while the
work presented here concentrated on side channel protection at the algorithm level, there are many
other methods for protecting against side channel attacks, such as smoothing the power trace at a
circuit level using dual-rail logic, or through the use of controlled place and route [194–196]. All
of these methods are included in future work as a means of further protecting the circuitry from
potential adversaries. A fully secure future device should ensure that no keys should be allowed
to leave the ECDSA processor. Any sensitive information transferred off-chip to the external
RAM could be easily intercepted. The Microblaze processor should also not have any access to
private key information. In this way, for security partitioning, only the hash function block and the
Microblaze should be unsecured against all forms of attack.
Finally, it was shown that additional designs and cryptographic algorithms can easily and quickly
be added through the use of the project peripheral repository. As such, additional types of cryp-
tographic primitives and protocols not implemented in this thesis, i.e. AES [26], DES [25],
RSA [30], could be added to the overall architecture, thereby allowing further complexity in ap-
plications using this architecture.
Additionally, from a design point of view, due to the large development time associated with
the large amount of designs implemented in the thesis, further automated testing would result in
a reduced test time for the algorithms presented. Furthermore, the work presented throughout
this thesis shows that the expected results from any particular set of implementations transpired
to fairly accurately mirror the measured results. As such, it was shown that the methods used
to generate these expected results are sufficiently accurate as to negate the need for full further
testing, and thereby further alleviate test times in future cases.
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A.1 Double-and-Add Algorithms
The following section derives the Double-and-Add algorithms described in Chapter 3 in full. The
equations given here were directly used to generate the instruction set necessary for the ECC
processor.
A.1. DOUBLE-AND-ADD ALGORITHMS
Algorithm 28: Point Doubling in Affine Coordinates
input : P (x1, y1) ∈ Fq
output: [2]P (x3, y3) ∈ E(Fq)
x22 = x2.x2, 2x
2
2 = x
2
2 + x
2
2,;
A = 3x22 = 2x2 + x2, B = A+ a,;
2y2 = y2 + y2, inv2y2, λ = B/2y2,;
λ2 = λ.λ, 2x2 = x2 + x2, x3 = λ
2 − 2x2,;
C = x2 − x3, D = λ.C, y3 = D − y2
Algorithm 29: Point Addition in Affine Coordinates
input : P (x1, y1);
Q(x2, y2) ∈ Fq
output: P +Q(x3, y3) ∈ E(Fq)
A = y2 − y1, B = x2 − x1, invB,;
λ = A/B, λ2 = λ.λ, C = λ2 − x1,;
x3 = C − x2, D = x1 − x3, E = D.λ, y3 = E − y1
Algorithm 30: Point Doubling in Projective Coordinates
input : P (X1, Y1, Z1) ∈ Fq
output: [2]P (X3, Y3, Z3) ∈ E(Fq)
z22 = z2.z2, a.z
2
2, x
2
2 = x2.x2;
2x22 = x
2
2 + x
2
2, 3x
2
2 = x
2
2 + 2x
2
2, A = (a.z2)
2 + (3x2)
2;
y2.z2, x2.y2, B = x2y2.y2z2,;
A2 = A.A, 2B = B + B, 4B = 2B + 2B,;
8B = 4B + 4B, C = A2 − 8B, y2z2.C,;
X3 = (y2z2.C).(y2z2.C), 4B −C,D = A(4B − C),;
y22 = y2.y2, (y2.z2)
2, 2(y2.z2)
2,;
4(y2.z2)
2, 8(y2.z2)
2, E = y22.8(y2z2)
2,;
Y3 = D −E, Z3 = 8(y2.z2)3,
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Algorithm 31: Point Addition in Projective Coordinates
input : P (X1, Y1, Z1);
Q(X2, Y2, Z2) ∈ Fq
output: P +Q(X3, Y3, Z3) ∈ E(Fq)
y2.z1, y1.z2, x2.z1, x1.z2,;
A = (y2z1).(y1z2), B = (x2z1).(x1z2), A
2 = A.A,;
B2 = B.B, B3 = 2B.B, z1.z2,;
A2.(z1z2), C = A
2(z1z2)−B3, B2.(x1z2),;
D = 2(B2.(x1z2)), C −D,X3 = B.(C −D),;
E = (B2.(x1z2))− (C −D), A.E, F = B3.(y1z2),;
Y3 = AE − F, Z3 = B3.(z1z2),;
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A.2 Edwards Curves
For standard projective twisted Edwards, each PA requires 11M and 7add, while the PD requires
7M and 7add as given in Algorithm 32 and Algorithm 33.
Algorithm 32: Point Addition for twisted Edwards
input : P (X1, Y1, Z1);
Q(X2, Y2, Z2) ∈ Fq
output: P +Q(X3, Y3, Z3) ∈ E(Fq)
A = Z1Z2, B = A
2, C = X1X2, D = Y1Y2,
E = dCD, F = B − E,G= B + E,
X3 = AF ((X1 + Y1)(X2 + Y2)− C −D, Y3 = AG(D− aC), Z3 = FG
Algorithm 33: Point Doubling for twisted Edwards
input : P (X1, Y1, Z1) ∈ Fq
output: [2]P (X3, Y3, Z3) ∈ E(Fq)
B = (X1 + Y1)
2, C = X21 , C = X1X2, D = Y1Y2, E = aC,
F = E +D,H = Z21 , J = F − 2H,
X3 = (B −C −D)J, Y3 = F (E −D), Z3 = FJ
The extended projective twisted Edwards, requires 9M and 7add for each PA, and requires 7M
and 7add for each PD as given in Algorithm 34 and Algorithm 35.
Algorithm 34: Point Addition for Extended twisted Edwards
input : P (X1, Y1, T1, Z1);
Q(X2, Y2, T2, Z2) ∈ Fq
output: P +Q(X3, Y3, T3, Z3) ∈ E(Fq)
A = X1.X2, B = Y1.Y2, C = Z1.T2, D = T1.Z2,
E = D +C, F = (X1 − Y1).(X2+ Y2) + B −A,G = B + aA,H = D − C,
X3 = E.F, Y3 = G.H, T3 = E.H, Z3 = F.G
Algorithm 36 give the unified formula for standard twisted Edwards, while Algorithm 37 for
extended twisted Edwards. The unified single point operation, processes the same formula for
both PA and PD, thereby giving it the same power trace for either operation, at a cost of 12M and
7add per point operation. The extended unified formula performs better at 9M and 7add.
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Algorithm 35: Point Doubling for Extended twisted Edwards
input : P (X1, Y1, T1, Z1) ∈ Fq
output: [2]P (X3, Y3, T3, Z3) ∈ E(Fq)
A = X21 , B = Y
2
1 , C = 2Z
2
1
D = aA, E = B + A, F = B −D,G = C −E,
H = (X1 + Y1)
2 − A−B,
X3 = G.H, Y3 = E.F, T3 = F.H, Z3 = E.G
Algorithm 36: Unified twisted Edwards Point Operation
input : P = (X1 : Y1 : Z1), Q = (X2 : Y2 : Z2)
output: P +Q = (X3 : Y3 : Z3)
A = Z1Z2, B = A
2, C1 = aX1X2, C2 = X1Y2
D1 = Y1Y2, D2 = X2Y1, E = dC2D2, F = B − E,G= B + E
X3 = AF (C2 +D2), Y3 = AG(D1 −C1), Z3 = FG
Algorithm 37: Extended Unified twisted Edwards Point Operation
input : P = (X1 : Y1 : Z1), Q = (X2 : Y2 : Z2)
output: P +Q = (X3 : Y3 : Z3)
A = (X1.X2), B = (Y1.Y2), C = dT1.T2
D = Z1.Z2, E = (X1 + Y1).(X2 + Y2)− A−B,
F = D − C,G = D + C,H = B − aA
X3 = E.F, Y3 = G.H, T3 = E.H, Z3 = F.G
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A.3 Co-Z Algorithms
In this section we present some of the Co-Z operations defined in Chapter 3, presented as Alg 38–
Alg 44.
Algorithm 38: Co-Z Addition with Update (ZADDU)
Require : P = (X1 : Y1 : Z) and Q = (X2 : Y2 : Z)
Ensure : (R, P )← ZADDU(P,Q) where R← P +Q = (X3 : Y3 : Z3) and
P ← (λ2X1 : λ3Y1 : Z3) with Z3 = λZ for some λ 6= 0
Function: ZADDU (P,Q)
C ← (X1 −X2)2,W1 ← X1C;W2 ← X2C
D ← (Y1 − Y2)2; A1 ← Y1(W1 −W2),X3 ← D −W1 −W2
Y3 ← (Y1 − Y2)(W1 −X3)−A1, Z3 ← Z(X1 −X2)
X1 ←W1; Y1 ← A1; Z1 ← Z3
R = (X3 : Y3 : Z3), P = (X1 : Y1 : Z1)
Algorithm 39: Conjugate Co-Z Addition (ZADDC)
Require : P = (X1 : Y1 : Z) and Q = (X2 : Y2 : Z)
Ensure : (R, S)← ZADDC(P,Q) where R← P +Q = (X3 : Y3 : Z3) and
S ← P −Q = (X3 : Y3 : Z3)
Function: ZADDC(P,Q)
C ← (X1 −X2)2,W1 ← X1C;W2 ← X2C
D ← (Y1 − Y2)2; A1 ← Y1(W1 −W2),X3 ← D −W1 −W2
Y3 ← (Y1 − Y2)(W1 −X3)−A1, Z3 ← Z(X1 −X2)
D ← (Y1 + Y2)2, X3 ← D −W1 −W2
Y3 ← (Y1 + Y2)(W1 −X3)−A1
R = (X3 : Y3 : Z3), S = (X3 : Y3 : Z3)
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Algorithm 40: Out-of-Place Differential Addition-and-Doubling 1 (AddDblCoZ1)
Require : X1, X2, Z, xD, a, 4b
Ensure : X ′1, X
′
2, Z
′
Function: AddDblCoZ1(X1, X2, Z)
U = (X1 −X2)2, V = 4X2(X22 + aZ2) + 4bZ3
X ′1 = V
[
2(X1 +X2)(X1X2 + aZ
2) + 4bZ3 − xDZU
]
X ′2 = U
[
(X22 − aZ2)2 − 8bZ3X2
]
, Z ′ = UV Z
Algorithm 41: Out-of-Place Differential Addition-and-Doubling 2 (AddDblCoZ2)
Require : X1, X2, Z, xD, a, 4b
Ensure : X ′1, X
′
2, Z
′
Function: AddDblCoZ2(X1, X2, Z)
U = (X1 −X2)2,V = 4X2(X22 + aZ2) + 4bZ3
X ′1 = V [(X1+X2)(X
2
1 +X
2
2 − U + 2aZ2) + 4bZ3 − xDZU ]
X ′2 = U
[
(X22 − aZ2)2 − 8bZ3X2
]
, Z ′ = UV Z
Algorithm 42: Out-of-Place Differential Addition-and-Doubling 3 (AddDblCoZ3)
Require : X1, X2, TD = xDZ, Ta = aZ
2, Tb = 4bZ
3
Ensure : X ′1, X
′
2, T
′
D, T
′
a, T
′
b
Function: AddDblCoZ3(X1, X2, Z)
U = (X1 −X2)2, V = 4X2(X22 + Ta) + Tb
W = UV , T ′D = TDW , T
′
a = TaW
2
T ′b = TbW
3, X ′1 = V
[
(X1 +X2)(X
2
1 +X
2
2 − U + 2Ta) + Tb
]− T ′D
X ′2 = U
[
(X22 − Ta)2 − 2X2Tb
]
Algorithm 43: Co-Z Doubling-Addition with Update (ZDAU)
Require : P = (X1 : Y1 : Z) and Q = (X2 : Y2 : Z)
Ensure : (R,Q)← ZDAU(P,Q) where R← 2P +Q = (X3 : Y3 : Z3) and
Q← (λ2X2 : λ3Y2 : Z3) with Z3 = λZ for some λ 6= 0
Function: ZDAU(P,Q)
C′ ← (X1 −X2)2,W ′1 ← X1C′;W ′2 ← X2C′
D′ ← (Y1 − Y2)2; A′1 ← Y1(W ′1 −W ′2), Xˆ ′3 ← D′ −W ′1 −W ′2
C ← (Xˆ ′3 −W ′1)2, Y ′3 ← [(Y1 − Y2) + (W ′1 − Xˆ ′3)]2 −D′ − C − 2A′1
W1 ← 4Xˆ ′3C;W2 ← 4W ′1C, D ← (Y ′3 − 2A′1)2; A1 ← Y ′3(W1 −W2)
X3 ← D −W1 −W2, Y3 ← (Y ′3 − 2A′1)(W1 −X3)−A1
Z3 ← Z
(
(X1 −X2 + Xˆ ′3 −W ′1)2 − C′ − C
)
D← (Y ′3 + 2A′1)2
X2 ← D −W1 −W2, Y2 ← (Y ′3 + 2A′1)(W1 −X2)−A1, Z2 ← Z3
R = (X3 : Y3;Z3), Q = (X2 : Y2 : Z2)
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Algorithm 44: (X, Y )-Only Co-Z Conjugate-Addition–Addition with Update (ZACAU′)
Require : P ′ = (X1 : Y1) and Q
′ = (X2 : Y2) for some P = (X1 : Y1 : Z) and
Q = (X2 : Y2 : Z), and C = (X1 −X2)2
Ensure : (R′, S ′, C)← ZACAU′(P ′, Q′, C) where R′ ← (X3 : Y3) and S ′ ← (X4 : Y4)
for some R = 2P = (X3 : Y3 : Z3) and S = P +Q = (X4 : Y4 : Z4) such that
Z3 = Z4, and C ← (X3 −X4)2
Function: ZACAU′(P ′, Q′, C)
W1 ← X1C;W2 ← X2C, D← (Y1 − Y2)2; A1 ← Y1(W1 −W2)
X ′1 ← D −W1 −W2; Y ′1 ← (Y1 − Y2)(W1 −X ′1)− A1,D ← (Y1 + Y2)2
X ′2 ← D −W1 −W2, Y ′2 ← (Y1 + Y2)(W1 −X ′2)− A1, C′ ← (X ′1 −X ′2)2
X4 ← X ′1C′;W ′2 ← X ′2C′, D′ ← (Y ′1 − Y ′2)2; Y4 ← Y ′1(X4 −W ′2)
X3 ← D′ −X4 −W ′2, Y3 ← (Y ′1 − Y ′2)(X4 −X3)− Y4, C ← (X3 −X4)2;
Y3 ← (Y ′1 − Y ′2 +X4 −X3)2 −D′ −C − 2Y4, X3 ← 4X3; Y3 ← 4Y3; X4 ← 4X4
Y4 ← 8Y4; C ← 16C
R′ = (X3 : Y3), S
′ = (X4 : Y4), C
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A.4 Point Doubling Formulæ with Update in Homogeneous Coordi-
nates.
A double of point P = (X1 : Y1 : Z1) on EH, denoted DBLH, is computed as 2P = (X3 : Y3 :
Z3) with
X3 = 2BD, Y3 = A(4C −D)− 8(Y1B)2, Z3 = 8B3
where A = aZ21 + 3X
2
1 , B = Y1Z1, C = X1(Y1B), and D = A
2 − 8C. The cost of it
is 6M+ 5S+ 1c. DBLH was optimised by trading one multiplication with one squaring which
results in a cost of 5M+ 6S+ 1c and is given as
X3 = 4BD, Y3 = A(4C −D)− 64(Y1B)2, Z3 = 64B3
where A = 2(aZ21 +3X
2
1 ), B = Y1Z1, C = 2[(X1+Y1B)
2−X21 − (Y1B)2], andD = A2−8C.
If Z1 = 1, the cost drops to 3M+ 5S, with
X3 = 4Y1D, Y3 = A(4C −D)− 64B, Z3 = 64Y1α
whereA = 2(a+3X21 ), α = Y
2
1 ,B = α
2,C = 2[(X1+α)
2−X21−B], andD = A2−8C. Notice
that together with 2P a representation of a point P is obtained having the same Z coordinate at a
cost of only one multiplication.
P˜ = (64Y1α ·X1 : 64B : 64Y1α) ∼ (X1 : Y1 : Z1) = P .
Let (P˜ , 2P ) ← DBLUH(P ) denote the corresponding operation, where P˜ ∼ P and Z(P˜ ) =
Z(2P ). The cost of DBLUH operation (doubling with update) is 4M+ 5S.
Furthermore, for implementation purpose of Algorithm 19, an (X,Z)-only point doubling is
defined with an update in homogeneous coordinate, denoted as DBLUH
∗ as DBLUH
∗(P ) ←
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(X(P˜ ) : X(2P) : Z(2P )) = (X1 · 64Y1α : 4Y1D : 64Y1α) . The cost of DBLUH∗ operation is
3M+ 5S .
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A.5 Full Coordinate Recovery
The formula for the recovery of the full projective coordinates of the output pointQ = kP , from
the x-coordinates R0 = (X1, Z) and R1, Z = (X2, Z) at the end of the Montgomery ladder is
described in Alg. 45.
Algorithm 45: Out-of-Place (X : Y : Z)-Recovery 1
Require : X1, X2, TD = xDZ, Ta = aZ
2, Tb = 4bZ
3
Ensure : R = (X : Y : Z) = (X1 : X2 : Z)
Function: recoverfullcoordinates1(X1, X2, Z)
A = Z2, B = ZA, C = xDZ, D = 4yDX1,X1 = DX1A
X2 = 2
[
(CX1 + aA)(C +X1)−X2(C −X1)2
]
+ 4bB, Z = DB
R = (X : Y : Z) = (X1 : X2 : Z)
Note thatD = (xD, yD) represents the invariant, input pointP , of theMontgomery ladder in affine
coordinates. The cost of this formula is 8M+ 2S+ 1Ma + 1M4b + 8add detailed in algorithm 7
of [64].
The full coordinates recovery formula given by Algorithm 19 is evaluated in Alg 46.
Algorithm 46: Out-of-Place (X : Y : Z)-Recovery 2
Require : X1, X2, TD, Ta, Tb
Ensure : R = (X : Y : Z) = (X1 : X2 : Z)
Function: recoverfullcoordinates2(X1, X2, Z)
X1 = 4yDxDT
2
DX1
X2 = X
3
D[Tb + 2(TDX1 + Ta)(X1 + TD)− 2X2(X1 − TD)2]
Z = 4yDT
3
D
R = (X : Y : Z) = (X1 : X2 : Z)
The cost of which is 10M+ 3S+ 8add as detailed in algorithm 8 of [64].
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A.6 Point Doubling and Tripling with Co-Z Update
Algorithms 18, 20, 21, 22 and 23 require a point doubling or a point tripling operation for their
initialisation. We describe here how this can be implemented.
Initial Point Doubling: The double of a point is computed using the DBLU operation below.


X(2P ) =M2 − 2S,
Y(2P ) =M(S − X(2P ))− 8L,
Z(2P ) = 2Y1
(A.1)
with M = 3B + a, S = 2((X1 + E)
2 − B − L), L = E2, B = X12, and E = Y12. Since
Z(2P ) = 2Y1, it follows that
(S : 8L : Z(2P )) ∼ P with S = 4X1Y12 and L = Y14
is an equivalent representation for point P . Updating point P such that its Z-coordinate is equal
to that of 2P comes thus for free [87]. Let (2P, P˜) ← DBLU(P ) denote the corresponding
operation, where P˜ ∼ P and Z(P˜ ) = Z(2P ). The cost of DBLU operation (doubling with
update) is 1M+ 5S.
Initial Point Tripling: The triple of P = (X1 : Y1 : 1) can be evaluated as 3P = P +2P using
co-Z arithmetic [92]. From (2P, P˜)← DBLU(P ), this can be obtained as ZADDU(P˜ , 2P ) with
5M + 2S and no additional cost to update P for its Z-coordinate becoming equal to that of 3P .
The corresponding operation, tripling with update, is denoted TPLU(P ) and its total cost is of
6M+ 7S.
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A.7 Full Power, Energy and Timing Results
Presented here are the full set of results for the dedicated and SPA secure algorithms presented in
Section 3.4.1 and Section 3.10, using Equation 3.19.
Table A.1 presents the full results for the dedicated double and add algorithms. Columns 3 and
4 give the supply data from the power meter, while subsequent columns give the results either
obtained from the oscilliscope or calculated using equation 3.19. We draw attention to the final
two columns, the former being the time taken to perform a full calculation of the algorithm and the
latter being the energy expended to perform that calculation. In both cases, the lower the value,
the better the result.
Table A.1: FPGA Power and Timing Results for Double-and-Add
Power Meter Oscilliscope
Algorithm No of. Suppl. Suppl. µ Resistor Resistor µ FPGA µ FPGA Calc. Energy
Mult. Current Power Voltage Drop Power Voltage Power Time
mA mW mV mW mV mW mS mJ
Affine D&A 1 151.9 151.9 139.8 19.5 860.2 120.2 13.9 1.7
Projective 1 150.0 150.0 138.8 19.3 861.2 119.5 32.6 3.9
Double 2 157.2 157.2 145.0 21.0 855.0 124.0 17.8 2.2
and 3 164.8 164.8 153.6 23.6 846.4 130.0 13.9 1.8
Add 4 171.3 171.3 157.1 24.7 842.9 132.4 10.8 1.4
Jacobian 1 148.9 148.9 137.8 19.0 862.2 118.8 25.4 3.0
Double 2 156.3 156.3 144.4 20.8 855.6 123.5 16.9 2.1
and 3 164.5 164.8 153.8 23.7 846.2 130.2 13.8 1.8
Add 4 169.6 169.6 156.7 24.5 843.3 132.1 13.0 1.7
Twisted 1 150.7 150.7 138.3 19.1 861.7 119.2 23.6 2.8
Edwards 2 157.1 157.1 144.4 20.8 855.5 123.4 12.7 1.6
Dedicated 3 165.6 165.6 153.8 23.8 845.9 130.4 9.6 1.2
4 168.9 168.9 156.7 24.1 843.8 131.8 9.6 1.3
Extended 1 148.2 148.2 138.3 19.0 862.2 118.8 22.8 2.7
Twisted 2 156.2 156.2 144.3 20.8 855.8 123.4 12.8 1.7
Edwards 3 164.6 164.6 154.1 23.5 846.8 129.7 10.4 1.3
Dedicated 4 167.5 167.5 156.2 24.1 844.9 131.1 8.0 1.1
It can be seen from the table that the affine coordinates give quite good timing and energy re-
sults when compared to the Projective and Jacobian coordinates for 1M for a key with an average
hamming weight. However, as it does not scale with parallelisation, it is overtaken in both the cal-
culation time and energy usage by the other coordinate systems by 4M. The Jacobian coordinates
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start off quicker with more energy efficiency than the Projective coordinates, but the latter makes
better use of parallelisation to overtake the former in timing, albeit at a greater cost in energy.
Table A.2 gives the timing, power and energy results. The Double-and-Always-Add, while being
the slowest at 1M performs quite well for parallelisation and the speedup performance is quite
acceptable at 4M. There is very little difference in the Joye and Hutter algorithms until 4M
where the Hutter algorithms perform better. The standard unified twisted Edwards does not have
a very good speed or energy performance in comparison, however, the extended unified algorithm
performs best of the algorithms under examination at 4M.
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Table A.2: SPA Secure Power and Timing Results
Power Meter Oscilliscope
Algorithm No of. Suppl. Suppl. µ Resistor Resistor µ FPGA µ FPGA Calc. Energy
Mult. Current Power Voltage Drop Power Voltage Power Time
mA mW mV mW mV mW mS mJ
Double 1 150.6 150.6 139.2 19.4 860.8 119.8 42.3 5.1
and 2 157.3 157.3 144.8 21.0 855.2 123.8 22.0 2.7
Always 3 163.9 163.9 152.2 23.2 847.8 129.0 15.8 2.0
Add 4 169.1 169.1 156.7 24.6 843.3 132.1 14.2 1.9
Montgomery 1 148.9 148.9 138.4 19.2 861.6 119.2 26.6 3.2
Ladder 2 158.1 158.1 146.2 21.4 853.8 124.8 15.6 2.0
with Co-Z 3 163.5 163.5 152.2 23.2 847.8 129.1 10.9 1.4
Addition 4 168.6 168.6 155.7 24.2 844.3 131.5 10.9 1.4
Joye’s 1 150.1 150.1 138.9 19.3 861.1 119.6 26.7 3.2
Double-Add 2 157.3 157.3 144.8 21.0 855.2 123.9 15.7 1.9
with Co-Z 3 164.2 164.2 153.2 23.5 846.8 129.7 11.0 1.4
Addition I 4 169.2 169.2 156.4 24.5 843.6 131.9 11.0 1.4
Joye’s 1 151.3 151.3 139.2 19.4 860.8 119.8 26.8 3.2
Double-Add 2 157.7 157.7 144.6 20.9 855.4 123.7 15.8 2.0
with Co-Z 3 163.9 163.9 152.7 23.3 847.3 129.4 12.7 1.6
Addition II 4 169.3 169.3 156.3 24.4 843.7 131.9 11.1 1.5
Montgomery 1 147.4 147.4 137.8 19.0 862.2 118.8 28.1 3.3
Ladder 2 155.1 155.1 144.5 20.9 855.5 123.6 15.5 1.9
(X,Z) 3 162.3 162.3 150.2 22.6 849.8 127.7 10.8 1.4
(Alg.40&45) 4 169.1 169.1 156.5 24.5 843.5 132.0 9.1 1.2
Montgomery 1 147.3 147.3 138.0 19.0 862.0 119.0 26.5 3.2
Ladder 2 155.3 155.3 144.6 20.9 855.4 123.7 13.9 1.7
(X,Z) 3 162.3 162.3 151.7 23.0 848.3 128.7 10.8 1.4
(Alg.41&45) 4 169.0 169.0 156.4 24.5 843.6 132.0 9.1 1.2
Montgomery 1 147.5 147.5 138.1 19.0 861.9 119.0 24.9 3.0
Ladder 2 155.6 155.6 145.2 20.9 854.8 124.1 13.9 1.7
(X,Z) 3 163.1 163.1 152.3 23.0 847.7 129.1 9.1 1.2
(Alg.42&46) 4 169.2 169.2 156.5 24.5 843.5 132.0 9.1 1.2
Montgomery 1 148.7 148.7 138.6 19.2 861.4 119.4 24.1 2.9
Ladder 2 156.0 156.0 145.6 21.2 854.4 124.4 13.0 1.6
(X,Y) 3 167.4 167.4 156.1 24.4 843.9 131.7 9.9 1.3
4 169.8 169.8 156.8 24.6 843.2 132.2 8.3 1.1
Signed 1 147.3 147.3 138.1 19.1 861.9 119.0 23.6 2.8
Digit 2 155.8 155.8 145.3 21.1 854.7 124.2 14.2 1.8
3 164.6 164.6 153.4 23.5 846.6 129.9 11.0 1.4
4 170.2 170.2 156.8 24.6 843.2 132.2 9.5 1.3
Twisted 1 148.8 148.8 139.0 19.3 861.0 119.7 33.8 4.1
Edwards 2 154.7 154.7 144.0 20.7 856.0 123.3 22.2 2.7
Unified 3 165.1 165.1 154.5 23.9 845.5 130.6 17.5 2.3
4 168.5 168.5 156.5 24.5 843.5 156.6 15.2 2.0
Extended 1 148.7 148.7 138.7 19.2 861.3 119.5 26.8 3.2
Twisted 2 154.5 154.5 144.5 20.9 855.5 123.6 15.1 1.9
Edwards 3 165.3 165.3 154.8 24.0 845.2 130.8 10.5 1.4
Unified 4 169.1 169.1 156.4 24.5 843.6 131.9 8.1 1.1
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Appendix - Hash Functions
B.1 Round Two Hash Function Implementation Results
The area results for the implemented hash functions on the Xilinx Virtex-5 are presented in Ta-
ble B.1. This table should be used as an addendum to Table 4.8 The -w designation defines the
results inclusive of the wrapper, while−nw gives the hash function as a stand alone entity.
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Table B.1: Full Hash Round Two Area & Frequency Results
Hash Area-w Max.Freq-w Area-nw Max.Freq-nw
Design (slices) (MHz) (slices) (MHz)
SHA-2-256 1019 125.06 656 125.125
SHA-2-512 1771 100.04 1213 110.09
BLAKE-32 1653 91.34 1118 118.06
BLAKE-64 2888 71.04 1718 90.90
BMW-256∗ 5584 14.30 4997 14.01
BMW-512∗ 9902 8.98 9810 10
Cubehash 1025 166.66 695 166.83
ECHO-256∗ 8798 161.21 7372 198.92
ECHO-512∗ 9130 166.66 8633 166.69
Fugue-256 2046 200 1689 200.04
Fugue-384 2622 200.08 2380 200.08
Fugue-512 3137 195.81 2596 200.16
Grøstl-256∗ 2579 78.06 2391 101.31
Grøstl-512∗ 4525 113.12 4845 123.39
Hamsi-256 1664 67.19 1518 72.41
Hamsi-512 7364 14.93 6229 16.51
JH 1763 144.11 1291 250.12
Keccak-224∗ 1971 195.73 1117 189
Keccak-256∗ 1971 195.73 1117 189
Keccak-384∗ 1971 195.73 1117 189
Keccak-512 1971 195.73 1117 189
Luffa-256∗ 2796 166.66 2221 166.66
Luffa-384∗ 4233 166.75 3740 166.75
Luffa-512∗ 4593 166.66 3700 166.75
Shabal 2512 143.47 1583 148.03
SHAvite3-256 3776 82.27 3125 109.17
SHAvite3-512 11443 63.66 9775 59.4
SIMD-256 24536 107.2 22704 107.2
SIMD-512 44673 107.2 43729 107.2
Skein-512 3027 83.57 1938 83.65
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B.2 Round Two Hash Function Results
Here follows the additional Round two hash function results in graphical form as presented in
Section 4.6. the results for a 32-bit bus with padding in hardware are presented first, followed
by the same 32-bit bus with the padding in software. Finally an ideal bus, i.e. equal to the input
size required is presented. The performance of the hash functions in each of the scenarios for
throughput and throughput-area, compared to SHA-2 is used as a metric to determine best design.
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Figure B.1: 256-bit Long 32-bit Bus Padding Hardware
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Figure B.2: 256-bit Short 32-bit Bus Padding Hardware
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Figure B.3: 512-bit Long 32-bit Bus Padding Hardware
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Figure B.4: 512-bit Short 32-bit Bus Padding Hardware
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Figure B.5: 256-bit Long 32-bit Bus Padding Software
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Figure B.6: 256-bit Short 32-bit Bus Padding Software
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Figure B.7: 512-bit Long 32-bit Bus Padding Software
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Figure B.8: 512-bit Short 32-bit Bus Padding Software
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Figure B.9: 256-bit Long Ideal-Bus Padding Software
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Figure B.10: 256-bit Short Ideal-Bus Padding Software
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Figure B.11: 512-bit Long Ideal Bus Padding Software
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Figure B.12: 512-bit Short Ideal Bus Padding Software
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B.3 Round Three FPGA Power and Timing Results
Here the full FPGA Power and Timing Results for the round three SHA-3 designs are presented
in Table B.2. This table is meant as an addendum to Table 4.10
Table B.2: Full FPGA Power and Timing Results for SHA-3 at 24MHz
Power Meter Oscilliscope
Algorithm Supplied Supplied Mean Resistor Resistor Mean FPGA Mean FPGA Iteration Energy
Current Power Voltage Drop Power Voltage Power Time
224/256 mA mW mV mW mV mW µS µJ
Blake S 169.3 169.4 166.1 27.6 833.9 138.5 4.34 0.601
Blake L 151.4 151.5 141.4 20.0 858.6 121.4 92.25 11.20
Grøstl S 263.6 263.8 284.4 80.9 715.6 203.5 2.80 0.570
Grøstl L 319.9 321.0 302.0 91.2 698.0 210.8 33.78 7.11
JH S 157.7 157.7 150.9 22.8 849.1 128.2 6.78 0.870
JH L 157.4 157.3 146.7 21.5 853.3 125.2 77.0 9.64
Keccak S 157.9 158.0 151.9 23.1 848.1 128.8 4.32 0.557
Keccak L 132.7 132.8 122.7 15.1 877.3 107.7 42.92 4.62
Skein S 226.1 226.2 239.3 57.3 760.7 182.0 3.93 0.715
Skein L 164.0 164.1 154.2 23.8 845.8 130.4 59.02 7.57
384/512
Blake S 204.5 204.6 203.1 41.3 796.9 161.9 65 1.057
Blake L 224.6 224.8 214.3 45.9 785.7 168.4 70.56 11.88
Grøstl S 440.3 440.0 525.3 27.59 474.7 229.3 4.50 1.008
Grøstl L 440.5 440.5 530.5 28.14 469.5 249.1 35.05 8.725
JH S 158.6 158.7 151.6 23.0 848.4 128.6 7.10 0.913
JH L 159.5 159.6 150.2 22.6 849.8 127.7 77.50 9.89
Keccak S 159.7 159.8 156.0 24.3 844.0 131.7 3.29 0.433
Keccak L 168.5 168.6 160.3 25.7 839.7 134.6 54.76 7.37
Skein S 239.6 239.7 253.8 64.4 746.2 189.4 4.20 0.806
Skein L 207.1 207.2 198.4 39.3 801.6 159.0 59.44 9.45
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